Part Ⅰ—Rethinking Specific Offenses 1
Chapter One: The Topology of Theft 3
1.1. Introduction 3
1.1.1. Larceny and Embezzlement 4
1.1.2. Obtaining Property by False Pretenses 10
1.2. Points of Stress in the Topology of Theft 13
1.2.1. Receiving the Chattel with a Fraudulent Purpose 15
1.2.2. The Problem of Finders 18
1.2.3. The Problem of Mistaken Delivery 20
1.2.4. The Problem of Delivery from a Third Party 22
1.2.5. A Guide to Analyzing Theft Offenses 26
A. Custody Acquired at T1 28
B. Possession Acquired at T1 28
C. Title Acquired at T1 29
1.3. The Interests Protected by Theft Offenses 30
1.3.1. An Earlier Understanding 31
1.3.2. Larceny as a Crime Against Possession 35
1.3.3. Protecting Objects and Protecting Economic Interests 39
1.3.4. The Interests Protected in Punishing Fraud 49
Chapter Two: Gommon-Law Larceny and Its Metamorphosis 59
2.1. Enigmas of the Common Law 59
2.1.1. Possessorial Immunity 61
2.1.2. Enigmas of the Common Law: The Carrier's Case 66
2.1.3. The Problem of Staged Larceny 70
2.2. A Theory for Resolving the Enigmas of the Common Law 76
2.2.1. Possessorial Immunity 81
2.2.2. Carrier's Case 83
2.2.3. Staged Larceny 86
2.2.4. The Rationale of Manifest Criminality 88
2.3. The Metamorphosis of Larceny 90
2.3.1. The King v. Pear 90
2.3.2. Reinterpreting the Tradition 94
2.3.3. The Intellectual Background 100
2.4. Judicial Expansion of the Common Law 103
2.4.1. Liability of Finders 104
2.4.2. The Problem of Mistaken Delivery 107
2.4.3. Legislative Consolidation 110
Chapter Three: Two Pattems of Criminality 115
3.1. Abstracting from the History of Larceny 115
3.1.1. The Pattem of Manifest Criminality 115
3.1.2. The Pattern of Subjective Criminality 118
3.1.3. Maxims Common to Both Patterns of Liability 119
3.2. Related Theft Offenses 122
3.2.1. Embezzlement 122
3.2.2. False Pretenses 124
3.2.3. Burglary 124
3.2.4. New Offenses Akin to Burglary-Without-Breaking 128
3.3. Attempts 131
3.3.1. Two Doctrinal Issues in Attempts 135
3.3.2. Objectivist Approaches and the Theory of Attempts 139
A. Stages of Commission 140
B. The Criterion of Danger 141
C. Apprehension and Unequivocal Conduct 141
3.3.3. Manifest Criminality and Impossible Attempts 146
A. The Shooting Cases 149
B. The Poisoning Cases 152
C. The Empty Receptacle Cases 154
D. Receiving Stolen Property 154
3.3.4. A General Theory of Attempting 157
3.3.5. The Ascendancy of Subjective Criminality 166
3.3.6. The Principles Behind the Subjectivist Theory of Attempts 170
3.3.7. The Prospects of a Subjective Theory of Attempts 174
3.3.8. The Problem of Abandonment 184
3.4. Possession Offenses 197
3.4.1. Possession Offenses as a Form of Discretionary Social Control 202
3.5. The Overt Act in Treason 205
3.5.1. Compassing Death and Overt Acts 207
3.5.2. Overt Acts and Treason Under the Constitution 213
3.6. An Excursus on Conspiracy 218
3.6.1. Inconsistent Criteria of Inchoate Liability 220
3.6.2. The Requirement of an Overt Act 223
3.7. Stop-and-Frisk and Flirtations with Manifest Criminality 225
3.8. The Two Patterns of.Criminality Revisited 232
Chapter Four: Homicide: Three Lines of Liability 235
4.1. Toward a Third Pattern of Liability 235
4.2. Intentional Killings 242
4.2.1. Provocation 242
4.2.2. Diminished Capacity 250
4.2.3. Premeditation and Deliberation 253
4.2.4. Intention in Homicide 256
4.3. Homicide by Excessive Risk-Taking 259
4.3.1. Liability for Manslaughter 262
4.3.2. Liability for Murder 264
4.4. Formal Criteria of Liability 274
4.4.1. The Historical Background 276
4.4.2. The Misdemeanor-Manslaughter Rule 285
4.4.3. Tort Theory Points the Way 287
4.4.4. Felony-Murder in the Second Degree 290
4.4.5. Conflicting Rationalia for Curtailing the Second-Degree Felony-Murder Rule 297
4.4.6. First-Degree Murder: The Means Tests 303
4.4.7. First-Degree Murder: Felony-Murder 307
4.4.8. The Institutional Context of Formal Liability 319
4.5. Comparative Notes 321
4.5.1. Analogues to Manslaughter 322
4.5.2. The Standard Form of Criminal Homicide 325
4.5.3. Aggravated Homicide 326
A. The Motive of the Slaying 326
B. The Manner of Killing 328
C. Felony-Murder 330
4.5.4. Special Features of Continental Legislation 331
A. Killing on Request 332
B. Infanticide 334
4.6. Capital Homicide 336
