INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAWPDF电子书下载

1. Trade and Economic Policy 1

A. A Few Numbers on Trade and Economic Growth 1

B. The Debate on Liberalized Trade 7

Walter Kirn， Help Wanted 7

C. Comparative Advantage 10

1. The Parable of the Lawyer-Secretary 11

2. The Parable of the Entrepreneur-Merchant 11

3. An Example of Comparative Advantage 13

D. Traditional Arguments Against Trade 19

1. Domestic Market Failures 19

Paul Krugman & Maurice Obstfeld， The Domestic Market Failure Argument Against Free Trade 19

2. Distribution 22

3. Infant Industry 23

4. Optimal Tariffs 25

5. Strategic Trade Policy 25

6. National Security 26

E. Non-Economic Reasons Supporting Liberalized Trade 28

2. The Trade Debate Among Economists 31

Jagdish Bhagwati， Technology， Not Globalisation， Is Driving Wages Down 31

A. Outsourcing 33

Alan S. Blinder， Free Trade’s Great， But Offshoring Rattles Me 34

Charles Schumer & Paul Craig Roberts， Second Thoughts on Free Trade 37

Arvind Panagariya， Defending the Case for Free Trade （On Outsourcing） 38

B. A Debate Rages 42

David Dollar & Aart Kraay， Spreading the Wealth 43

Dani Rodrik， How to Save Globalization from Its Cheerleaders 46

3. The Making and Impact of Trade Agreements in National Legal Systems 51

A. Trade Policymaking in the United States 52

Charan Devereaux， Robert Lawrence & Michael Watkins， Case Studies in U.S. Trade Negotiation， Vol. 1： Making the Rules 53

United States Trade Representative， Report to the Congress on the Extension of Trade Promotion Authority 55

Pamphlet Against Fast Track， Public Citizen’s Global Trade Watch 56

B. Trade Policymaking in the European Union 58

Stephen Woolcock， Trade Policy： From Uruguay to Doha and Beyond 59

Sophie Meunier， Trade Policy and Political Legitimacy in the European Union 63

Sophie Meunier， What Single Voice？ European Institutions and EU-U.S. Trade Negotiations 65

C. The Status of WTO Agreements in U.S. and EC Law 67

John James Barcelo， The Status of WTO Rules in U.S. Law 67

Marco Bronckers， The Effect of the WTO in European Court Litigation 70

Piet Eeckhout， External Relations of the European Union， Legal and Constitutional Foundations 73

4. The WTO： History and Structure 79

A. What Does the WTO Do？ 80

World Trade Organization， Understanding the WTO， Chapter 1： Basics 80

B. A Very Brief History of the GATT/WTO System 82

William Davey， The World Trade Organization： A Brief Introduction 82

C. Why Does the WTO Exist？ 85

Douglas Irwin， Petros Mavroidis & Alan Sykes， The Genesis of the GATT 85

D. The Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 88

WTO Agreement， Article Ⅲ， Functions of the WTO 88

World Trade Organization， Understanding the WTO， Chapter 7： The Organization 89

E. Secretariat and Staff 93

F. Membership 94

G. Navigating the WTO Agreements 95

Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization 95

World Trade Organization， Understanding the WTO， Chapter 2： The Agreements 97

H. What Does the WTO Do， and What Does It Not Do？ 99

World Trade Organization， Ten Common Misunderstandings About the WTO 100

I. Is the WTO a Legitimate and Accountable Institution？ 107

Susan George， Beyond the WTO： The Problem Isn’t Beef， Bananas， Cultural Diversity， or the Patenting of Life； The Problem Is the WTO 107

Ruth Grant & Robert Keohane， Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics 109

5. WTO Dispute Settlement 115

A. Understanding the WTO Dispute Settlement System 116

William Davey， The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 116

B. Flowchart of the DSU Process and Timelines 132

C. Problem： Antigua Gambling 134

6. Special Topics in WTO Dispute Settlement 137

A. Retaliation and the Level of Trade Suspension 137

EC—Hormone Beef 138

B. Unilateral vs. Multilateral Enforcement of GATT/WTO Agreements 146

C. Confidential Proceedings vs. Transparency and Open Hearings 151

1. Private Representation Before the WTO 152

2. Amicus Curiae Briefs 153

3. Public Hearings 159

D. Problem： Patria and Protectio 164

7. Tariffs 165

A. Background to Tariff Negotiations and Commitments 166

1. Tariffs， Tariff Negotiations， and Tariff Bindings 166

2. Special Cases： Agriculture and Information Technology Products 170

3. Tariff Renegotiations 171

Anwarul Hoda， Tariff Negotiations and Renegotiations Under the GATT and the WTO， Procedures and Practices 171

