货币政策与理论 英文版PDF电子书下载

PART 1 FUNDAMENTALS OF MONETARY THEORY 1

1 CURRENCY IN AN ISLAND ECONOMY 2

1.1 Money and Barter 2

1.2 Method of Analysis 3

1.3 An Island Economy 5

1.4 Autarky 7

1.5 Barter under Bilateral Exchange with No Intermediate Trades 8

1.6 Barter under Bilateral Exchange with Intermediate Trades 12

1.7 Exchange with Commodity Money 13

1.8 Exchange with Representative Commodity Money 17

1.9 Exchange with Fiat Money 19

1.10 Summary 20

2 THE MONIES OF A MODERN ECONOMY 25

2.1 The Monetary Aggregates 26

2.2 Ml 26

2.3 M2 31

2.4 M3 and L 37

2.5 Units of Money 39

2.6 Credit Card Transactions and Money 40

2.7 Summary 40

3 THE DEMAND FOR MONEY 45

3.1 A Household's Transactions Demand for Money 46

3.2 A Household's Precautionary Demand for Money 49

3.3 The Demand for Money by Firms 49

3.4 An Aggregate Money Demand Function 50

3.5 Estimating the Demand fOr Money 52

3.6 The Demand fOr Real Money Balances 54

3.7 Velocity 54

3.8 Secular Changes in the Demand for M1 56

3.9 The Velocity of M2 59

3.10 Other Velocity Measures 62

3.11 Summary 65

4 STOCK AND BOND VALUUAION AND THE TERM STRUCTURE OF INTEREST RATES 70

4.1 Household Preferences and the Required Return to Savings 71

4.2 The Fisher Equation 74

4.3 Bond Valuation 75

4.4 Stock Valuation 77

4.5 Bond Stock and Price Fluctuation 79

4.6 The Term Structure of Interest Rates: The Pure Expectations Hypothesis 80

4.7 The Yield Curve 82

4.8 The Liquidity Premium 83

4.9 Interpreting the Slope of the Yield Curve 85

4.10 Summary 86

PART II FUNDAMENTALS OF MONETARY AND FINANClAL INSTITUTIONS 89

5 FiNANCIAL INTERMEDiATION 90

5.1 Financial Intermediation in an Island Economy 91

5.2 FinancialIntermediation and the Matching of Intertemporal Preferences 91

5.3 Risk Assessment, Agency Costs, and Uncertain Investment Projects 95

5.4 Financial Intermediation and Risk-Reduction through Diversification 98

5.5 Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring 99

5.6 Summary 101

6 FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 105

6.1 Financial Intermediation in Stocks and Bonds 106

6.2 The Financial Intermediation of Depository Institutions 108

6.3 Mutual versus Stock-Based Ownership of Depository Institutions 111

6.4 Depository Institutions in the United States 112

6.5 A Closer Look at Commercial Banking 112

7 THE MONEY SUPPLY PROCESS 113

6.6 Loan Default Risk, Deposit Insurance, and Capital Requirements 118

6.7 Summary 120

7.1 Reserve Aggregates 124

7.2 The Federal Reserve's Balance Sheet 127

7.3 Open Market Operations 129

7.4 The Relationship betWeen Open Market Operations and Total Bank Reserves 131

7.5 Multiple Deposit Creation: A Simple Example 133

7.6 Reserve Aggregate Multipliers 136

7.7 Money Multipliers 137

7.8 The Sources of Imperfect Monetary Control 139

7.9 Endogenous Money Supply 140

7.10 Summary 140

8 INSTITUTIONS OF MONETARY CONTROL: HISTORICAL ROLE OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE IN THE UNITED STATES 144

