1. Introduction 1
1. The margin of appreciation in the ECtHR, IACtHR, and the UN HRC 3
2. Book structure 6
3. Approach 10
PART Ⅰ-HEORY: CONCEPTUALIZING AND JUSTIFYING THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 15
2. Deference: Reasoning Differently on the Basis of External Factors 17
1. Introduction 17
2. Assigning weight differently on the basis of external factors 18
3. Deference on the basis of external factors 21
4. Types of reason for deference 24
a. Relationships and comity 24
b. Epistemic limitations and expertise 25
5. Cases that demonstrate this approach in practice 26
a. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 27
b. Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 31
c. United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRC) 34
6. Conclusion 37
3. Different Approaches to Deference in International Human Rights Law 38
1. Introduction 38
2. The margin of appreciation and relativism about human rights 40
a. The meaning of universality in moral discourse 42
b. Moral universality and the margin of appreciation 43
c. Legal rights that implement moral rights 44
d. Legal orders and comparisons 45
e. The margin of appreciation and relativism in practice 47
f. Summary 49
3. Critiques of deference 50
a. The 'one right answer' thesis 50
b. Harmonization and integration 53
c. Supporting case law 55
d. Summary 57
4. Justifying the margin of appreciation 58
a. The Tribunals as forums for the contestation of sovereignty 58
b. Deference and subsidiarity 61
c. Views of commentators 62
d. The practice of the Tribunals 63
e. Summary 65
5. Conclusion 66
PART Ⅱ-PRACTICE: FACTORS AFFECTING THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION 67
4. Democracy and Participation 69
1. Introduction 69
2. Theories of judicial review and the justification of the margin of appreciation for democratic reasons 70
3. The contribution of the Tribunals to theories of democracy in international law 73
4. Democratic legitimacy as an external factor for the margin of appreciation in practice 75
a. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 75
b. Inter-American Court of Human Rights (lACtHR) 79
c. United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRC) 80
d. Giving state legislatures time to change the law 81
5. Cases in which democratic legitimacy is a factor in favour of granting the state a margin of appreciation 83
a. Conflicting private rights: testing the choice of the legislature 83
b. Conflicting personal-public freedoms: questions of moral or political controversy 86
6. Cases in which democratic legitimacy issues heighten scrutiny 90
a. Democratic rights: the example of electoral participation 90
b. Minorities and vulnerable groups 93
c. A lack of societal/parliamentary debate 96
d. The application of legal formulae where the provisions are too broad-brush 98
e. Other rule of law concerns 100
7. Conclusion 101
5. Treaty Interpretation, Current State Practice, and Other International Law Influences on the Practice of Deference 103
1. Introduction 103
2. State consent and the legality of international agreements 103
3. Treaty interpretation: Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) and the special status of human rights treaties 106
a. Original intent or 'evolutive' interpretation 108
b. Treaty provisions with autonomous meanings 110
c. Summary 112
4. Other approaches to the role of current state practice 113
5. Current state practice as an external factor affecting the margin of appreciation in practice 116
a. Lack of consensus increases deference 116
b. Current state practice in the applicant's favour heightens scrutiny 120
c. Current state practice in the state's favour increases deference 124
d. Current state practice is not calculated with precision 127
6. Deference to international norms, institutions, and organizations 130
a. Decisions of other international human rights tribunals 131
b. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 135
c. Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 137
d. Other international law norms 141
7. Conclusion 143
6. Expertise and Competence 145
1. Introduction 145
2. Epistemology, expertise, and judicial responsibility 146
3. Expertise as a factor for the margin of appreciation in practice 148
a. European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 148
b. Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR) 150
c. United Nations Human Rights Committee (UN HRC) 152
4. Types of expertise where there are commonly stronger grounds for a margin of appreciation 153
a. National security 153
b. Child protection 159
c. Health care 162
d. Education 163
e. Policing and civil service 164
f. Economic matters 164
5. Heightened scrutiny where the Tribunals have expertise 167
a. Legal procedures 167
b. Reasonable time 171
c. Legal interpretation 172
6. Conclusion: expertise and subsidiarity 174
PART Ⅲ-THE STRUCTURE OF HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION: THE MARGIN OF APPRECIATION AND PROPORTIONALITY 175
7. Proportionality: Determining Rights 177
1. Introduction 177
2. The origins of proportionality 178
3. Theories of rights: balancing, trumps, and human rights determinations 181
a. Interest-based theories 182
b. Rights as trumps (reason-blocking theories) 189
4. The margin of appreciation and proportionality in human rights adjudication 192
a. The conceptual connection between the margin of appreciation and proportionality 194
b. Cases that demonstrate the connection between the margin of appreciation and proportionality 196
5. Conclusion: the structure of decision-making in human rights law 198
8. Nature of the Right and Type of Case 200
1. Introduction 200
2. How the 'nature of the right' or 'type of case' may affect the margin of appreciation or proportionality 201
3. The nature of the right 204
a. Absolute rights: life and freedom from torture 204
b. Strong rights: fair trial, liberty, and derogations 210
c. Qualified rights: privacy, and freedoms of religion, association, speech, and non-discrimination 211
d. Weak rights: property, education, and free elections 215
4. Types of case 216
5. Conclusion 217
9. Concluding Remarks 219
Bibliography 226
Index 231