SELF-SUFFICIENCY OF LAWPDF电子书下载

Part Ⅰ Law as a Complex Practice: The Rule-Based Model 5

1 Legal Theory as a Scientific Discipline and the Variety of Rules 5

1.1 Preliminary 5

1.2 Austin and the Autonomy of Legal Theory 6

1.3 Kelsen and the Scientific Amendment of Legal Positivism 10

1.4 Beyond Commands and Imperatives: The Puzzle of Secondary Rules 13

2 Legal Validity and the Problem of Rule-Acceptance 19

2.1 Preliminary 19

2.2 Four Notions of Acceptance 21

2.3 The Ambiguities of Acceptance as Observance 27

3 Reflective Acceptance: Reasons for Action and Criterion-Rules 31

3.1 Preliminary 31

3.2 Internal Point of View and Rule-Government 33

3.3 Rules as Reasons for Action 36

3.4 Habits, Rules and the Limits of Hart's Approach 38

3.5 A Quasi-Wittgensteinian Reading of the Practice Theory 41

3.6 Criterion-Rules and Conditions of Thinkability 46

4 The Legal Practice and Its (Vanishing) Borders 49

4.1 Preliminary 49

4.2 The 'Payne Problem': Relevant Population and Lay People 50

4.3 Rule-Based Model of What? 54

4.4 Law as a Practice Among Practices 60

Part Ⅱ Law as a Selective Practice: The Social and the Legal 67

5 The Pluralist Divide 67

5.1 Preliminary 67

5.2 The Reasons for Legal Pluralism: Pragmatic and Conceptual Arguments 68

5.3 First Type of Pluralism: Law as Organisation 71

5.3.1 Eugen Ehrlich: The Living Law of Associations 72

5.3.2 Santi Romano: Institutions as Legal Orders 76

5.4 Second Type of Pluralism: The Artificial Character of Law 79

5.4.1 Sally Falk Moore: The Dialectic Spontaneity/Artificiality 79

5.4.2 Marc Galanter: The Historicity of Legal Borders 83

5.5 Third Type of Pluralism: The Dissolution of Legal Pluralism 86

5.5.1 Sally Engle Merry: Law as Frame of Significance 87

5.5.2 Brian Tamanaha: The Praxiological Way-Out 90

5.6 Legal Pluralism: A Provisional Assessment 94

6 Legal Pluralism Revised: Law as the Product of Selection 99

6.1 Preliminary 99

6.2 The Root of All Evils: The Malinowski Problem 99

6.3 Legal Selection and Legitimate Coercion: Hoebel's View 105

6.4 Towards a Concept of Law as a Selective Practice 111

7 Classic Institutionalism: Jural Reality and Legal Selection 113

7.1 Preliminary 113

7.2 Institutions, Inner Orders, and Romano's Dilemma 114

7.3 Jural Reality and Official Law 119

7.4 Integrating Institutionalism: Thin Functionalism 125

8 Exploring the Jural Continuum 127

8.1 Preliminary 127

8.2 The Background of Social Practices 128

8.3 Criterion-Rules, Instance-Rules, Norm-Rules 132

8.4 The Jural Continuum: Practices, Institutions, Organisations 139

8.5 Relevant Population and Lay People Reconsidered 144

Part Ⅲ The Law as a Special Practice: Legal Field and Social Reality 151

9 Negotiating Reality: Knowledge and Categories in the Legal Field 151

9.1 Preliminary 151

9.2 Law as a Trans-Sectional Venue 152

9.3 Law and Its Custodians: The Paradigmatic Case of the Roman ius 157

9.4 The Semiotic Circuit of Law: The Intriguing Case of Mekgwa Le Melao 162

9.5 Is Productive Circularity Really Distinctive? A Theoretical Objection 167

9.6 The Indispensable Self-sufficiency 173

10 The Ritual Dimension of Law: Normality, Normativity, and Critique 177

10.1 Preliminary 177

10.2 Ritual and the 'Question of Plausibility' 178

10.3 Law's Nondiscursive Dimension: Normality and Normative Facts 187

10.4 Law's Discursive Dimension: The Space for Critique 190

Epilogue 195

Defending a Pluralist Critical-Institutional View of Law 195

Bibliography 201

Author Index 209

Subject Index 213