8.1 The Problem of an Inelastic Money Supply 145

8.2 Endogenous Money Supply 147

8.3 Unintended Consequences of Open Market Operations, 1917-1921 149

8.4 The Centralization of Monetary Policy Decision Making, 1921-1935 151

8.5 The Gold Purchase Program and Treasury Department Dominance, 1933--1937 155

8.6 Unintended Consequences of Reserve Requirement Changes,1937-1938 157

8.7 World War II and the U.S. Government Bond Price Support Program, 1939-1945 158

8.8 The Treasury--Federal Reserve Accord: Truce and Settlement, 1945-1952 159

8.9 The Collapse of the Bretton Woods Agreements, 1952--1973 160

8.10 Post-Bretton Woods and the Humphrey-Hawkins Full-Employment Act 162

8.11 Summary 164

PART III EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS 169

9 "FULL ENPLOYNENT" AND MONETARY POLICY NEUTRALITY 170

9.1 Modeling the Economy as a Collection of Aggregate Markets 171

9.2 The Principal Economic Agents and Their Roles in Determining Equilibrium 172

9.3 Household Preferences 174

9.4 The Consumption/Savings Decision 177

9.5 The Portfolio Allocation Decision 178

9.6 The Labor/Leisure Decision 180

9.7 Technology of the Goods-Producing Firms 182

9.8 The Production and Labor Demand Decision 184

9.9 The Investment and Bond Supply Decision 185

9.10 The Government's Money Supply Decision 188

9.11 General Equilibrium 189

9.12 "Full Employment" 192

9.13 Monetary Policy Neutrality 193

9. 14 Summary 196

10 ECONOMIC FLUCTUATIONS AND MONETARY ACCOMMODATION 199

10.1 Total Factor Productivity Shocks 201

10.2 The Response of Firms to a Positive Productivity Shock 203

10.3 The Response of Households to a Positive Productivity Shock 204

10.4 The Determination of Nominal Wages 205

10.5 Equilibrium Analysis of a Positive Productivity Shock without Monetary Accommodation 206

10.6 Equilibrium Analysis of a Positive Productivity Shock with Monetary Accommodation 207

10.7 Preference Shocks 210

10.8 Intratemporal Preference Shocks 211

10.9 Intertemporal Preference Shocks 213

10.10 Summary 216

11 STABILIZATION POLICY WHEN FIRMS SET PRICES IN ADVANCE 219

11.1 Price Setting by Firms 220

11.2 Liquidity-Constrained HousehOlds 222

11.3 Equilibrium Response without Monetary Accommodation in the Absence of Preference Shocks 224

11.4 Equilibrium Response with Monetary Accommodation in the Absence of Preference Shocks 227

11.5 Monetary Policy and the Signal Extraction Problem 229

11.6 Equilibrium Response with Monetary Accommodation in the Presence of an Intratemporal Preference Shock 230

11.7 Equilibrium Response with Monetary Accommodation in the Presence of an Intertemporal Preference Shock 236

11.8 Summary 239

12 STABILIZATION POLICY IN THE PRESENCE OF LONGTERM NOMINAL WAGE CONTRACTS 244

12.1 A Keynesian Labor Market 246

12.2 Response of the Economy to a Productivity Shock When Nominal Wages Are Set in Advance and When There Is No Attempt at Monetary Accommodation 248

12.3 Response of the Economy to a Positive Shock When Nominal Wages Are Set in Advance and There Is an Attempt at Monetary Accommodation 251

12.4 Is the Full-Employment Objective of Stabilization Policy Inappropriate When Preference Shocks Are Long-lived? 256

12.5 Response of the Economy to a Long-Lived Intratemporal Preference Shock When Nominal Wages Are Set in Advance 257

12.6 Response of the Economy to a Long-Lived Intertemporal Preference Shock When Nominal Wages Are Set in Advance 265

12.7 Summary 270

PART IV DESCRIPTlVE DYN MICS AND INFLATION 275

13 A CRITIQUE OF STABILIZATION POLICY 276

13.1 A Monetarist Critique of Stabilization Policy 277

13.2 Time Lags and Macroeconomic Dynamics 279

13.3 Recognition Lag 280

13.4 Policy Design and Implementation Lags 281

13.5 The Dynamic Response of the Economy to a Change in Monetary Policy 282

13.6 Sluggish Prices 283

13.7 Long and Variable Lags 285

13.8 Stabilization Policy in Practice 289

13.9 Summary 291

14 MONETARY RULES 294

14.1 Long-Run PoliCy Objectives 294

14.2 Policy Design: The Constant Growth Rate (CGR) Rule 297

14.3 Long-Run Structural Changes and the CGR Rule 300

14.4 Financial Instability and the CGR Rule 301

14.5 Long-Run Consequences of an Active Stabilization Policy 303

14.6 Summary 306

15 INFWION AND SEIGNIORAGE: WHAT IS OPTIMAL? 310

15.1 Inflation Taxes in the Island Economy 310

15.2 Price Level Stability 313

15.3 Labor Market Rigidities and Moderate Inflation 315

15.4 Seigniorage 316

15.5 Summary 319

PART V THE MECHANICS OF POLICY AND POLICY-MAKING 323

16 OPTIMAL TARGETING AND THE RESPONSE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS 324

16.1 Stabilization Policy and the Choice of an Intermediate Target 325

16.2 Policy Instruments and Policy Tools 331

16.3 The Federal Funds Market 332

16.4 Discount Rate Po1icy 335

16.5 Monetary Target Cones and "Base Drift" 337

16.6 Monetary Aggregate Targeting and the Response of the Financial Markets to the Weekly Money Supply Announcements 339

16.7 Less than Complete Monetary Aggregate Targeting and the Response of the Financial Markets to Other Macroeconomic News that Could Alter Monetary Policy 341

16.8 The Transition Back to Federal Funds Rate Targeting 343

16.9 Summary 344

17 DESK OPERATIONS AND THE KEPO MARKET FOR TREASURIES 348

17.1 The Repurchase Agreement 349

17.2 The Federal Reserve's Book Entry System for Treasury Securities 350

17.3 Dealer Financing in the RP Market and DVP Transfers on the Securities Wire 352

17.4 RPs with the Federal Reserve and Their Connection with the Federal Funds Market 354

17.5 Arbitrage of the RP Rate and the Federal Funds Rate 355

17.6 The Mix of Outright Purchases, RPs, and MSPs 356

17.7 Summary 359

18 TIME INCONSISTENCY AND THE CREDIBILITY OF MONETARY POLlCY 362

18.1 Time Inconsistency in Monetary Policy 364

18.2 Rules versus Discretion 367

18.3 Reputation-Building and Discretionary Policy 371

18.4 Is There an Optimal Contract for the Policy Maker? 373

18.5 Summary 374