1．Introduction 1
1.1 Motivations for the study 1
1.1.1 Agency conflicts in corporations 1
1.1.2 Corporate governance devices 3
1.1.3 Agency conflicts and corporate governance structures in China 6
1.2 Objectives of the study 11
1.3 Methodology 14
1.4 Organization of the book 16
2．Literature review of corporate governance in China 17
2.1 Ownership structure 17
2.2 Board of directors 20
2.3 CEO duality,CEO compensation,and CEO turnover 21
2.4 External governance mechanisms 24
2.4.1 Takeover market 24
2.4.2 Product market competition 25
2.4.3 Legal infrastructure 25
2.4.4 Bank monitoring 26
2.5 Summary of the literature review and research questions 27
3．Corporate governance and firm value during the global financial crisis：Evidence from China 29
3.1 Introduction 29
3.2 Hypotheses 33
3.3 Sample selection and data 37
3.4 Empirical analyses 43
3.4.1 Univariate analyses 43
3.4.2 Regression results 44
3.5 Additional tests 50
3.5.1 Differing definitions of financial crisis periods 50
3.5.2 Deletion of outliers 53
3.5.3 Pre-crisis period results 54
3.6 Conclusions 57
4．Long-term stock performance following top executive turnover：Evidence from China 60
4.1 Introduction 60
4.2 Hypotheses 64
4.3 Sample selection and data 67
4.3.1 Sample selection 67
4.3.2 Measure of turnover-related stock performance change 71
4.4 Empirical results 73
4.4.1 Stock performance following CEO turnover 73
4.4.2 Cross-sectional determinants of turnover-related change in stock performance 77
4.5 Conclusions 81
5．Controlling shareholder,split-share structure reform and cash dividend payments in China 83
5.1 Introduction 83
5.2 Hypotheses 86
5.3 Sample selection and data 89
5.3.1 Sample selection 89
5.3.2 Variables 90
5.3.3 Data description 92
5.4 Empirical results 95
5.5 Absolute levels of cash dividends,NPTS,and ownership concentration 101
5.6 Conclusion 104
6．Conclusion and implications 106
References 109
Appendix 133
致谢 135