第1章 绪论 1
1.1 问题的提出 1
1.2 本书的研究内容及创新点 2
1.3 本书的理论依据和研究方法 5
1.4 需要说明的几个基本概念 10
第2章 当代企业理论 15
2.1 将企业视作基本分析单位的企业理论 15
2.2 交易成本的理论 17
2.3 信息经济学的企业理论 18
2.4 委托—代理理论的标准模型 25
3.1 企业经营者人性假设 30
第3章 企业经营者行为分析及其激励约束机制 30
3.2 经营者行为模式分析 34
3.3 经营者行为的激励与约束机制 37
3.4 小结 43
第4章 经营者市场竞争与经营者选择机制 44
4.1 经营者市场的目标模式 44
4.2 经营者能力的信号显示 48
4.3 经营者的选择机制案例分析 51
4.4 优秀经营者(大企业家)应具备的素质 53
4.5 小结 54
第5章 企业经营者激励机制设计与代理成本分析 55
5.1 一般契约设计与代理成本 55
5.2 考虑其他变量时的最优契约与代理成本 60
5.3 长期激励机制设计 64
5.4 案例分析 65
5.5 小结 68
第6章 相对业绩比较与动态激励机制设计 70
6.1 相对业绩比较信息和隐性激励 70
6.2 隐性与显性激励模型 77
6.3 案例分析 83
6.4 小结 84
第7章 生产、采购与销售管理中的利益分配和标准调整 86
7.1 模型 86
7.2 最优报酬特征 90
7.3 比较静态分析 102
7.4 小结 114
第8章 对企业经营者行为的监督机制 116
8.1 固定工资下的监督问题 117
8.2 激励工资下的监督问题 120
8.3 小结 124
第9章 制约企业经营者的管理腐败行为 125
9.1 对管理腐败问题的认识 125
9.2 管理腐败问题的根源 127
9.3 管理腐败行为的监控策略分析 130
9.4 制约防范管理腐败行为的建议 136
9.5 小结 139
总结与展望 140
Chapter 1 Preface 142
1.1 Putting Forward Questions 142
1.2 Studying Content and Innovation Point of This Book 144
1.3 Theory Foundation and Study Methods of This Book 149
1.4 Some Basic Concepts Needed to Be Explained 155
Chapter 2 The Theory of Contemporary Firm 161
2.1 The Firm Theory Regarding the Firm as the Elemental analyzing unit 161
2.2 Transaction Cost Theory 164
2.3 Information Economics Firm Theory 165
2.4 The Standard Principal-agent Theory Model 175
3.1 The Hypothesis of Humanity of Managers in Firm 180
Charter 3 The Analysis of the Manager’s Behavior and the Incentive and Restraint Mechanism in Firm 180
3.2 The Analysis of Managers’Behavior Model 185
3.3 Incentive and Restraint Mechanism of Manager’s Behavior 190
3.4 Brief Summary 198
Chapter 4 Competition of Managers Market and Managers’Selecting Mechanism 200
4.1 The Target Model of Managers Market 201
4.2 The Signal Indications of Managers’Capacity 206
4.3 Case Analysis:Managers’Selection Mechanism 210
4.4 The Diatheses Excellent Enterprise’s Managers Should Be Qualified With 212
4.5 Brief Summary 214
Chapter 5 Design of Reward Contract for Companies’Managers and Agency Cost Analysis 216
5.1 General Contract Design and Agency Cost 216
5.2 The Optimum Contract and Agency Cost When Considering Other Variables 223
5.3 Designing of Long-Term Incentive Mechanism 228
5.4 The Analysis of a Case 229
5.5 Conclusion 233
Chapter 6 Performance Comparison and Dynamic Incentive Mechanism Design 234
6.1 Comparative Performance Information and Explicit Incentives 235
6.2 Model of Implicit and Explicit Incentives 243
6.3 Case Analysis 250
6.4 Conclusion 252
Chapter 7 Profit Sharing and Standard Adjustment in Production，Procurement and Marketing Management 253
7.1 The Model 253
7.2 The Characteristic of Optimal Compensation 257
7.3 Comparative Static Analysis 270
7.4 Conclusion 282
Chapter 8 Supervising Mechanism of Managers’Behavior 285
8.1 Supervising Problems in Fixed Salary 286
8.2 Supervising Problems in Incentive Salary 290
8.3 Summary 294
Chapter 9 Controlling of Managers’Corrupts Behavior 295
9.1 Understanding of the Managing Corrupt Problem 295
9.2 Origin of the Managerial Corrupt Problem 298
9.3 Tactics Analysis of Monitoring Corruption Behaviors 303
9.4 The Measure about How to Restrict Managers’Corrupt Behavior 311
9.5 Brief Summary 315
参考文献 317