Introduction 1
Rawls' Law of Peoples 1
The argument 2
Aims 4
Structure 5
Part I 7
1 The Cosmopolitan Critique 9
Rawls' 'Libertarian turn' 10
A flawed Law of Peoples? 14
Peoples, not persons 17
The rejection of global redistribution 21
Rereading Rawls 28
2 Elucidating the ’Libertarian' Law of Peoples 34
Four reasons why 36
Fraternity 37
Reciprocity 39
Rawls' political constructivism 42
The principle of redress 44
The social minimum and its international analogue 52
Conclusion 56
3 A Duty with No Obligations? 58
Burdened societies 59
Self-determination 60
Political autonomy 62
A principle of transition 64
A mixed reception 67
Conclusion 74
PartⅡ 77
4 Considering the Capability Perspective 79
The justification of the duty 81
The duty of assistance as a pillar of international justice 84
The duty to burdened societies 85
The extent of the duty 89
Rawls' positive liberty? 89
Sen's idea of justice 91
Sen's critique of transcendental institutionalism 93
The capability critique 94
Rawlsian capabilities? 98
Conclusion 103
5 Conceptualizing State Capability: The Freedom of Peoples 106
Elaborating the international minimum 107
Beyond negative and positive 110
From two concepts to a triadic relation 112
Rawls' conception of freedom 115
Burdened societies' obstacles to freedom 120
Conclusion 125
6 Actualizing State Capability 127
Rawls' explanatory nationalism 128
Sen and Landes on development 130
The colonial legacy for political culture 136
A robust and rounded duty 140
State builders 140
System analysis 149
Conclusion 153
Part Ⅲ 159
7 A Duty in Equilibrium? 161
The foundations of a realistic utopia 162
Destabilizing assistance? 168
Intolerant advice? 175
Conclusion 178
8 Creeping Cosmopolitanism? 179
Converging with the cosmopolitans 180
Normative difference 185
Difference and toleration 190
A response to Sen 194
Toleration vs assistance 198
Conclusion 200
9 Conclusions 202
Notes 213
Bibliography 226
Index 233