《FROM CRISIS TO CRISIS THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM AND REGULATORY FAILURE》PDF下载

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  • 作  者:ROSS P.BUCKLEY AND DOUGLAS W.ARNER
  • 出 版 社:WOLTERS KLUWER
  • 出版年份:2011
  • ISBN:9041133542
  • 页数:333 页
图书介绍:

Chapter 1 History of the Global Financial System 1

1.1 History 1

1.2 The Bretton Woods System 8

1.2.1 Pressures on the Bretton Woods system 10

1.2.2 Collapse of the Bretton Woods Exchange Rate System 12

1.2.3 Financial Cooperation 15

2.4 The IMF at the Onset of the Global Financial Crisis 15

1.2.5 The World Bank at the Onset of the GFC 17

1.2.6 The WTO at the Onset of the GFC 18

1.3 The Globalised Financial System Today 19

Chapter 2 The Latin American and African Debt Crisis of 1982 25

2.1 The Debt Crisis of 1982 25

2.2 The Loans of the 1970s: Their Origins & Destinations 27

2.2.1 The Lenders 27

2.2.2 The Borrowers 28

2.3 Causes of the Latin American and African Debt Crisis 29

2.3.1 Recycling of OPEC Funds 29

2.3.2 Bank Behaviour 30

2.3.2.1 Time and Ignorance of History 32

2.3.2.2 Inexperience of the Banks 32

2.3.2.3 Bank Profitability and Market Share 33

2.3.2.4 The Promotion of Bankers’ Careers 34

2.3.2.5 Strong Debtor Economies 34

2.3.2.6 Syndicated Lending 35

2.3.2.7 Floating Interest Rates 35

2.3.2.8 The Position of US Banks at Home 35

2.3.3 Debtor Nation Policies 36

2.3.3.1 Large Budget Deficits 36

2.3.3.2 Overvalued Exchange Rates 36

2.3.3.3 Anti-export Trade Regimes 36

2.3.3.4 Capital Flight 37

2.3.3.5 Corruption 37

2.3.4 External Factors 38

2.3.4.1 Interest Rate Increases 38

2.3.4.2 Adverse Exchange Rate Movements 38

2.3.4.3 Falls in Commodity Prices 39

2.3.4.4 The Worldwide Recession 39

2.3.4.5 Cessation of Petro-Dollar Recycling 39

2.3.4.6 Conclusion on External Factors 39

Chapter 3 The Brady Plan of 1989 to 1994 41

3.1 Background to the Brady Plan 41

3.2 The Baker Plan 41

3.3 The Brady Plan 42

3.3.1 Mexico’s Brady Restructuring 43

3.3.1.1 Outcomes of Mexico’s Brady Restructuring 46

3.3.2 Venezuela’s Brady Restructuring 48

3.3.3 Brazil’s Brady Restructuring 49

3.3.4 Argentina’s Brady Restructuring 50

3.3.5 Collateralising Brady Bonds 51

3.3.6 Conclusions Regarding the Brady Plan 52

Chapter 4 The Asian Financial and Economic Crisis of 1997 55

4.1 The Crisis Erupts 55

4.2 Causes of the Asian Crisis 56

4.2.1 Type of Indebtedness 57

4.2.2 Extent of Indebtedness 57

4.2.2.1 Excess Liquidity in the Developed World 58

4.2.2.2 The Central Role of Cross-Over Investors 59

4.2.3 Financial Sector Weaknesses 60

4.2.3.1 Failure to Intermediate Capital Flows Effectively 60

4.2.3.2 The Premature Liberalisation of Local Financial Markets 60

4.2.4 Fixed Exchange Rates 61

4.2.5 Region-Wide Loss of Confidence 62

4.3 Lessons from the Asian Crisis 63

4.3.1 The Benefits of Floating Exchange Rates 64

4.3.2 The High Risks of Foreign Currency Borrowing 64

4.3.3 The Need for Long-Term Local Currency Capital 64

4.3.4 International Capital Flows as a Product of Developed World Liquidity 65

4.3.5 The Urgent Need for a New Perspective on Responsibility in International Lending and Investment 65

4.4 The Role and Impact of the IMF in the Asian Crisis 66

4.4.1 Misdiagnosis 66

4.4.2 Excessive Conditionality 68

4.4.3 Protection of the System and of Creditors 68

4.4.4 Mishandling of Market Expectations 69

4.4.5 Social Costs of IMF Policies 70

4.5 Conclusions on the IMF’s Role in the Asian Crisis 70

Chapter 5 The Post-Asian Crisis International Financial Architecture: 1998 to 2008 73

