1 Reclaiming Fuller 1
Ⅰ Form and Agency 8
Ⅱ What is Being ‘Reclaimed’? 11
Ⅲ About the Book: Method, Material and Structure 17
Ⅳ Outline of the Chapters 20
2 Before the Debate 25
Ⅰ The Early Fuller: Positivism and Natural Law at Mid-century 28
Ⅱ Eunomics: A ‘Science or Theory of Good Order and Workable Social Arrangements’ 32
A Eunomics ‘Writ Large’ 37
B Eunomics ‘Writ Small’: The Models 39
Ⅲ Navigating the Labels 45
Ⅳ Conclusion 48
3 The 1958 Debate 51
Ⅰ Mapping the Debate 54
A Setting the Agenda: Hart’s Claims 54
B Reorienting the Agenda: Fuller’s Replies 58
（ⅰ） The Fidelity Frame 58
（ⅱ） Diagnosing the Impasse 60
（ⅲ） Moralities External and Internal 63
（ⅳ） The Incompleteness of Positivism 65
Ⅱ Reclaiming Fuller through the Nazi Law Debate 66
A Nazi Law according to Hart 66
B Nazi Law according to Fuller 68
C Analysis: Reading Fuller through the Nazi Law Debate 72
（ⅰ） Defending a Distinctive Natural Law Analysis 72
（ⅱ） Positivism and Legal Pathology 73
（ⅲ） The Turn to the Subject 75
（ⅳ） Validity and Existence 76
Ⅲ Fuller and Legal Validity 78
Ⅳ Conclusion 84
4 The Morality of Law 86
Ⅰ Mapping The Morality of Law 88
A The Story of King Rex 88
B Situating Fuller’s Claims 92
C Conception of the Person Implicit in Legality 97
Ⅱ Hart’s Review of The Morality of Law 102
A Mapping Hart’s Response 102
B Efficacy and Trusteeship 105
C Lessons from a Tyrant? 108
Ⅲ A Different Path? 111
Ⅳ Conclusion 115
5 The Reply to Critics 118
Ⅰ Mapping the ‘Reply to Critics’ 123
A ‘The Structure of Analytical Legal Positivism’ 124
B ‘Is Some Minimum Respect for the Principles of LegaliEssential to the Existence of a Legal System?’ 125
C ‘Do the Principles of Legality Constitute an “Internal Morality of Law”?’ 126
Distinction between Law and Managerial Direction 127
D ‘Some Implications of the Debate’ 130
Ⅱ Generality, Efficacy and Agency: Insights from the Archive 131
Ⅲ Reflections on the ‘Reply to Critics’ 135
Ⅳ Conclusion 138
6 Resituating Fuller Ⅰ: Raz 141
Ⅰ Fuller and Raz 144
Ⅱ Raz on the Rule of Law 148
Ⅲ Raz on Authority 154
Ⅳ Conclusion: Form, Agency and Authority 159
7 Resituating Fuller II: Dworkin 161
Ⅰ Fuller and Dworkin 161
Ⅱ The 1965 Essays 163
Ⅲ Dworkin’s Project 166
Ⅳ Fuller, Dworkin and Interpretation 168
Ⅴ Fuller, Dworkin and Methodology 174
Ⅵ Fuller, Dworkin and the Value of Legality 177
A Content and Moral Significance of Generality 181
B Form and Concepts of Law 186
Ⅶ Conclusion: Taking Form Seriously 188
8 Three Conversations 190
Ⅰ Morality 191
Ⅱ Instrumentalism 193
Ⅲ Legality 196
Fuller and Shapiro: A New Conversation? 198
Ⅳ Conclusion 203
Index 205