GAME THEORY AND THE LAWPDF电子书下载

PART Ⅰ GENERAL 3

1. Ian Ayres （1990）, ‘Playing Games with the Law’, Stanford Law Review, 42, May, 1291-317 3

2. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Eric Rasmusen, Jeffrey Evans Stake,Robert H. Heidt and Michael Alexeev （1997）, ‘Review Dialog: On Game Theory and the Law’, Law and Society Review, 31 （3）,613-29 30

3. Eric A. Posner （2000）, ‘Agency Models in Law and Economics’, in Eric A. Posner （ed.）, Chicago Lectures in Law and Economics,Chapter 12, New York: Foundation Press, 225-42 47

4. Franklin M. Fisher （1989）, ‘Games Economists Play: A Noncooperative View’, RAND Journal of Economics, 20 （1）,Spring, 113-24 65

PART Ⅱ BARGAINING AND PROCEDURE 79

5. Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld （1989）, ‘Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution’, Journal of Economic Literature, ⅩⅩⅦ （3）, September, 1067-97 79

6. I.P.L. P’ng （1983）, ‘Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial’, Bell Journal of Economics, 14 （2）, Autumn, 539-50 110

7. Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde （1986）, ‘Settlement,Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’, RAND Journal of Economics, 17 （4）, Winter, 557-66 122

8. Lucian Arye Bebchuk （1996）, ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue’, Journal of Legal Studies,ⅩⅩⅤ （1）, January, 1-25 132

9. Keith N. Hylton （1994）, ‘An Economic Theory of the Duty to Bargain’, Georgetown Law Journal, 83 （1）, November, 19-77 157

10. Ian Ayres （1991）, ‘Fair Driving: Gender and Race Discrimination in Retail Car Negotiations’, Harvard Law Review, 104 （4）, February,817-72 216

PART Ⅲ CONTRACTS 275

11. Ian Ayres and Robert Gertner （1992）, ‘Strategic Contractual Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules’, Yale Law Journal, 101 （4）, January, 729-73 275

12. Eric B. Rasmusen （2001）, ‘Explaining Incomplete Contracts as the Result of Contract-Reading Costs’, Advances in Economic Analysis and Policy, 1 （1）, http://www.bepress.com/bejeap/advances/voll/iss 1 /art2 320

13. J. Mark Ramseyer （1991）, ‘Legal Rules in Repeated Deals: Banking in the Shadow of Defection in Japan’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅩ（1）, January, 91-117 359

PART Ⅳ TORTS, CRIME, AND TAXES 389

14. John Prather Brown （1973）, ‘Toward an Economic Theory of Liability’, Journal of Legal Studies,Ⅱ（2）, June, 323-49 389

15. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che （1991）, ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’, RAND Journal of Economics, 22 （4）, Winter, 562-70 416

16. Michael J. Graetz, Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde（1986）, ‘The Tax Compliance Game: Toward an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization,2 （1）, Spring, 1-32 425

17. A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell （2000）, ‘The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’, Journal of Economic Literature, ⅩⅩⅩⅧ （1）, March, 45-76 457

PART Ⅴ COURTS 491

18. George L. Priest and Benjamin Klein （1984）, ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅢ （1）, January,1-55 491

19. Rafael Gely and Pablo T. Spiller （1990）, ‘A Rational Choice Theory of Supreme Court Statutory Decisions with Applications to the State Farm and Grove City Cases’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, 6 （2）, Fall, 263-300 546

20. Frank H. Easterbrook （1988）, ‘Stability and Reliability in Judicial Decisions’, Cornell Law Review, 73, January, 422-33 584

Name Index 597