1. An Introduction to Law and Economics 1
Ⅰ. What Is the Economic Analysis of Law? 3
Ⅱ. Some Examples 4
Ⅲ. The Primacy of Efficiency Over Distribution in Analyzing Private Law 7
Ⅳ. Why Should Lawyers Study Economics? Why Should Economists Study Law? 9
Ⅴ. The Plan of This Book 10
2. A Brief Review of Microeconomic Theory 11
Ⅰ. Overview: The Structure of Microeconomic Theory 11
Ⅱ. Some Fundamental Concepts: Maximization, Equilibrium, and Efficiency 12
Ⅲ. Mathematical Tools 14
Ⅳ. The Theory of Consumer Choice and Demand 18
Ⅴ. The Theory of Supply 26
Ⅵ. Market Equilibrium 28
Ⅶ. Game Theory 33
Ⅷ. The Theory of Asset Pricing 37
Ⅸ. General Equilibrium and Welfare Economics 37
Ⅹ. Decision Making Under Uncertainty: Risk and Insurance 43
Ⅺ. Profits and Growth 49
Ⅻ. Behavioral Economics 50
3. A Brief Introduction to Law and Legal Institutions 55
Ⅰ. The Civil Law and the Common Law Traditions 56
Ⅱ. The Institutions of the Federal and the State Court Systems in the United States 59
Ⅲ. The Nature of a Legal Dispute 62
Ⅳ. How Legal Rules Evolve 64
4. An Economic Theory of Property 70
Ⅰ. The Legal Concept of Property 73
Ⅱ. Bargaining Theory 74
Ⅲ. The Origins of the Institution of Property: A Thought Experiment 76
Ⅳ. An Economic Theory of Property 81
Ⅴ. How are Propetyy Rights Protected? 94
Ⅵ. What Can be Privately Owned?—Public and Private Goods 102
Ⅶ. What May Owners Do with Their Property? 105
Ⅷ. On Distribution 106
Appendix: The Philosophical Concept of Property 109
5. Topics in the Economics of Property Law 112
Ⅰ. What can be Privately Owned? 112
Ⅱ. How are Property Rights Established and Verified? 143
Ⅲ. What May Owners Do with Their Property? 156
Ⅳ. What are the Remedies for the Violation of Property Rights? 166
6. An Economic Theory of Tort Law 187
Ⅰ. Defining Tort Law 189
Ⅱ. An Economic Theory of Tort Liability 199
Appendix: Liability and Symmetry 228
7. Topics in the Economics of Tort Liability 230
Ⅰ. Extending the Economic Model 230
Ⅱ. Computing Damages 253
Ⅲ. An Empirical Assessment of the U.S.Tort Liability System 261
8. An Economic Theory of Contract Law 276
Ⅰ. Bargain Theory: An Introduction to Contracts 277
Ⅱ. An Economic Theory of Contract Enforcement 283
Ⅲ. An Economic Theory of Contract Remedies 287
Ⅳ. Economic Interpretation of Contracts 291
Ⅴ. Relational Contracts: The Economics of the Long-Run 299
9. Topics in the Economics of Contract Law 307
Ⅰ. Remedies as Incentives 307
Ⅱ. Formation Defenses and Performance Excuses 341
Appendix: Mathematical Appendix 373
10.An Economic Theory of the Legal Process 382
Ⅰ. The Goal of the Legal Process: Minimizing Social Costs 384
Ⅱ. Why Sue? 386
Ⅲ. Exchange of Information 391
Ⅳ. Settlement Bargaining 399
Ⅴ. Trial 403
Ⅵ. Appeals 410
11.Topics in the Economics of the Legal Process 419
Ⅰ. Complaints, Lawyers, Nuisances, and Other Issues in the Legal Process 419
Ⅱ. An Empirical Assessment of the Legal Process 442
12.An Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment 454
Ⅰ. The Traditional Theory of Criminal Law 455
Ⅱ. An Economic Theory of Crime and Punishment 460
13.Topics in the Economics of Crime and Punishment 485
Ⅰ. Crime and Punishment in the United States 485
Ⅱ. Does Punishment Deter Crime? 491
Ⅲ. Efficient Punishment 501
Ⅳ. The Death Penalty 510
Ⅴ. The Economics of Addictive Drugs and Crime 518
Ⅵ. The Economics of Handgun Control 522
Ⅶ. Explaining the Decline in Crime in the United States 526
Case Index 533
Name Index 535
Subject Index 539