1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Three Ideologies of Judicial Decision-Making by Jerzy Wr6blewski 1
1.2 The Three Situations of Legal Decision-Making by Kaarle Makkonen 6
1.3 The Subject Matter of the Treatise: Legal Argumentation, or How to Construct and Read the Law in a Reasoned Manner 11
1.4 The Concept of a Frame of Legal Analysis 12
1.5 The Theories of Truth and Legal Analysis 14
1.6 The Semantics of Law: Rudolf Carnap’s Method of Extension and Intension 20
2 An Isomorphic Theory of Law: A Relation of Structural Similarity Between the Two Fact-Constellations Compared 29
2.1 Kaarle Makkonen on Legal Isomorphism 29
2.2 The Picture Theory of Language in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, as Read in Light of Erik Stenius’ Wittgenstein’s Tractatus.A Critical Exposition of the Main Lines of Thought 31
2.2.1 The Internal Categorial Structure and the External Configuration Structure of Reality 31
2.2.2 A Legal Fact-Situation as an Analysed Fact-Situation 36
2.3 The Two Requirements Placed on Legal Isomorphism 41
2.4 The Transition From an Isomorphic Situation to a Situation of Semantic Ambiguity 43
2.5 Legal Isomorphism and Institutional Facts 45
2.6 The Semantic Theory of Truth by Alfred Tarski 47
2.7 A Critical Evaluation of the Isomorphic Theory of Law 48
3 Coherence Theory of Law: Shared Congruence Among Arguments Drawn from the Institutional and Societal Sources of Law 53
3.1 Truth As Coherence Among the Sentences of a Scientific Theory 53
3.2 In Search for the Concept of Coherence 55
3.2.1 A Quantitative Approach: “The More/Longer/Greater （…）, the More Coherent the Theory” 55
3.2.2 A Qualitative Approach: “That the Law is Structured by a Coherent Set of Principles About Justice and Fairness and Procedural Due Process…” 60
3.3 The Duhem-Quine Thesis: The Inherently Holistic and Underdetermined Character of a Scientific Theory,and Its Implications for Legal Analysis 68
3.4 Towards Partial Coherence in Law 71
3.5 The Concept of Coherence Redefined 73
3.6 A Critical Evaluation of the Coherence Theory of Law 77
4 “Between the Evident and the Irrational”: The New Rhetoric and Legal Argumentation Theory 79
4.1 The Varieties of Pragmatism and the Law 79
4.2 The Universal Audience as a Subjective Thought Construct of the Speaker by Chaim Perelman 81
4.3 The Realm of Rhetoric and the Quest for Value-Cognitivism 87
4.4 The New Rhetoric and Its Alternatives 93
5 Philosophical Pragmatism: Law, Judged in Light of Its Social Effects 97
5.1 “What, In Short, is the Truth’s Cash Value in Experiential Terms?” 97
5.2 The Lure of Pragmatism and the Law 102
5.3 “These Doctrines Form a System for Inducing People to Behave Efficiently…” 106
5.4 “Why Efficiency?” and “Is Wealth a Value?” - A Critical Evaluation of the Economic Analysis of Law,with Brief Comments on the Marxist Theory of Law 108
6 Analytical Legal Positivism: Retracing the Original Intentions of the Legislator Under Legal Exegesis 113
6.1 Scientific Positivism Defined 113
6.2 What Is Analytical Philosophy? 116
6.3 Legal Positivism Defined 118
6.4 The Saga of Modern Legal Positivism 124
6.4.1 Analytical Legal Positivism 124
6.4.2 Institutional Legal Positivism 130
6.4.3 Exclusive and Inclusive Legal Positivism 132
6.5 The Unresolvable Dilemma of Kaarlo Tuori’s Critical Legal Positivism 136
6.6 One Step （or Two） Back in History: The Exegetical School of Law （Ecole de l’Exegese） in France and Belgium in the Nineteenth Century 138
6.7 A Critical Evaluation of Legal Exegesis 141
7 Legal Realism: The Law in Action, Not the Law in Books,As the Subject Matter of Legal Analysis 145
7.1 Philosophical Realism Defined 145
7.2 Legal Realism, American and Scandinavian 148
7.3 The Legacy of American Legal Realism 151
7.4 The Concept of A Judicial Ideology by Alf Ross, and the Rule of Recognition by H.L.A.Hart 154