B. The Jurisprudence on Import Tariffs 176

1. Argentina—Textiles 176

Argentina—Textiles （Appellate Body Report） 178

Argentina—Textiles （Panel Report） 180

2. EC—Customs Classification of Chicken Cuts 182

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties， Article 31： General Rules of Interpretation 184

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties， Article 32： Supplementary Means of Interpretation 184

EC—Customs Classifiication of Chicken Cuts 185

C. The International Trade Negotiation Game 195

D. Problem： Tramontanan Chocolate Duties 197

8. Quantitative Restrictions 199

A. What Is a Non-Tariff Barrier？ 201

B. Background to the General Ban on Quantitative Restrictions 203

Arthur Dunkel & Frieder Roessler， The Ranking of Trade Policy Instruments Under the GATT Legal System 204

C. Japan—Semi-Conductors 209

Japan —Semi-Conductors 210

D. Other Developments 215

1. The Line Between Government and Private Conduct 215

Argentina—Bovine Hides 216

2. What Are “Restrictions on Importation”？ 218

India—Autos 219

E. Problem： Patrian Shoes 222

9. National Treatment —Internal Taxation 225

A. National Treatment 226

Petros C. Mavroidis， The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade： A Commentary 226

B. The Leading Case： Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 227

Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages （Panel Report） 228

Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages （Appellate Body Report） 230

C. Other Developments 241

1. How Does One Prove That Products Are “Directly Competitive or Substitutable”？ 242

2. When Is a Tax Applied “So as to Afford Protection to Domestic Production”？ 243

Chile—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages 243

3. The Line Between a Tax and a Tariff and When Is a Tax “Applied， Directly or Indirectly， to&Products” and Subject to “Border Tax Adjustment” and National Treatment？ 247

Mexico—Soft Drinks 251

D. Problems： Luxury Taxes and Carbon Taxes 253

1. Patria’s “Luxury Tax” 253

2. Eutopia’s “Carbon Tax” 254

10. National Treatment —Internal Regulations 255

A. What Is Regulatory Protectionism？ 256

1. The Dilemma of Regulating Regulations 256

2. Why Regulatory Protection Is the Worst Kind of Protection 257

B. The Leading Case： EC—Asbestos 259

EC—Asbestos 260

C. Other Developments 275

1. “No Less Favorable” 275

Joost Pauwelyn， The Unbearable Lightness of Likeness 278

2. When Does a Regulation “Affect” Products？ 280

Tuna—Dolphin I 281

D. Problems： Communian Beef and Flandrian Seals 284

1. Communia’s Hormone Beef Ban 284

2. Flandria’s Ban on Seal and Seal Products 285

11. Most-Favored-Nation Treatment 287

A. The MFN Obligation 288

William Davey & Joost Pauwelyn， MFN-Unconditionality： A Legal Analysis of the Concept in View of Its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence 289

Robert Hudec， “Like Product”： The Differences in Meaning in GATT Articles I and Ⅲ 291

B. The Leading Case： EC—Bananas 297

EC—Bananas 298

C. Other Developments 302

1. Does GATT Article I：1 Cover Both De Jure and De Facto Discrimination？ 302

Canada—Autos 303

2. Any Advantage Must Be Accorded “Immediately and Unconditionally” to the Like Product of All Other WTO Members 306

Belgian Family Allowances 307

Steve Charnovitz， The Law of Environmental “PPMs” in the WTO： Debunking the Myth of Illegality 308

3. Non-Discrimination for Government Procurement and State Trading Enterprises 311

D. Problems： Moralian Soccer Balls and Eutopia and Flandria Revisited 313

1. Moralia—Soccer Balls 313

2. Eutopia’s Carbon Tax and Flandria—Seal Products（Revisited） 314

12. Preferential Trade Agreements 315

A. The Basics of Preferential Trading Arrangements 315

B. The Leading Case： Turkey—Textiles 321

Turkey—Textiles 321

C. The Special Case of Regionalism Among Developing Countries 328

D. The Pros and Cons 329

Joel Trachtman， International Trade： Regionalism 329

UNCTAD， Trade and Development Report， 2007 333

Martin Jacques， The Death of Doha Signals the Demise of Globalisation 336

E. Problem： The East-West Compact 338

13. General Exceptions： GATT Article XX 339

A. Requirements of Article XX： A Two-Step Analysis 340

B. The Meaning of “Necessary” 341

1. Brazil—Tyres 341

Brazil —Tyres 342

2. EC—Asbestos 346

EC—Asbestos 346

C. The Policy Concern Behind Article XX（A）： “Public Morals” 352

United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply o f Gambling and Betting Services 354

