1.Introduction to Experimental Economics&Alvin E.Roth 3
Ⅰ.A Brief History of Experimental Economics 4
A.Early Experiments：1930-1960 5
B.The 1960s to the Present 19
Ⅱ.The Uses of Experimentation 21
Ⅲ.Some Series of Experiments 23
A.Prisoners’ Dilemmas and Public Goods 26
B.Coordination 35
C.Bargaining Behavior 40
D.Market Organization and Competitive Equilibrium 49
E.Auction Markets and Disequilibrium Behavior 60
F.Individual Choice Behavior 67
Notes 86
Bibliography 98
2.Public Goods：A Survey of Experimental Research&John O.Ledyard 111
Ⅰ.Introduction 111
A.A Simple Public Goods Experiment 112
B.The Art of Experiment：Sensitivity and Control 113
C.The Language of Experiment：Mechanisms and Environments 115
D.The Range of Public Goods Environments 118
E.What Is and Is Not to Be Surveyed 119
Ⅱ.Are People Selfish or Cooperative？ 121
A.Bohm：Estimating Demand 122
B.Dawes et al：Social Dilemmas 126
C.Marwell et al.：The Free-Rider Problem 130
D.Economists Begin to React 134
E.Isaac et al.：Systematic Study by Economists 137
Ⅲ.What Improves Cooperation？ 141
A.Thresholds and Provision Points 144
B.Experience，Repetition，and Learning 146
C.Strong Effects 149
D.Weak Effects 158
E.Unknown Effects 167
Ⅳ.Final Thoughts 169
Appendix 174
Notes 175
Bibliography 181
3.Coordination Problems&Jack Ochs 195
Introduction 195
Ⅰ.Experiments Using Overlapping Generations Environments 197
A.Adaptive Learning Processes and Rational Expectations Equilibria 197
B.The Path of Prices When the Rate of Growth of the Money Stock Is Zero 199
C.Price Inflation with a Growing Money Stock 201
D.Sunspots 205
Ⅱ.Coordination Games with Pareto Ranked Equilibria 209
A.Payoff Dominance，Security and Historical Precedent 209
B.The Relevance of Dominated Strategies 218
C.Influencing Equilibrium Selection 222
Ⅲ.Experiments in Decentralized Matching Environments：Games with Multiple Optimal Equilibria 233
Ⅳ.Concluding Remarks 244
Notes 246
Bibliography 249
4.Bargaining Experiments&Alvin E.Roth 253
Ⅰ.Agreements 254
A.Unstructured Bargaining Experiments 255
B.Sequential Bargaining Experiments 256
Ⅱ.Disagreements and Delays 292
A.The Frequency of Disagreements and Delays 292
B.Anonymous versus Face-to-Face Bargaining 294
C.Tests of Hypotheses about the Causes of Disagreements and Costly Delays 304
D.Deadlines 323
Ⅲ.Concluding Remarks 327
Notes 331
Bibliography 342
5.Industrial Organization：A Survey of Laboratory Research&Charles A.Holt 349
Ⅰ.Overview 349
Ⅱ.Beginnings 350
Ⅲ.The Relevance of Experiments to the Study of IO 352
A.Experiments That Evaluate Behavioral Assumptions 352
B.Tests for Sensitivity to Violations of Structural Assumptions 354
C.Searching for Empirical Regularities 354
Ⅳ.Design and Procedural Issues 355
A.Instructions 355
B.Design Considerations 358
Ⅴ.Trading Institutions 360
A.Posted Prices 361
B.Uniform Prices 365
C.One-Sided Sequential Auctions 367
D.Double Auctions 368
E.Decentralized Negotiations 373
F.Discounting 373
G.Other Institutions 374
H.Disadvantages of the Cournot Quantity-Choice Institution 375
Ⅵ.Monopoly Regulation and Potential Entry 377
A.Monopoly 377
B.Decentralized Regulatory Proposals 382
C.Potential Competition as a Regulator：Market Contestability 383
D.Predatory Pricing and Antitrust Remedies 387
Ⅶ.Market Structure and Market Power 391
A.Definitions of Market Power 392
B.Market Power in Double Auctions 393
C.Market Power in Posted-Offer Auctions 396
Ⅷ.Plus Factors That Facilitate Collusion 398
A.Repetition with Different Cohorts：Experience 401
B.Multiperiod Repetition with the Same Cohort 403