Chapter Five: The Jurisprudence of Homicide 341
5.1. The Uniqueness of Homicide 341
5.1.1. Blaming and Tainting 343
5.1.2. Omissions and Negligence 349
5.1.3. Interaction with the Victim and Culpability by Degrees 350
5.1.4. The Outer and Inner Circles of Liability 355
5.2. The Outer Circle of Liability 358
5.2.1. The Jurisprudence of Acting 358
5.2.2. The Jurisprudence of Causing Death 360
A. The Degree of Causal Contribution 362
B. The Victim Endangers His or Her Own Life 365
C. An Intentional Intervening Act by a Third Person 366
5.2.3. The Jurisprudence of Life and Death 372
5.3. From Desecration to a Pattern of Harmful Consequences 379
5.3.1. Desecration in a Secular Society 380
5.3.2. A Pattern of Harmful Consequences 385
5.3.3. The Three Patterns of Liability 388
Part Ⅱ--Rethinking the General Part 391
Chapter Six: The Quest for the General Part 393
6.1. The Need for Synthesis 393
6.2. Some Preliminary Distinctions 395
6.2.1. Descriptive.and Normative Uses of the Same Terms 396
6.2.2. Conceptual and Empirical Propositions 401
6.2.3. Analyzing Statutes and Explicating the Structure of the Criminal Law 406
6.3. Punishment and Its Rationale 408
6.3.1. On What Punishment Is 409
6.3.2. The Rationale of Punishment 414
6.4. The Concept of Acting 420
6.4.1. Acts and Omissions 421
6.4.2. Acts Contrasted with Conditions 426
6.4.3. The Teleological Theory of Action 433
6.5. The Concept of Intention 439
6.5.1. Intending and Desiring 440
6.5.2. Intention and Recklessness 442
6.5.3. Intending and Omissions 449
6.5.4. Intention in Ordinary Language 449
6.5.5. Intention and Motives 452
6.5.6. A Glossary of Intents 452
6.6. The Concepts of Wrongdoing and Attribution 454
6.6.1. Wrongdoing and Norms 456
6.6.2. Punishment and Wrongdoing 459
A. The Components of Desert 461
B. Defiance as Wrongdoing 463
6.6.3. On the Indispensability of Wrongdoing 466
6.6.4. On the Externality of Wrongdoing 469
6.6.5. Wrongdoing and Harm 472
A. Arguments for the Three German Theories 476
B. The Evidentiary Value of Harm 481
C. Harm and Remorse 482
6.6.6. Wrongdoing, Mistakes and Accidents 483
6.7. Tensions in the Theory of Attribution 491
6.7.1. The Descriptive Theory of Attribution 492
6.7.2. The Normative Theory of Attribution 495
6.7.3. Responsibility and Attribution 496
6.7.4. Guilt Without Attribution 497
6.8. Objectivity and Subjectivity in Criminal Theory 504
6.8.1. Utility and Objective Standards 506
6.8.2. Justice and Attribution 511
Chapter Seven: The Structure of Wrongdoing 515
7.1. Introduction 515
7.2. The Problem of the Burden of Persuasion 516
7.2.1. The Private Law Style 519
7.2.2. The Private Law Style in Criminal Litigation 524
7.3. The Revolt Against the Private Law Style 532
7.3.1. The Emergence of a Normative Theory of Guilt 532
7.3.2. The Borderland of Culpability 538
A. Insanity 539
B. Entrapment 541
C. Culpability and the Abandonment of Attempts 544
7.3.3. Politics and Policies in Allocating the Burden of Persuasion 545
7.3.4. The Burden of Persuasion as a Constitutional Issue 549
7.4. The Structure of Wrongdoing 552
7.4.1. Definition and Justification 555
7.4.2. On Norms and Privileges 562
7.4.3. On Distinguishing Between Norms and Exceptions 566
7.5. Due Process and Fair Warning 569
7.5.1. The Problem of Vagueness 570
7.5.2. Legislative Control over the Refinement of the Criminal Law 573
7.6. The Structure of Offenses: A Review 575
7.6.1. The Definition of the Offense 575
7.6.2. Wrongdoing and Justification 576
7.6.3. Culpability, Wrongdoing and Excuses 577
Chapter Eight: The Theory of Derivative Liability 581
8.1. The Concepts of Direct and of Derivative Liability 581
8.2. Derivative Liability for Omissions 585
8.2.1. Causation and Derivative Liability 588
8.2.2. An Alternative to "But For" Causation 593
8.2.3. Verbs of Interference and Causation 599
8.2.4. Liberty, Interference and Allocation 602
8.2.5. The Quinlan Case 606
8.3. Derivative Liability: The Criteria of Duty 611
8.3.1. The Personal Relationship Between the Defendant and a Dependent Person 611
8.3.2. A Community of Shared Risks 614
8.3.3. Contract and Undertaking 614
8.3.4. The Defendant's Creating the Danger 618
8.3.5. Statutory Duties 620
8.3.6. Duties To Control Third Persons 622
