Introduction 1
Ⅰ.The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording 4
A. Interpretation as a Legal Method 4
B. Judicial Development of the Law 5
C. Why the Differentiation Matters 6
Ⅱ.Interpretation and Invention in English Legal Reasoning 7
A. Statutory Interpretation and Democracy 7
（ⅰ） The Purposive Versus the Literal Approach 7
（ⅱ） Law-Applying Versus Law-Making 9
（ⅲ） The Missing Method: Judicial Development of the Law 12
B. Human Rights Act: What Is Possible? 13
C. Result 14
Ⅲ.Towards a Common European Approach 15
Ⅳ.The Possibility of the Rule of Law Defended 18
Ⅴ.The Sceptical Challenge: Indeterminacy and Vagueness 19
A. The Concept of Indeterminacy 20
B. Vagueness as Boundarylessness 20
（ⅰ） Higher-order Vagueness 21
（ⅱ） The Significance of Interpretation in the Law 22
C. Scepticism in Law 22
Ⅵ.The Rationality and Objectivity of Legal Reasoning 23
A. Justification, Rationality and Legitimacy 24
B. The Dworkin-Fish Controversy 25
C. ‘B’ Semantics versus ‘KP’ Semantics 26
D. The Objectivity of Law Defended 27
Ⅶ.At a Glance 27
A. General Approach 27
B. Chapter 1 28
C. Chapter 2 29
D. Chapter 3 31
Chapter 1:The Doctrine of the Limits of the Wording 33
Ⅰ.The Limits of the Wording in Hermeneutic Legal Theory 33
A. The Reception of Ontological Hermeneutics in Legal Theory 33
(ⅰ)The Limits of the Wording and Pre-Judgements 35
（a） Ontological Prerequisites for the Understanding of Normative Texts 35
（b） Significance for the Application of Law in General 36
（c） Significance for the Limits of the Wording 37
（ⅱ）Limits of the Wording and Typology 40
（ⅲ）The Limits of the Wording and the Analogicity of Language 42
B. Hermeneutics and Legal Interpretation 43
Ⅱ.The Limits of the Wording in Analytic Legal Theory 44
A. The Clarification of the Limits of the Wording by Koch,RuBmann, and Herberger 44
（ⅰ）Establishing and Assigning Meaning 45
（ⅱ）Classification of Unclear Usage Rules 46
（a） Ambiguity 47
（b） Inconsistency 47
（c） Vagueness 48
（ⅲ）The Limits of the Wording According to Koch,Ru Bmann, and Herberger 48
B. The Role of the Limits of the Wording in Alexy’s Theory of Legal Argumentation 50
（ⅰ） The Discursive Character of Interpretation 50
（ⅱ） Main Features of the Theory of Legal Argumentation 51
（a） Internal Justification and the Word Usage Rule 51
（b） External Justification and Semantic Arguments 52
Ⅲ.The Deconstructivistic Challenge of the Structuring Legal Theory 54
A. Basic Premises of Structuring Legal Theory 54
B. Criticism of New Hermeneutics 56
C. Criticism of the Theory of Legal Reasoning According to Koch and RufBmann 56
D. Criticism of Alexy’s Theory of Legal Argumentation 58
E. Structuring Legal Theory and the Limits of the Wording 59
（ⅰ）The Limits of the Wording as a Result of the Concretisation of Rules 59
（ⅱ）Binding Effects of Legal Culture 60
（ⅲ）The Limits of the Wording as the Limits of the Normative Program 62
（ⅳ）The Role of the Limits of the Normative Program 63
F Structuring Legal Theory—Summary 63
Ⅳ.The Results of the First Chapter 64
A. State of Research 64
（ⅰ）The Hermeneutic Position 65
（a） Pre-Judgements and Typology 65
（b） Arguments in Support of the Hermeneutic Position 65
（1） Argument of Ontological Hermeneutics 65
（2） Argument of Analogicity 66
（3） Argument of Procedural Correctness 66
（4） Argument of Normative Necessity 66
（ⅱ）The Analytic Position 66
（a） Establishing and Assigning Meaning 66
（b） Arguments for the Analytic Viewpoint 67
（1） Argument of Clear Cases 67
（2） Argument of the Empirical Discernibility of Meaning 67
（3） Argument of Possible Corrections 68
（ⅲ）The Structuring Legal Theory Position 68
（a） Putting Rules in Specific Terms and the Limits of the Normative Program 68
（b） Arguments in Support of Structuring Legal Theory 68
（1） Argument of the Indefiniteness of the Legal Text 68
（2） Argument of Legal Culture 68
（ⅳ）Arguments Against the Limits of the Wording 69
（a） Argument of Practical Ineffectiveness 69
（b） Argument of Necessary Failure 69
（c） Argument of the Lacking Normative Necessity 69
（d） Argument of Reversal 69
