Acknowledgements 1
CHAPTER Ⅰ Introduction 11
1.1 The aim of the book 11
1.2 The problems regarding the regulation of transnational mergers 12
1.3 The structure of the book 15
CHAPTER Ⅱ The unilateral strategy 17
2.1 Introduction 17
2.2 The concept of extraterritorial jurisdiction 18
A） Definition of extraterritorial jurisdiction 18
B） Limits of extraterritorial exercise of prescriptive and enforcement jurisdictions 19
2.3 The grounds of extraterritoriality 21
A） The principle of objective territoriality 21
B） The doctrine of effects 22
2.4 The unilateral strategy and competition law 24
2.5 The US and EC positions for extraterritorial application of competition law 25
A） The US approach 25
B） The EC approach 30
2.6 Extraterritorial application of competition law to merger cases 34
A） The position of the US 35
B） The position of the EC 36
2.7 The demise of the unilateral strategy 43
CHAPTER Ⅲ A comparative analysis of EC and US merger control law： The institutional framework and procedural rules 49
3.1 Introduction 49
3.2 The history of US merger control law 51
3.3 The history of EC merger control law 52
3.4 Introduction to the EC/US bilateral cooperation 53
3.5 The institutional framework 54
A） Introductory remarks 54
B） The allocation of regulatory powers 55
C） The EC administrative regime 56
D） The US prosecutorial regime 57
E） Determination of the scope of application of merger control： qualitative and quantitative criteria 59
3.6 Procedural rules 63
A） Notification of merger operations 63
B） Investigation period 64
C） Notification form 66
3.7 Differences between EC and US institutional framework and procedural rules： Possible consequences on the outcome of mergers review 67
A） The powers of the European Commission 67
B） Role of competitors 69
C） Different timetable of merger control proceedings 73
3.8 Criticism of the EC Courts regarding Commission’s administration of merger control 74
3.9 The new EC Regulation 139/2004 and its impact on EC merger control regime 78
3.10 The soft law initiatives of the Commission to amend the EC merger control regime 80
CHAPTER Ⅳ A comparative analysis of EC and US merger control law： The substantive rules 83
4.1 Introduction 83
4.2 Substantive assessment of mergers： Introductory remarks 83
A） The US substantive test 83
B） The EC substantive test 84
4.3 Definition of relevant markets 86
4.4 Evaluation of anti-competitive effects of mergers 87
A） The US approach 87
B） The EC approach 89
4.5 A comparative analysis of the scope of application of the market dominance test and of the substantial lessening of competition test 92
A） Monopolist scenario 93
B） Oligopolist scenario 93
C） The EC Regulation 139/2004 and the unilateral anti-competitive effects in oligopolies 97
4.6 The Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger 98
A） The decision of the Federal Trade Commission 98
B） The decision of the European Commission 98
4.7 The General Electric/Honeywell merger 100
A） The decision of the Department of Justice 100
B） The decision of the European Commission 100
C） The judgment of the Court of First Instance 102
D） US criticism of the Commission’s decision 102
4.8 Regulation of foreclosure effects： is it big really bad？ 103
A） The theory of conglomerate effects 103
B） The theory of conglomerate effects in the case law of the Commission 105
C） The theory of conglomerate effects in the case law of the EC Courts 106
D） The theory of conglomerate effects in the US 111
E） Comparing the EC and US positions for the assessment of conglomerate effects 111
F） Critical review of the foundations and practicability of the theory of conglomerate effects 113
4.9 The EC and US different approaches to regulation of mergers between large firms： Possible explanations 116
A） Goals of competition law 116
B） Different perception of market forces 120
C） Availability of post-merger remedies 121
D） Treatment of efficiencies 123
4.10 Final thoughts on convergence and divergence between EC and US merger control laws 128
4.11 Conclusion 131
CHAPTER Ⅴ A comparative analysis of merger control laws enacted by other jurisdictions 133
5.1 Introduction 133
5.2 Institutional frameworks 134
5.3 Procedural rules 136
A） Jurisdictional criteria 136
B） Merger notification regimes 138
C） Investigation period 140
D） Notification forms and filing fees 140
5.4 Substantive rules 141
A） Substantive tests for the assessment of mergers 141
B） Competition harms 143
C） Goals of competition law 143
5.5 Major implications of differences in national merger control laws 144
5.6 Conclusion 146
CHAPTER Ⅵ The bilateral strategy 147
6.1 Introduction 147
6.2 The origins of bilateral cooperation 147