8.3.7. The Scope of Duties To Avert Harm 622
8.4. Derivative Liability for Omissions: Some Doubts 625
8.4.1. Conceptual Problems 625
8.4.2. Constitutional Arguments 628
8.4.3. Accommodations 631
8.4.4. Why Punish the Failure To Avert Harm? 633
8.5. Perpetrators and Accessories: Derivative Liability for Human Conduct 634
A. The Formal Basis of Liability 635
B. Causation 635
C. Intent 635
8.5.1. Direct Liability for Perpetration 637
8.5.2. Two Categories of Accessories 640
8.5.3. A Special Category of Instigation 644
8.5.4. Neighboring Concepts of Complicity 645
A. Accessories After the Fact 645
B. Conspiracy 646
C. Vicarious Liability 647
8.6. The Rationale for Differentiated Participation in Criminal Plans 649
8.6.1. Punishing the Accessory for the Perpetrator's Wrong 652
8.6.2. The Rationale for Categorically Mitigating the Accessory's Punishment 654
8.7. Specific Problems of Demarcation 657
8.7.1. Is the Person Who Culpably Executes the Deed Always a Perpetrator? 657
8.7.2. When Is a Conspirator a Co-perpetrator? 659
8.7.3. Accessories and Perpetrators-by-Means 664
A. F's conduct is wrongful but excused. 664
B. F's conduct is justified and therefore not wrongful. 667
C. F's act is formally legal. 670
8.7.4. The Special Status of Instigators 671
8.8. Minimal Criteria for Accessorial Liability 674
8.8.1. Parties to Conspiracies 674
8.8.2. Minimal Facilitation 677
Chapter Nine: The Theory of Mistake 683
9.1. Introduction 683
9.1.1. What Mistakes Are About 684
A. Mistakes about elements of the definition 684
B. Mistakes related to justificatory claims 684
C. Mistakes about excusing conditions 685
D. Mistakes in cases of negligent risk-taking 685
E. Mistakes about elements extrinsic to culpability 685
9.1.2. Outcomes in the Analysis of Mistakes 687
A. Mistakes Negating Intent 687
B. Mistakes Negating Culpability 687
C. Irrelevant Mistakes 690
9.2. Arguments Favoring the Exculpatory Effect of Mistakes 691
9.2.1. Mistakes Negating the Required Intent 691
9.2.2. The Borderland of Definition and Justification 698
9.2.3. Requiring That Exculpatory Mistakes Be Reasonable 707
9.3. Strategies for Disregarding Mistakes 713
9.3.1. Mistakes Extrinsic to Wrongdoing and Culpability 713
9.3.2. Arguments for Strict Liability: Special Governmental Purposes 716
9.3.3. Arguments for Strict Liability: The Wrongdoer Runs the Risk 723
9.3.4. Arguments for Strict Liability: Mistakes of Law 730
9.4. Domesticating Mistakes of Law 736
9.4.1. The German Experience 737
9.4.2. The American Instrumentalist Rationale 755
Chapter Ten: The Theory of Justification and Excuse 759
10.1. Tensions in the Theory of Justification 759
10.1.1. The Interactional Effects of Justificatory Claims 759
10.1.2. The Problem of Putative Justification 762
10.1.3. Is There a Single Theory of Justification? 769
A. The Value of Autonomy 770
B. Acting in the Name of the Government 771
10.2. The Theory of Lesser Evils 774
10.2.1. Lesser Evils in the German Tradition: The Statutory Background 775
10.2.2. The Emergence of Extra-Statutory Necessity 779
10.2.3. The Emergence of Necessity as a Justification in Anglo-American Law 788
10.2.4. Limitations on the Privilege of Necessity 792
10.3. The Theory of Excuses 798
10.3.1. Excuses, Character and Desert 799
10.3.2. Excuses and Voluntariness 802
10.3.3. Compassion and Mercy in the Theory of Excuses 807
10.3.4. Do Excuses Amend the Law? 810
10.3.5. The Utilitarian Theory of Excuses 813
10.4. A Comparative Survey of Excuses 817
10.4.1. Necessity 818
10.4.2. Duress 829
10.4.3. The Synthesis of Duress and Necessity 833
10.4.4. Insanity 835
A. Is Insanity a Condition or an Excuse? 836
B. Is Insanity a Scientific Issue? 839
C. The Movement To Abolish the Insanity Defense 843
10.4.5. Intoxication 846
10.4.6. Inconsistent Duties 852
10.5. The Theory of Necessary Defense 855
10.5.1. Necessary Defense as an Excuse 856
10.5.2. Necessary Defense as a Variation of Lesser Evils 857
10.5.3. Necessary Defense and the Vindication of Autonomy 860
10.5.4. Disputed Points in the Theory of Self-Defense 864
A. The Duty To Retreat 864
B. Rights of Third Parties 868
C. The Culpability of the Aggressor 869
D. The Problem of Proportionality 870
Table of Cases 877
Index 885