（e） The Language Game Argument 70
（1） Argument of Openness 70
（2） Argument of Innovation 70
（3） Argument of Context Dependency 70
（4） Argument of Circularity 70
（f） Argument that Meaning Remains Unclarified 71
（1） Argument of Objectivism 71
（2） Argument of Features Semantics 71
（3） Argument of the Incorrect Reception of the Speech Act Theory 71
（4） Argument of Excessive Commitment 71
（5） Argument of the Impossibility of the Empirical Determination of Meaning 71
B. Criticism 72
（ⅰ）Analytic Versus Post-Positivistic Legal Theory 72
（ⅱ）A Critical Look at Structuring Legal Theory 73
（a） The Basic Norm 74
（b） Circularity 75
（c） Normal and Exceptional Cases 76
（d） Commitment to the Majority Opinion 77
（e） Inconsistency 78
（f） Concluding Remarks 79
（ⅲ）Controversial Issues 81
Chapter 2: Normativity and Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning 87
Ⅰ.Introduction 87
A. Meaning Scepticism and the Indeterminacy Thesis 87
B. Meaning as a Problem of the Philosophy of Language 89
C. Language-Philosophical Theories of Meaning 90
（ⅰ）Classification in Categories 91
（a） Referent, Idea, and Behaviour 91
（b） Realism and Anti-Realism 93
（c） Functions of Language 94
（ⅱ）Significance for the Limits of the Wording 94
D. An Integrative Theory of Meaning 94
Ⅱ.The Normativity of Linguistic Meaning 96
A. The Concept of Semantic Normativity 96
（ⅰ）The General Thesis of Normativity 96
（ⅱ）The Three Conditions for Normativity Theories 98
（a） The Condition of Anti-Reductionist Supervenience 98
（b） The Condition of Internality 99
（c） The Condition of Possible Semantic Mistakes 100
（ⅲ）Four Strategies of Arguing Semantic Normativity 100
（a） Normativity and Truth 101
（b） Normativity and Internal Relation 103
（c） Normativity and Rationality 104
（d） Normativity and Regularity 106
（1） Semantic Normativity According to the Rule Model 106
（2） Objection of the Analytic Priority of Individualism 107
（3） Objection of the Incoherence of Prescriptivity and Constitutivity 109
（ⅳ）Normativity and Connection Thesis 114
B. Brandom’s Linguistic Normativity 115
（ⅰ）Normative Pragmatics 117
（a） Anthropologic Basis and Implicit Normativity 117
（b） Normative Attitudes and Sanctions 119
（c） Result: Principle of Instituting Norms through Social Practice 122
（ⅱ）Inferential Semantics 122
（a） The Pragmatic Priority of Propositional Meaning 122
（b） Meaning and Material Inference 123
（c） Result: The Principle of the Normative Significance of Conceptual Systems 125
（ⅲ）Interlocking Normative Pragmatics and Inferential Semantics in a Discursive Practice Model 126
（a） Commitment and Entitlement as Deontic Statuses 127
（b） Three Types and Three Dimensions of Inferential Structure 129
（c） The Deontic Score-keeping Model 131
（d） Propositional Meaning in Discursive Practice 133
（ⅳ）Theory of the Meaning of Subsentential Expressions 134
（a） Substitution 135
（b） Anaphora 139
（c） Results of the Theory of the Meaning of Subsentential Expressions 140
C. Objections against the Theory of Normativity 141
（ⅰ）Kripke’s Theory of Rule-Following 142
（a） Kripke’s Sceptical Paradox 142
（b） Kripke’s Sceptical Solution 145
（c） Criticism 145
（1） Normativity and Agreement 146
（2） Naturalism,Reductionism,and Regress 147
（ⅱ）The Objection of Semantic Holism 151
（a） The Doctrine of Semantic Holism 151
（b） WVO Quine’s Two Dogmas of Empiricism 152
（c） Criticism 156
（1） The Central Chains of Argument 157
（2） Reversibility and the Status of Logical Laws 158
（3） Dummett’s Argument of the Possibility of Communication 165
（4） Canonical Standards in Moderate Holism 166
（ⅲ）The Objection of the Impossibility of Analyticity 167
（a） Analyticity,Aprioricity,Modality 168
（b） WVO Quine’s Word and Object 169
（c） Criticism 173
（1） Relativity and Normativity 174
（2） Analyticity’s Triadic Relativity 175
（3） OLOL Analyticity 179
D. Result for the Normativity of Linguistic Meaning 180
Ⅲ.The Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning 181
A. The Concept of Objectivity 181
B. Objectivity as Reference 183
（ⅰ）Reference and Inference 184
（ⅱ）Frege’s Analysis of Picking out Objects 185