A） The first generation of bilateral cooperation agreements 148
B） The second generation of bilateral cooperation agreements 149
C） De facto application of the principle of comity 150
6.3 Contributions of the OECD to the development of international cooperation 150
6.4 The EC/US bilateral cooperation 151
A） The 1991 Cooperation Agreement 151
B） The 1993 Cooperation Agreement 153
C） Practical assessment of the EC/US bilateral cooperation in merger control 155
6.5 Regional Agreements 162
A） The Australia New Zealand Closer Economic Relations Agreement 163
B） Asian Regional Agreements 164
C） African Regional Agreements 165
D） American Regional Agreements 166
6.6 European Regional Agreements 168
A） Europe Agreements 168
B） Partnership and Cooperation Agreements 170
C） Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Agreements 170
6.7 Competition rules of the European Regional Agreements and regulation of transnational restrictive business practices 172
A） Pursuance of different level of harmonization 172
B） Objectives of Association Agreements 175
6.8 A critical review of competition rules of European Association Agreements and of Regional Trade Agreements 175
6.9 A Critical review of the bilateral strategy 176
A） Advantages of bilateral cooperation agreements 176
B） Disadvantages of bilateral cooperation agreements 177
6.10 The bilateral strategy and regulation of transnational mergers 185
CHAPTER Ⅶ Multilateral strategy： Instruments of hard law 189
7.1 Introduction 189
7.2 First attempts to create multinational competition rules 190
A） The Havana Charter 190
B） The Draft International Antitrust Code 191
7.3 The first steps of the proposal for WTO competition rules： From the Van Miert Report to Singapore 193
7.4 Arguments for WTO competition rules 194
7.5 Arguments against WTO competition rules 196
A） Law-making problems 196
B） Misapplication problems 198
7.6 On the road towards Cancun Conference 202
7.7 The failure of the Cancun Conference. Is it the end of WTO competition rules？ 207
7.8 An alternative approach for the creation of multilateral competition rules： The theory of market access developed by Professor Fox 210
A） Interaction between competition and trade law 210
B） The set of proposed international principles for regulation of transnational restrictive business practices 211
C） Some critical thoughts on the theory of market access 213
7.9 Multilateral instruments of hard law as regulatory tools for transnational Mergers. Prospects and problems 216
A） Unwillingness of countries to cede sovereignty to international bodies 216
B） Aversion to undertake legally binding commitments 218
C） The risk of “race to the bottom” 219
7.10 Conclusion 221
CHAPTER Ⅷ Multilateral strategy： Instruments of soft law 223
8.1 Introduction 223
8.2 The UNCTAD Set 224
A） Goals and contents 224
B） The UNCTAD set and regulation of transnational restrictive business practices 225
8.3 The initiatives of the OECD 225
A） Instruments adopted by the OECD 225
B） Evaluation of the OECD activities 227
8.4 The International Competition Network 228
A） The origin of the ICN 228
B） The ICN： A successful venture 229
8.5 Soft law international cooperation in the financial services sector 230
A） The Basle Committee 232
B） The IOSCO 233
C） The IAIS 234
D） Other relevant initiatives 234
8.6 Lessons from international cooperation in the financial services sector 235
Building a feasible international framework for regulation of transnational mergers 237
8.8 The definition of “transnational” mergers 238
8.9 The concepts of legitimacy and efficiency 240
8.10 The International Competition Principles 241
A） Conflict-of-jurisdiction rules 242
B） Principles regarding mergers notification 247
C） Principles regarding review period 248
D） Principles regarding notification forms 249
E） Other procedural principles 252
F） Principles regarding remedies 256
G） Principles regarding powers of competition authorities 257
H） Comments on the Recommended Practices 257
8.11 Harmonisation of substantive rules 258
A） Problems associated with harmonisation 258
B） An innovative approach to harmonisation 260
8.12 The extrinsic dimension of efficiency 263
A） The principle of conditionality 263
B） Technical assistance and capacity building programmes 265
C） Peer review systems 266
8.13 Arguments for the creation of the International Framework for Merger Control： A Summary 268
8.14 Conclusion 270
CHAPTER Ⅸ Conclusion 273
List of abbreviations 283
Bibliographv 285
Table of Cases 339
Table of International Agreements and Other International Instruments 343
Table of Statutes 349
List of Important Websites 353