Chapter 1 Introduction 1
1.1 The Purpose and Scope of the Study 3
1.2 Research Methods 4
Chapter 2 Introduction to the WTO Dispute Settlement Remedies: An International Law Perspective 7
2.1 Why the Law of State Responsibility Matters in the GATT/WTO Context 8
2.2 Panel and Appellate Body's Recommendations and Rulings 11
2.3 Cessation and Non-repetition 12
2.4 Reparation 13
2.4.1 Restitution 14
2.4.1.1 GATT 1947 Practice 15
2.4.1.2 WTO Practice 16
2.4.2 Compensation 19
2.4.2.1 Peculiarities of GATT/WTO Compensation 20
2.4.2.2 GATT 1947 Practice 21
2.4.2.3 WTO Practice 22
2.4.2.4 Monetary Compensation in the GATT/WTO 22
2.4.3 Satisfaction 25
2.5 Countermeasures 26
2.5.1 The Legal Nature 26
2.5.2 The Status in the Remedies System 27
2.5.3 Purposes 28
2.5.3.1 Inducement of Compliance 28
2.5.3.2 Re-balancing of the Benefits 29
2.5.3.3 Do These Purposes Coexist? 31
2.5.3.4 Compensation 33
2.5.4 The Content 33
2.5.5 ‘Curbed' Unilateralism 35
2.5.5.1 The Principle of Multilateralism 35
2.5.5.2 Prohibition of Non-authorized Unilateral Retaliation 36
2.5.5.3 Prohibition of the Threat of Retaliation? 38
2.5.5.3.1 Publication of Retaliation Lists 39
2.5.5.3.2 Suspension of Customs Liquidation 40
2.5.6 The Proportionality Principle 42
2.5.6.1 The Proportionality Principle versus Inducement Effect 44
2.5.7 Applicability of the Law of State Responsibility to WTO Retaliation 45
2.6 Concluding Remarks 47
Chapter 3 Retaliation under GATT 1947 and the DSU 49
3.1 The Evolution of the GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 50
3.1.1 The GATT 1947 Dispute Settlement Mechanism 50
3.1.1.1 GATT 1947 Articles ⅩⅩⅡand ⅩⅩⅢ 50
3.1.1.2 Other Main Instruments on Dispute Settlement 51
3.1.2 The WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism 52
3.1.2.1 The DSU 53
3.1.2.2 Institutions and Procedures 53
3.2 Retaliation in the Pre-WTO Dispute Settlement System 55
3.2.1 The Havana Charter 56
3.2.2 GATT 1947 56
3.2.2.1 The ‘Serious Enough' Requirement 56
3.2.2.2 The Appropriateness Standard 57
3.2.3 Other Instruments and Practice 58
3.2.3.1 Prima Facie Nullification or Impairment 58
3.2.3.2 The Case of Developing Countries 59
3.2.4 Retaliation Practice 59
3.2.4.1 Case Study: United States Import Restrictions on Dairy Products 60
3.2.4.1.1 Factual Background 60
3.2.4.1.2 Findings 60
3.2.4.1.3 Assessment 61
3.3 Retaliation under the DSU 62
3.3.1 Three-Stage Retaliation 65
3.3.2 Cross-Retaliation 67
3.3.2.1 Whether Suspension Is Not Practicable or Not Effective 68
3.3.2.2 ‘The Importance of Such Trade' 70
3.3.2.3 ‘The Broader Economic Elements' and ‘The Broader Economic Consequences' 71
3.3.2.4 ‘The Circumstances are Serious Enough' 71
3.3.2.5 Application of the Requirements in Practice 72
3.3.3 ProceduralIssues 74
3.3.3.1 The Mandate of Arbitrators under DSU Article 22 74
3.3.3.1.1 Article 22.6 74
3.3.3.1.2 Article 22.7 75
3.3.3.2 Burden of Proof 76
3.3.3.2.1 General Remarks 76
3.3.3.2.2 DSU Article 22 77
3.3.3.2.3 The Duty to Cooperate 78
3.3.3.3 Third-Party Rights under DSU Article 22 78
3.3.3.4 Sufficiency of a Retaliation Request 79
3.3.3.4.1 The Minimum Requirements 79
3.3.3.4.2 Other Elements of the Request ‘Specificity' 80
