Introduction: Natural Law and the Theory of Practical Rationality 1
0.1 Natural Law Theory an Account of Practical Rationality 1
0.2 The Ways in Which This Work Is Incomplete 3
1 The Real Identity Thesis 6
1.1 Rival Views of How Goods Are Known 6
Inclinationist and Derivationist Accounts of Fundamental Practical Knowledge 6
Difficulties with Derivationism and Inclinationism 13
The Real Identity Thesis Stated 17
1.2 Functioning and Flourishing 21
That the Human Has a Function: The Functional-Composition Thesis 23
An Analysis of ‘Function’ 26
That the Human’s Functioning Is to Be Identified with Its Flourishing 29
A Superfluous Concept? 32
1.3 Knowledge of Human Flourishing 34
Mentalism 34
Statistical Normalcy 35
Knowledge of Flourishing as Implicit in Particular Function Judgments 36
1.4 The Real Identity Thesis 40
Reasons to Affirm the Real Identity Thesis 40
Aquinas’s Natural Law Theory and the Real Identity Thesis 43
2 Well-Being 46
2.1 Natural Law Theory as Welfarist and Objectivist 46
2.2 The Refutation of Conceptual Subjectivism 48
2.3 The Simple Desire-Fulfillment Theory as the Best Version of Strong Subjectivism 50
Against the Simple View: That Desires Can Be Based on False Beliefs 53
Against the Simple View: That Desires Can Be Absent due to a Lack of True Beliefs 62
Against the Simple View: That Second-Order Desires Must Be Taken into Account 64
Against the Simple View: That It Is Unable to Capture the Critical Character of the Good 67
2.4 The Refutation of Strong Subjectivism 71
How Desires Entail Reasons 72
A Question Left Open 76
2.5 The Refutation of Weak Subjectivism 76
The Subject-Relativity of Well-Being 76
Internalist Constraints 80
Troubles with Substantive Theories of Rationality 90
A Question Left Open 92
2.6 ‘Objective List’ Theories 94
3 The Reasons That Make Action Intelligible 96
3.1 The List of Goods 96
3.2 Pleasure and Pain 96
3.3 The Basic Goods 100
Life 101
Knowledge 106
Aesthetic Experience 109
Excellence in Play and Work 111
Excellence in Agency 114
Inner Peace 118
Friendship and Community 126
Religion 131
Happiness 133
3.4 Inner Peace, Happiness, and the Hybrid View of the Nature of Well-Being 135
3.5 The Real Identity Thesis Revisited 137
4 Welfarism and Its Discontents 139
4.1 Welfarism in the Theory of Practical Rationality 139
4.2 Welfarism Does Not Imply Egoism 140
4.3 Welfarism Does Not Imply a Maximizing Theory of Rationality 142
4.4 Welfarism Does Not Imply Promotionism 147
5 The Principles That Make Choice Reasonable 157
5.1 A Justificatory Framework for Principles of Practical Reasonableness 157
Plans of Action and Principles of Practical Reasonableness 157
The Formulation and Defense of Principles of Practical Reasonableness 160
5.2 Egoism, Consequentialism, Kantianism 162
Egoism 162
Consequentialism 167
Kantianism 169
5.3 The Nature of Reasons for Action 172
Welfarism about the Good 172
Agent-Relativity and Agent-Neutrality 174
Incommensurability 182
Producible Ends and Ends-in-Themselves 187
5.4 A Note on Hierarchy among the Basic Goods 190
5.5 Principles of Practical Reasonableness Governing Plans of Action 198
Against Dismissing or Devaluing Aspects of Well-Being 198
Against Dismissing or Devaluing Persons within the Context of Agent-Neutral Ends 201
Against Intentional, Instrumental Destruction of Instances of Basic Good 204
Against Inefficiency 207
5.6 Principles of Practical Reasonableness Governing Agents 208
Against Over- and Under-Specificity in Planning 209
Against Flightiness and Stubbornness 210
Against Idleness 212
5.7 Virtue Theory 212
Virtue and the Correctness of Practical Judgment 213
Virtues, Principles, and Motivation 217
6 What Ought to Be Done 220
6.1 ‘Ought’ 220
6.2 The Moral ‘Ought’ 222
6.3 How Practical Reason Can Err 228
Against Discrimination 230
Against Lying 234
Against Callousness 238
6.4 Moral Dilemmas 240
6.5 Positive Norms, Life Plans, and the Partial Constitution Thesis 246
6.6 Normative Openness and Natural Law Theories of Authority 252
Notes 255
Works Cited 271
Index 279