C.Pure-Numbers Effects and the Ability to Punish 406
D.Communication 409
E.Contractual Provisions 411
Ⅸ.Product Differentiation and Multiple Markets 416
A.Product Quality，Asymmetric Information，and Market Failures 417
B.Spatial Competition 419
C.Veerically Related Markets 420
Ⅹ.Conclusion 421
Notes 425
Bibliography 435
6.Experimental Asset Markets：A Survey&Shyam Sunder 445
Ⅰ.Informational Efficiency of Markets 446
A.Field Data from Financial Markets 447
B.Designing Experimental Asset Markets 447
C.Dissemination of Information 450
D.Aggregation of Information 456
E.Market for Information 461
Ⅱ.Futures and State-Contingent Claims 464
Ⅲ.Bubbles and False Equilibria 467
Ⅳ.Learning and Dynamics 475
A.Adjustment Path 475
B.Variables That Transmit Information 475
C.Learning Sequences 477
D.Aggregate Uncertainty 479
E.Role of Arbitrage 479
F.Generation of Bids and Asks 480
Ⅴ.Econometric Comparisons of Field and Laboratory Data 481
A.Variance Bound Tests 481
B.Arbitrage Relationships 482
Ⅵ.Investment and Public Policy 484
A.Trading Suspensions and Price Change Limits 484
B.Double Auction versus Call Market 485
C.Specialist Privileges and Book Display 486
D.Control of Speculative Bubbles 486
E.Bid-Ask Spread 490
F.Off-Floor and Block Trading 490
Ⅶ.Laboratory Modeling of Asset Markets 491
Ⅷ.Concluding Remarks 493
Notes 494
Bibliography 495
7.Auctions：A Survey of Experimental Research&John H.Kagel 501
Introduction 501
Ⅰ.The Symmetric Independent Private-Values Model 503
A.Experimental Procedures 504
B.Tests of the Revenue-Equivalence Theorem 505
C.Effects of Varying and Uncertain Numbers of Bidders 514
D.Auctions with Affiliated Private Values 517
E.Effects of Price Information in Private Value Auctions 520
F.Learning，Adjustment Processes，and Cash Balance Effects in First-Price Private Value Auctions 521
G.Risk Aversion，CRRA，the Flat Maximum Critique，and the Binary Lottery Procedure for Controlling Risk Preferences 523
Ⅱ.Common Value Auctions 536
A.The Winner’s Curse in Sealed Bid Common Value Auctions 537
B.More Winner’s Curse：English Auctions and First-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Information 547
C.The Winner’s Curse in Other Market Settings 550
D.Learning and Adjustment Processes in Markets with a Winner’s Curse 557
Ⅲ.Additional Topics 560
A.Collusion 560
B.Comparing Results from Field Studies with Experiments 564
C.Two-Sided Auctions 569
D.Other Auction Studies 572
Ⅳ.Conclusions 572
Notes 573
Bibliography 580
8.Individual Decision Making&Colin Camerer 587
Ⅰ.Introduction 587
A.Limited Rationality and Decision Research 588
B.Two Controversies：Methods and Implications 588
C.A Map and Guidebook 589
Ⅱ.Judgment 590
A.Calibration 590
B.Perception and Memory Biases 595
C.Bayesian Updating and Representativeness 596
D.Confirmation Bias and Obstacles to Learning 608
E.Expectations Formation 609
F.Iterated Expectations and the Curse of Knowledge 612
G.The Illusion of Control 615
H.Judgment：Summary and New Directions 616
Ⅲ.Choice under Risk and Uncertainty 617
A.Expected Utility 617
B.Some History and Early Evidence 619
C.Mounting Evidence of EU Violation （1965-1986） 622
D.Generalizations of Expected Utility and Recent Tests 626
E.Subjective Expected Utility 644
F.Choice over Time 649
G.Process Theories and Tests 651
H.Description Invariance 652
I.Procedure Invariance 657
J.Endowment Effects and Buying-Selling Price Gaps 665
K.Search 670
L.Choice：Summary and New Directions 673
Ⅳ. Conclusions and Research Directions 674
Notes 676
Bibliography 683
Author Index 705
Subject Index 715