3.3.3.5 Identification of Concessions/Obligations in a Retaliation Request 81
3.3.3.6 The Scope of Target Products 81
3.3.3.7 Treatment of Confidential Information 82
3.3.3.8 Opening Arbitration Hearings to the Public 83
3.3.4 Substantive Issues 84
3.3.4.1 ‘Nullification or Impairment' 84
3.3.4.1.1 The Concept of ‘Nullification or Impairment' 84
3.3.4.1.2 ‘Nullification or Impairment' versus‘Violation' 85
3.3.4.1.3 Nullification or Impairment as a Result of Legislation ‘as Such’‘/as Applied' 85
3.3.4.2 ‘Chilling Effect' of a Violation 86
3.3.4.3 The Equivalence Standard 87
3.3.4.3.1 General Considerations 87
3.3.4.3.2 Qualitative or Quantitative Equivalence 88
3.3.4.4 Indirect Benefits 89
3.3.4.5 A Point in Time Used for Calculations 89
3.3.4.6 Suspension of TRIPS Agreement Obligations 90
3.4 Concluding Remarks 93
Chapter 4 Retaliation under the SCM Agreement 95
4.1 Introduction to the SCM Agreement 95
4.2 Retaliation against Prohibited Subsidies 96
4.2.1 The Scope of ‘Prohibited Subsidies' 96
4.2.2 Special Procedures and Sui Generis Remedies 97
4.2.3 Procedural Issues 98
4.2.3.1 The Mandate of Arbitrators under Article 4.11 of the SCM Agreement 98
4.2.4 Substantive Issues 98
4.2.4.1 ‘Countermeasures' 98
4.2.4.2 ‘Appropriate Countermeasures' 99
4.2.4.2.1 Restrained Flexibility 100
4.2.4.2.2 Non-disproportionateness 100
4.2.4.2.3 Compliance-Inducing Effect 101
4.2.4.3 Legal Justification of the ‘Violation Value' Approach 102
4.2.4.3.1 Comparison with Article 22 of the DSU 102
4.2.4.3.2 Comparison with Articles 7 and 9 of the SCM Agreement 103
4.2.4.3.3 The Erga Omnes Partes Obligation 103
4.2.4.4 The ‘Qualitative' Element 105
4.2.4.4.1 ‘The Gravity of the Internationally Wrongful Act' 105
4.2.4.4.2 ‘The Rights in Question' 106
4.2.4.5 Punitive Countermeasures? 107
4.3 Retaliation against Actionable Subsidies 108
4.3.1 The Scope of ‘Actionable Subsidies' 108
4.3.2 Special Procedures and Sui Generis Remedies 109
4.3.3 The Commensurateness Standard 110
4.4 Concluding Remarks 112
Chapter 5 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation 113
5.1 Statistical Overview of WTO Retaliation Practice 114
5.2 Retaliation under DSU Article 22: The ‘Economic/Trade Effects' Approach 116
5.2.1 The ‘Actual/Counterfactual' Method 117
5.2.1.1 EC —Bananas Ⅲ （US/Ecuador） （Article 22.6 —EC） 118
5.2.1.1.1 Factual Background 118
5.2.1.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation: US Request 119
5.2.1.1.3 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation: Ecuador's Request 120
5.2.1.1.4 Assessment 121
5.2.1.1.5 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation 122
5.2.1.2 EC —Hormones （Canada/US） （Article 22.6 —EC） 122
5.2.1.2.1 Factual Background 122
5.2.1.2.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation 123
5.2.1.2.3 Assessment 124
5.2.1.2.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation 125
5.2.1.3 US —Gambling （Article 22.6 —US） 126
5.2.1.3.1 Factual Background 126
5.2.1.3.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation 127
5.2.1.3.3 Assessment 130
5.2.1.3.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation 131
5.2.2 The ‘Future Factors' Method 131
