INTRODUCTION 1
Language and Law 1
Interpretation in Context 2
Language and Context 4
An Overview 6
1. H. L. A. HART AND THE 'OPEN TEXTURE' OF LANGUAGE 7
Hart's Discussion of 'Open Texture' 7
Waismann's Discussion of 'Open Texture' 10
Waismann and Wittgenstein 14
Hart on 'Open Texture'-Revisited 17
'Open Texture' and Judicial Discretion 18
Hart on 'Open Texture'-In Conclusion 22
'Gaps', 'Extra-Legal Sources', and Discretion 25
An Overview of the Critics 28
2. THE APPLICATION (AND MIS-APPLICATION) OF WITTGENSTEIN'S RULE-FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS TO LEGAL THEORY 36
Introduction 36
The Rule-Following Considerations-A Summary 38
Disagreement and 'Forms of Life' 41
Over-Readings of Wittgenstein I: Langille 45
Over-Readings of Wittgenstein II: Patterson 50
Hard Cases and 'Contested Concepts' 53
Concepts and Conceptions 59
Conclusion 61
3. CLEAR CASES 63
The Idea of Easy Cases 63
Language and Discourse 71
Language and Dialect 73
Conclusion 76
4. RONALD DWORKIN'S RIGHT ANSWER THESIS 77
Introduction 77
The Concept of 'Right Answers' 78
The Scope of a Right Answer Thesis 88
Incommensurability 96
Interpretation and Disagreement 106
Interpretation and Consensus 111
Different Perspectives in Law 118
The Role of 'Purpose' 120
Intention and Interpretation 129
Conclusion 131
5. MICHAEL MOORE'S METAPHYSICAL REALISM 133
Introduction 133
Metaphysical Realism 134
Summary of Moore's Position 137
The Problem About 'Death' 140
Changing Beliefs and Changed Concepts 146
Wittgenstein's Critique of Metaphysical Realism 148
Moore's Project: A Second Look 151
Two Additional Criticisms 154
Summary of Brink's Position 157
Criticism of Brink 160
The Kripke-Putnam Theory of Reference 162
A Further Look at Natural Kinds 168
Alternatives to Natural-Kinds Analysis 171
Response to Moore 174
Conclusion 176
6. A SUMMING-UP 178
Introduction 178
Threads in the Rope 178
On Intention in Law 183
The Meaning of 'Law' 190
The Status of the Claims and the Temptation of Relativism 195
Bibliography 199
Index 217