D. Article XX（B）： “Protect Human， Animal or Plant Life or Health” 357

E. Article XX（D）： “Secure Compliance with Laws or Regulations&” 360

1. Korea—Beef 360

2. Canada—Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals 361

F. Article XX（G）： “Relating to the Conservation of Exhaustible Natural Resources” 364

United States—Shrimp 364

G. Problem： Tabac Tobacco 368

14. General Exceptions： The Chapeau of GATT Article XX 371

A. Introduction to the Chapeau 371

United States—Gasoline 372

B. The Leading Case： United States—Shrimp 375

1. US—Shrimp 375

United States—Shrimp 376

2. The Compliance Decision： United States—Shrimp， 21.5 386

United States—Shrimp， 21.5 386

C. Other Developments 393

1. “Between Countries Where the Same Conditions Prevail” 393

2. “Disguised Restriction on Trade” 394

EC—Asbestos 394

D. The Role of Non-WTO Law in WTO Dispute Settlement 396

Joel Trachtman， The Jurisdiction of the WTO 396

Joost Pauwelyn， How to Win a WTO Dispute Based on Non-WTO Law？ 397

E. Problem： Novador and Sashimia 403

15. Subsidies and Countervailing Duties 405

A. Defining and Regulating Subsidies 406

B. Requirements for a Subsidy 408

1. Foregone “Government Revenue That Is Otherwise Due” 409

United States—Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations” 409

2. Has a Benefit Been Conferred？ 412

3. Specificity 414

C. Prohibited Subsidies 415

Canada —Aircraft， 21.5 416

D. Actionable Subsidies 421

1. Injury to Domestic Producers 421

2. Nullification or Impairment 422

3. Serious Prejudice 422

E. The Impact of a DSU Decision 424

1. Prohibited Subsidies 424

2. Actionable Subsidies 425

F. Countervailing Duties 426

1. WTO Rules Governing CVDs 426

2. CVD Investigations in the United States 427

3. CVD Investigations in the EC 428

G. Does the SCM Agreement Help or Hurt？ 429

H. Agricultural Subsidies 430

I. Problem： Mobilian Auto Loans 433

16. Dumping and Anti-Dumping 433

A. What Is Dumping？ 433

1. In the Ordinary Course of Trade 435

US—Hot-Rolled Steel 435

2. “Comparable Price” 437

3. Other Methods of Calculating “Normal Value” 438

B. Calculating the Dumping Margin—“Zeroing” 440

EC—Bed Linens 440

C. Determination of Injury 444

D. Causation 445

E. Anti-Dumping as the Exclusive Remedy for Dumping（“Specific Action Against Dumping”） 446

US—Offset Act （Byrd Amendment） 447

F. Is Anti-Dumping Good or Bad？ 450

Terence P. Stewart， Administration of the Antidumping Law： A Different Perspective 451

Michael J. Trebilcock & Thomas M. Boddez， The Case for Liberalizing North American Trade Remedy Laws 454

G. Trade Remedies in the European Union 457

Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission， Anti-Dumping： Protection Against Dumped Imports 457

Directorate General for Trade of the European Commission， Europe’s Trade Defence Instruments （Fact Sheet） 459

H. Trade Remedies in the United States 460

United States International Trade Commission， Trade Remedy Investigations： Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Investigations 460

Jennifer A. Hillman， Testimony Before the Senate Finance Committee 460

I. Problem： Welcome to the Firm 464

17. Safeguards 467

A. Agreement on Safeguards and GATT ⅩⅨ 468

GATT Article ⅩⅨ： Emergency Action on Imports of Particular Products 468

B. Argentina—Footwear 471

Argentina —Footwear 471

C. Causal Influences Other Than Increased Imports 475

United States—Lamb 475

D. “Domestic Industry” 478

United States—Lamb 478

E. Form， Extent， and Duration of the Safeguard 481

1. Form 481

2. Extent 481

3. Duration 483

4. Compensation 483

F. The Justification for a Safeguard Exception 484

Alan O. Sykes， The Safeguards Mess： A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence 485