（ⅲ）Reference and de re Ascriptions 187
（ⅳ）Doxastic Gap and Objectivity 189
（ⅴ)Reference and Interpersonal Anaphora 191
C. Objectivity as Intersubjectivity 192
（ⅰ）The Social Perspectival Character of Conceptual Content 193
（ⅱ）The Paradox of Relative Objectivity 193
D. Objections to the Objectivity Theory 196
（ⅰ）Quine’s Objection of the Indeterminism of Reference 197
（ⅱ）The Objection of the Special Role Played by Theoretical Terms 197
（ⅲ）Wright’s Objection of the Impossibility of a Conventional Objectivity Theory 198
（a） Subjective Attitude and Objective Status 199
（b） The Possibility of Communal Errors 200
（ⅳ）The Objection of Incompatibility 201
（ⅴ)The Objection that There Is No Objective World 203
E. Conclusion on the Objectivity of Linguistic Meaning 205
Ⅳ.The Results of the Second Chapter 207
A. The Three Dimensions of Linguistic Meaning 207
B. The Universality Challenge 208
C. Scope and Role of Language-Analytical Discourse 208
Chapter 3: Semantic Normativity in the Law 211
Ⅰ.Addressing the Three Central Issues 211
A. Clear and Unclear Cases 212
（ⅰ）The Relevance in Legal Theory of the Distinction Between Clear and Unclear Cases 212
（ⅱ）The Concept of the Clear Case 212
（a） Semantic Clarity and Juridical Clarity 212
（b） Constitutive Clarity and Epistemic Clarity 213
（ⅲ）Semantic Clarity in Accordance with the Model of Deontic Scorekeeping 213
（a） Semantic Clarity in the First Inferential Dimension 214
（b） Semantic Clarity in the Second Inferential Dimension 215
（c） Semantic Clarity in the Third Inferential Dimension 215
（d） Result 215
（ⅳ）The Existence of Semantically-Clear Cases 216
（ⅴ）Limitations in Hard Cases 218
（ⅵ）Result on the First Issue 218
B. The Epistemic Openness of the Meaning of Norms 219
（ⅰ）Rejection of the Critical Arguments 220
（ⅱ）Confirmation of the Argument of Epistemic Openness 222
（a） Semantic Normativity and Rules for the Use of Words 222
（b） Semantic Object-Relatedness and the Theory of Meaning of Koch and of RuBmann 224
（c） The Objection of the Reification of the Law 226
（ⅲ）Result on the Second Issue 227
C. The Objectivity of the Meaning of Norms 229
D. Result Regarding the Three Central Issues 229
Ⅱ. The Theory of the Limits of the Wording 230
A. The Relationship Between Semantic Clarity andSemantically-Unclear Meaning 230
B. The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive Semantic Clarity 231
（ⅰ）The Function of Rules for the Use of Words in the Internal Justification 231
（ⅱ）Semantic Limits in the First Linguistic Dimension 233
（a） The Four Limits of Inferential Relations 233
（1） Conditional Commitment Limit 233
（2） Conditional Entitlement Limit 236
（3） Consequential Commitment Limit 238
（4） Consequential Entitlement Limit 242
（5） The System and Function of the Inferential Limits 243
（b） The Inferential Limits at Subsentential Level 248
（ⅲ）Semantic Limits in the Second Linguistic Dimension 250
（ⅳ）Semantic Limits in the Third Linguistic Dimension 252
（ⅴ）The System of Semantic Limits 254
C. The Limits of the Wording with Constitutive Semantically-Unclear Meaning 255
（ⅰ）The Classification of Semantically-Unclear Cases in Inferential Semantics 256
（a） The Concept of Vagueness 256
（b） The Concept of Ambiguity 262
（c） The Concept of Inconsistency 263
（d） The Concept of Evaluative Openness 263
（e） Result on the Classification of Unclear Cases 264
（ⅱ）Semantic Limits in the Case of Vagueness 265
（a） Connection Between the Three-Candidate Model and the Model of Rules for the Use of Words 265
（1） Preliminary Considerations 265
（2） The Scheme of the Positive Limits of the Wording 267
（3） The Scheme of the Negative Limits of the Wording 268
（4） Summary 269
（b） The System of Semantic Limits with Vagueness 270
（ⅲ）Semantic Limits with Ambiguity 270
（ⅳ）Semantic Limits with Evaluatively-Open Concepts 272
D. Result on the Theory of the Limits of the Wording 273
Ⅲ.The Results of the Third Chapter 274
A. Results 274
B. The Rehabilitation of Semantic Argumentation in the Law 276
C. The Objectivity of Legal Rulings 278
Bibliography 283
Index 301