5.1 Financial Crises in the 1990s and the International Response 73

5.2 Financial Stability 75

5.3 Structure and Process 76

5.3.1 International Financial Standards and Standard-Setting Organisations 77

5.3.2 Standard-setting 78

5.3.3 Implementation and Monitoring 79

5.4 Financial Liberalisation and the WTO 79

5.5 Development 81

Chapter 6 The Argentine Implosion of 2001 83

6.1 The Argentine Experience 83

6.2 Causes of the Argentine Crisis 85

6.2.1 The Peso-Dollar Peg 85

6.2.2 Excessive Indebtedness 86

6.2.3 Corruption 87

6.2.4 IMF Policies 88

6.3 The Restructuring of Argentina’s Indebtedness 89

Chapter 7 The Story of Debt Relief 93

7.1 Debt Relief 93

7.2 The US Approach to Iraqi Debt 94

7.3 Debt-for-Development Exchanges 99

Chapter 8 Causes of the GFC of 2008 103

8.1 Background and Causes 107

8.1.1 1929 to 1998: Foundations 108

8.1.1.1 The US Financial Regulatory System 108

8.1.1.2 The 1988 Basel Capital Accord 110

8.1.1.3 Regulatory Origins of Securitisation 111

8.1.1.4 Consequences for Debt Capital Markets 112

8.1.1.5 The Asian Crisis of 1997 to 1998 113

8.1.2 1998 to 2004: A New Model? 114

8.1.2.1 The New Model: Universal Banking and Originate and Distribute 114

8.1.2.2 Regulatory Reinforcement of the New Model 115

8.1.3 2005 to 2006: Taking it to Excess and the Role of Basel Ⅱ 117

8.1.3.1 Advanced Originate and Distribute 117

8.1.3.2 Rating Agencies 118

8.1.3.3 Basel Ⅱ 119

8.2 Consequences and Responses 122

8.2.1 Monoline Insurance Companies 122

8.2.2 Bear Stearns 123

8.2.3 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 124

8.2.4 Systemic Crisis 125

Chapter 9 International Responses to the GFC 127

9.1 Initial Domestic Responses 127

9.2 A Global Financial Response Emerges 130

9.3 FSF 131

9.4 G20 133

9.4.1 November 2008 133

9.4.2 Working Groups 136

9.4.3 April 2009: The Second G20 Heads of Government Level Meeting 136

9.4.4 September 2009: The Third G20 Heads of Government Level Meeting 140

9.4.5 June 2010: The Fourth G20 Heads of Government Meeting 142

9.4.6 November 2010: The Fifth G20 Heads of Government Meeting 143

9.5 Role of the IMF, MDBs and WTO in Crisis Response 145

9.6 Conclusion 146

Chapter 10 Post-crisis International Financial Regulation 149

10.1 Financial Regulation and Systemic Risk 150

10.2 The Post-Crisis International Financial Regulatory Agenda 152

10.2.1 The First G20 Leaders’ Summit: Establishing the Agenda for Post-Crisis Financial Regulatory Reform 153

10.2.2 The Second G20 Leaders’ Summit: Establishment of the FSB 158

10.2.3 The Third and Fourth Leaders’ Summits: Maintaining Commitment 160

10.2.4 The Fifth G20 Leaders’ Summit: Endorsing the ‘New Financial Regulatory Framework’ 160

10.3 Financial Infrastructure and Financial Regulation 162

10.3.1 Capital, Leverage and Liquidity 162

10.3.2 OTC Derivatives Markets 165

10.3.3 Accounting Standards 167

10.3.4 Compensation Arrangements 167

10.3.5 Expanding the Regulatory Perimeter: Regulation of Non-traditional Financial Firms 168

10.3.5.1 Hedge Funds 168

10.3.5.2 Credit Ratings and Credit Rating Agencies 169

10.3.5.3 Securitisation 170

10.4 Macroprudential Regulation and Regulatory Design 171

10.4.1 Macroprudential Supervision 172

10.4.2 Designing Effective Regulatory and Supervisory Systems 173

10.5 Systemically Important Financial Institutions and Financial Institution Resolution 176

10.5.1 Addressing SIFIs and G-SIFIs 176

10.5.2 Liquidity Arrangements 179

10.5.3 Deposit Insurance and Investor Protection Arrangements 179

10.5.4 Financial Institution Resolution Arrangements 180

10.6 Conclusion: Post-Crisis International Regulatory Responses 183

Chapter 11 The Dodd-Frank Act: The US Legislative Response 185

11.1 Introduction 186