G. A Comparison Among WTO Trade Remedies 488

H. Problem： Welcome （Back） to the Firm 488

18. Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures 489

A. The History and Scope of the SPS Agreement 489

B. The Dilemma： Health and Safety vs. Market Access 492

C. EC—Hormones 493

1. The Standard of Review 494

EC—Hormones 494

US—Continued Suspension in EC—Hormones 495

2. Harmonization： Article 3 497

EC—Hormones 497

3. Based on a Risk Assessment： Article 5 499

EC—Hormones 499

4. The “Rational Relationship” Requirement 502

EC—Hormones 502

EC—Hormones 504

D. The Precautionary Principle and the SPS Agreement：Article 5.7 507

E. Balancing Trade and Safety 513

Andrew Guzman， Food Fears： Health and Safety at the WTO 513

F. The Role of Scientific Experts 517

Joost Pauwelyn， The WTO Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary （SPS） Measures as Applied in the Three First SPS Disputes： EC—Hormones，Australia—Salmon， and Japan —Varietal 517

G. Problem： Salmon Plague 519

19. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 523

A. What Is a Technical Barrier？ 523

B. EC—Sardines 524

EC—Sardines 524

C. The Substantive Requirements of the TBT Agreement 531

1. Non-Discrimination 532

2. Least-Restrictive Means 532

3. International Standards 534

EC—Sardines 534

D. TBT Requirements and a Complex International Problem：Climate Change 544

Andrew Green， Climate Change， Regulatory Policy and the WTO： How Constraining Are Trade Rules？ 544

E. Problem： Dolphin-Safe Tuna 549

20. Trade in Services 553

A. Background to the Services Industry and Trade in Services 553

Bernard Hoekman & Carlos A. Primo Braga， Protection and Trade in Services： A Survey 553

B. A Brief Description of the GATS 558

Aaditya Mattoo， National Treatment in the GATS：Corner-Stone or Pandora’s Box？ 558

Bernard Hoekman & Carlos A. Primo Braga，Protection and Trade in Services： A Survey 562

GATS and Democracy： A Joint Publication of the Seattle to Brussels Network， Introduction 563

World Trade Organization， How ［GATS］ Schedules Are Structured 566

C. The Leading Case： U.S.—Gambling 568

U.S. —Gambling 569

Joost Pauwelyn， Rien Ne Va Plus？ Distinguishing Domestic Regulation from Market Access in GATT and GATS？ 582

D. Problem： Complexian Distribution Services 585

21. Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 589

A. A Primer on International IP 590

UNCTAD—ICTSD， Project on IPRS and Sustainable Development， Intellectual Property Rights：Implications for Development 590

B. A Brief Description of the TRIPS Agreement 597

Advocates General to the European Court of Justice， Re： The Uruguay Round Treaties 597

C. Case Study： The TRIPS Agreement and Access to Essential Medicines 604

1. The Problem of Access to Medicine 605

Commission on Intellectual Property Rights， U.K. Secretary of State for International Development， Integrating Intellectual Property Rights & Development Policy： Health 605

Alan O. Sykes， TRIPS， Pharmaceuticals， Developing Countries and the Doha “Solution” 609

2. Relevant Text of the TRIPS Agreement 614

3. Commentary on the TRIPS Amendment 615

Medecins sans Frontieres， Neither Expeditious， Nor a Solution： The WTO August 30th Decision Is Unworkable 615

4. Other Developments 617

D. Protection of Traditional Knowledge and the TRIPS Agreement 619

E. Problem： Generic Transit Through Richland 621

22. Development 623

A. Background： The WTO and Developing Countries 624

B. The Generalized System of Preferences and the Enabling Clause 631

The Enabling Clause （Differential and More Favourable Treatment， Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries） 631

C. The Leading Case： EC— Tariff Preferences 633

EC—Tariff Preferences 633

D. Does GSP Promote Development？ 644

Gene M. Grossman & Alan O. Sykes， A Preference for Development： The Law and Economics of GSP 644

Andrew Charlton， A Proposal for Special Treatment in Market Access for Developing Countries in the Doha Round 646

E. Other S&D Provisions in the GATT 647

1. Article ⅩⅧ 647

2. Part Ⅳ 648

F. Problem： Justice in Trade 650

Frank Garcia， Global Justice and the Bretton Woods Institutions 651

Table of Cases 655

Index 657