5.2.2.1 US —1916 Act （EC） （Article 22.6 —US） 132
5.2.2.1.1 Factual Background 132
5.2.2.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation 132
5.2.2.1.3 Assessment 134
5.2.2.1.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation 135
5.2.3 The ‘Economic Modelling' Method 135
5.2.3.1 US —Offset Act （Byrd Amendment）（Article 22.6 —US） 135
5.2.3.1.1 Factual Background 135
5.2.3.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation 136
5.2.3.1.3 Assessment 138
5.2.3.1.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation 139
5.3 Retaliation under SCM Agreement Article 4.10: The ‘Violation Value' Approach 139
5.3.1 The ‘Financial-Contribution-Based' Method 140
5.3.1.1 US —FSC （Article 22.6 —US） 140
5.3.1.1.1 Factual Background 140
5.3.1.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation 141
5.3.1.1.3 Assessment 142
5.3.1.1.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation 143
5.3.2 The ‘Benefit-Based' Method 143
5.3.2.1 Brazil —Aircraft （Article 22.6 —Brazil） 144
5.3.2.1.1 Factual Background 144
5.3.2.1.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation 145
5.3.2.1.3 Assessment 146
5.3.2.1.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation 146
5.3.2.2 Canada —Aircraft Credits and Guarantees（Article 22.6 —Canada） 146
5.3.2.2.1 Factual Background 146
5.3.2.2.2 Calculation of the Level of Retaliation 147
5.3.2.2.3 Assessment 148
5.3.2.2.4 Implementation of Authorized Retaliation 149
5.4 Concluding Remarks 149
Chapter 6 The WTO Retaliation System: Problems and Solutions 153
6.1 The DSU Review 154
6.2 Procedural Problems 155
6.2.1 The Pre-retaliation Stage 155
6.2.1.1 The ‘Sequencing' Issue 155
6.2.1.1.1 WTO Case Law 156
6.2.1.1.2 Ad Hoc Agreements by the Disputing Parties 157
6.2.1.1.3 Proposals for a Permanent Solution 158
6.2.2 The Post-retaliation Stage 160
6.2.2.1 ‘Carousel' Retaliation 160
6.2.2.1.1 WTO Case Law 160
6.2.2.1.2 Is ‘Carousel' Retaliation Legal? 162
6.2.2.1.3 Proposals on ‘Carousel' Retaliation 163
6.2.2.2 Termination of Retaliation 164
6.2.3 The Transparency Issue 165
6.3 The Matter of Efficacy 167
6.3.1 Early Determination and Application of Nullification or Impairment 168
6.3.2 Retroactive Retaliation 169
6.3.3 Collective Retaliation 171
6.3.4 Negotiable Retaliation 173
6.3.5 Increasing the Level of Retaliation over Time 175
6.3.6 Unconditional Cross-Retaliation 176
6.3.7 More Extensive Use of Compensation 177
6.3.7.1 Preauthorized Compensation: Contingent Liberalization Commitments 177
6.3.7.2 Monetary Compensation 178
6.4 Concluding Remarks 180
Chapter 7 Conclusion 181
Appendix 1 The Concept of Retaliation in the WTO Dispute Settlement System 185
Appendix 2 State of Play in WTO Retaliation Practice （1 January 1995—1 August 2008） 187
Appendix 3 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts 197
Appendix 4 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 213
Appendix 5 Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes 215
Appendix 6 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 243
Appendix 7Working Procedures for Arbitration Pursuant to Article 22.6 of the DSU 257
Bibliography 259
Table of Cases 277
Index 285