11.2 Supervisory Structure 187

11.2.1 Financial Stability Oversight Council 187

11.2.2 Orderly Liquidation Authority 188

11.3 Financial Institutions 189

11.3.1 Insurance Companies 189

11.3.2 Depository Institutions 189

11.3.3 Hedge Funds and Private Equity Funds 190

11.3.4 Credit Ratings Agencies 191

11.4 Capital Markets and Products 192

11.4.1 Securitisation 192

11.4.2 Derivatives 193

11.4.3 Payment, Clearing and Settlement Activities 195

11.5 Corporate Governance 195

11.6 Investor Protection 196

11.7 Consumer Protection 198

11.8 Commentary and Critique 199

11.8.1 Reform Objectives 200

11.8.2 Implementation 201

Chapter 12 Regulatory Measures for Developing Nations 205

12.1 Rigorous Local Prudential Regulation 205

12.2 Debt Policy and Local Debt Capital Markets 206

12.2.1 Borrow Less Foreign Currency 206

12.2.2 Issue Less Short-Term Debt and More Long-Term Local Currency Debt 207

12.3 Exchange Rate Policies 208

12.4 Capital Controls 211

12.4.1 Chile’s Controls 214

12.4.2 Malaysia’s Controls 215

12.4.3 The Uses of Inflow Controls 216

12.4.4 The Uses of Outflow Controls 217

12.4.5 Inflow and Outflow Controls Compared 218

12.4.6 Inflow Controls in Developed Countries 218

12.4.7 Conclusion on Capital Controls 219

12.5 Be More Willing to Play the Default Card 219

Chapter 13 Global Measures: National Balance Sheet Structures 227

13.1 The National Balance Sheet Problem 227

13.2 The Volatility Machine 228

13.3 Original Sin 229

13.4 Currency Mismatches 230

13.5 Local Currency Bond Markets 231

13.6 An International Solution 233

13.6.1 Changing the Lending Policies of Multilateral Development Banks 235

13.6.2 Local Currency Solutions 236

13.6.3 Re-orienting the Paris Club 236

13.7 Conclusion: National Balance Sheet Structures 237

Chapter 14 Global Measures: Bank Levies and Financial Taxes 239

14.1 Financial Market Trading: The Facts 242

14.2 Proponents of a Financial Transaction Tax 244

14.3 European Commission Review (April 2010) 248

14.4 IMF Report: A Fair And Substantial Contribution By The Financial Sector (June 2010) 250

14.5 Conclusion on Reports on the FTT 251

14.6 Mechanics 252

14.7 Conclusion 253

Chapter 15 Global Measures: A Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime 255

15.1 The Benefits of Bankruptcy Regimes Generally 257

15.2 Why Is There No Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime? 259

15.2.1 Traditional Absence of an Overarching Need for a Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime 259

15.2.2 Difficulties of Creating International Institutions 260

15.2.3 The Inability to Compel Participation in Such a Regime 260

15.2.4 Perceived Interests of Creditors 261

15.2.5 The Short-term Interests of Debtors 262

15.3 A Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime 262

15.4 A Chapter 9 Model for a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime 263

15.5 Benefits of a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime 267

15.6 Collective Action Clauses 268

15.7 The IMF Proposal: The Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism 270

15.8 Conclusion 273

Chapter 16 Global Measures: IMF Reform 275

16.1 The IMF and Poverty in Africa 281

16.2 The Socialisation of Private Sector Debt 283

16.3 The Fund’s Inability to Reinvent Itself 286

Chapter 17 The Road Ahead 293

17.1 Coordination 295

17.2 Trade 296

17.3 Macroeconomic and Monetary Policy 296

17.3.1 Macroeconomic Policy 297

17.3.2 Monetary Arrangements 297

17.4 Financial Stability and Development 298

17.4.1 Crisis Prevention: Regulation 298

17.4.2 Crisis Management: Liquidity 301

17.4.3 Crisis Resolution 302

17.5 Sustainable Growth and Development 303

17.6 Conclusion 303

Bibliography 309

Index 329