7.5 The Formal Validity and Efficient Enforcement of Law 160
7.6 A Critical Evaluation of Analytical Legal Realism 162
8 Legal Conventionalism: Law as an Expression of Collective Intentionality 165
8.1 Brute Facts and Institutional Facts 165
8.2 The Definitional Characteristics of Institutional Facts by John R.Searle, with Special Concern for Self-Referentiality 169
8.3 Conventions as Mutual Expectations of the Members of a Community 173
8.4 Nominalism vs.Realism: Are Intentions Attributable to a Collective Agent as a Whole or to Its Individual Members Only? 177
8.5 The Institutionally Qualified Character of Legal Conventions 179
8.6 Shared Legal Convictions as an Expression of the Volksgeist, or the Spirit of the Nation, by Friedrich Carl von Savigny 182
8.7 The Transformations of Customary Law in Modern Society 183
8.8 Legal Conventionalism and Legal Argumentation Theory 185
9 “Die Rechtssatze in ihrem systematischen Zusammenhang zu erkennen” - The Thrust of Legal Formalism 187
9.1 A Genealogy of Legal Concepts by Georg Friedrich Puchta 187
9.2 A Jurisprudence, Based on Legal Concepts and Their Systemic Relations 189
9.3 The Langdellian Orthodoxy - A Brief Account of Legal Formalism in America 192
9.4 The Constitutive Elements of Legal Formality by Robert S.Summers 194
9.5 “Der Zweck ist der Schopfer des ganzen Rechts” - A Critique of Legal Formalism by Rudolf von Jhering and Lon L.Fuller 196
10 Natural Law Philosophy: Law as Subordinate to Social Justice and Political Morality in Society 201
10.1 The Evolvement of Natural Law Philosophy 201
10.2 “eine wertfreie Beschreibung ihres Gegenstandes”-The Challenge of Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law for Natural Law Philosophy 206
10.3 The Internal Morality of Law by Lon L.Fuller 208
10.4 “The Core of Good Sense in the Doctrine of Natural Law” - The Minimum Content of Natural Law by H.L.A.Hart 212
10.5 The Seven Basic Values by John Finnis 216
10.6 A Critical Evaluation of Natural Law Theory 223
11 Radical Decisionism: Social Justice on a Strictly Contextualist Basis 225
11.1 The Significance of the Institutional Meta-Theory of Law 225
11.2 Denial of All Feasible Meta-Theories of Law:Kadi-Justice, the German Free Law Movement, and Carl Schmitt on the Law 226
11.3 Decisionism in Jurisprudence, I: Thomas Wilhelmsson on the Small-Scale, Good Narratives on Legal Responsibility 230
11.4 Decisionism in Jurisprudence, ⅠⅠ: Martti Koskenniemi on the International Lawyer’s Radically Situational Ethics 232
11.5 A Critical Comment of Radical Decisionism 236
12 Intermission 239
12.1 The Ten Frames of Legal Analysis, as Contrasted with Jerzy Wroblewski’s Three Ideologies of Judicial Decision-Making and Kaarle Makkonen’s Three Situations of Legal Decision-Making 239
12.2 Jerzy Wr6blewski’s Ideology of Legal and Rational Judicial Decision-Making Law as a Compound of the Legislative Ideology, Judicial Ideology, and a Societal Conception of Law and Justice 243
12.3 From a Synchronic to a Diachronic Approach:Two Sequential Models of Legal Reasoning 248
12.3.1 Neil MacCormick’s Theory of the Three C’s in Legal Reasoning: From Consistency and Coherence to the Consequences of Law 249
12.3.2 The Bielefelder Kreis: A Sequential Order of the Linguistic, Systemic, Teleological-Axiological, and Transcategorical Arguments in Legal Reasoning 251
13 Law and Metaphysics 255
13.1 The Truth of a Legal Sentence As Determined by the Frame of Analysis Adopted 255
13.2 The Logico-Conceptual Constitution, Normative Ontology, and Structural Axiology of Law 258
13.3 A Systemic Order of Things Among the Rules and Principles of Law 263
13.4 Textual Coherence, Institutional Authorities, and the Legal Community 266
13.5 （Is There） A Future for Analytical Jurisprudence? 268
References 271
Name Index 283
Subject Index 287