COMPENSATING CATASTROPHE VICTIMS A COMPARATIVE LAW AND ECONOMICS APPROACHPDF电子书下载

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

1.1 Introduction 1

1.2 Setting the Scene 1

1.3 Use of Terms 6

1.3.1 Catastrophes 6

1.3.2 Natural Catastrophes, Large-Scale Terrorism Events and Man-Made Disasters 8

1.3.3 Victims and Their Damages 9

1.3.4 Financial Compensation 10

1.4 Methodology 11

1.4.1 Law and Economics 11

1.4.2 Behavioural Law and Economics 13

1.4.3 Legal Analysis 14

1.4.4 Comparative Law and Economics 14

1.5 A Brief Overview 15

Part Ⅰ A Law and Economics Perspective on Compensation for Catastrophe Victims 19

Chapter 2 The Prevention of Catastrophes: Liability Law and Safety Regulation 19

2.1 Introduction 19

2.2 Liability law 21

2.2.1 Main Characteristics of Liability Law 21

2.2.1.1 Goals of Liability Law 21

2.2.1.2 Characteristics of Tort Liability 24

2.2.2 Introduction to the Economic Analysis of Tort Law 26

2.2.3 Minimizing the Social Costs of Accidents 28

2.2.4 The Learned Hand-Formula 29

2.2.5 Negligence or Strict Liability for Unilateral Accidents? 31

2.2.5.1 Introduction to the Shavell-Model 31

2.2.5.2 The Negligence Rule 32

2.2.5.3 The Strict Liability Rule 33

2.2.5.4 Interim Findings Relevant for Man-Made Catastrophes 34

2.2.5.5 A Few Refinements 36

2.2.5.6 The Use of Liability Law for Man-Made Catastrophes 38

2.2.6 Governmental Liability for Catastrophes 39

2.3 Tort Law Is Not the Only Instrument Internalizing Externalities 42

2.4 Safety Regulation 42

2.4.1 Introduction 43

2.4.2 Explanations for Government Regulation 44

2.4.3 Safety Regulation to Prevent Catastrophes 45

2.4.4 Loss-Reduction Measures and Safety Regulation 47

2.5 Safety Regulation versus Liability Law 48

2.5.1 The Law and Economics Approach on Safety Regulation versus Liability Law 49

2.5.2 Safety Regulation versus Liability Law in the Case of Catastrophe Risks 52

2.6 Conclusion on the Prevention of Catastrophes 54

Chapter 3 On the Edge of Prevention and Compensation: Insurance 57

3.1 Introduction 57

3.2 Basic Principles of Insurance 58

3.2.1 Expected Utility, Risk Aversion and Insurance 58

3.2.2 The Law of Large Numbers 59

3.2.3 Insurance Premium 60

3.2.4 Insurers' Problems due to Asymmetric Information 61

3.2.4.1 Moral Hazard 61

3.2.4.2 Remedies to Control Moral Hazard 62

3.2.4.3 Adverse Selection 64

3.2.4.4 Remedies to Control Adverse Selection 65

3.2.5 A Competitive Insurance Market 66

3.2.6 Features of Insurability 67

3.3 Liability Insurance 69

3.3.1 Introduction to Liability Insurance 70

3.3.2 Compensation for Personal Injury or Property Damage 72

3.3.3 Trends in Liability Law and Their Effects on Liability Insurance 73

3.3.3.1 Joint and Several Liability 73

3.3.3.2 Channelling of Liability 74

3.3.3.3 Shifting the Risk of Causal Uncertainty 75

3.3.3.4 Retrospective Liability 76

3.3.4 Compulsory Liability Insurance 77

3.3.4.1 Economic Arguments for Compulsory Liability Insurance 77

3.3.4.2 Potential Drawbacks of Compulsory Liability Insurance 79

3.3.4.3 Conclusions on Compulsory Liability Insurance 81

3.4 First-Party Insurance 82

3.4.1 Introduction to First-Party Insurance 82

3.4.2 Compensation for Personal Injury or Property Damage 84

3.5 Insurance in the Context of Catastrophe Risks 85

3.5.1 The Insurability of Catastrophes 85

3.5.1.1 Natural Catastrophes 85

3.5.1.2 Terrorism Events 88

3.5.1.3 Man-Made Catastrophes 90

3.5.1.4 Conclusion on the Insurability of Catastrophes 91

3.5.2 Liability Insurance in the Context of Man-Made Catastrophes 94

3.5.2.1 Introduction 94

3.5.2.2 Limited Insurance Capacity? 94

3.5.3 First-Party Insurance in the Context of Natural Catastrophes 97

3.5.3.1 Introduction 97

3.5.3.2 Demand for First-Party Insurance against Natural Disasters 97

3.5.3.2.1 The Decision to Purchase First-Party Insurance: Expected Utility Hypothesis and Other Considerations 97

3.5.3.2.2 The Lack of Demand for First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes 99

3.5.3.2.3 Behavioural Law and Economics on the Demand for First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes 102

3.5.3.2.3.1 It Will Not Happen to Me 103

3.5.3.2.3.2 Ex Post Government Assistance 107

3.5.3.2.3.3 Preference for Uncertain Losses 108

3.5.3.2.3.4 Ineffective Information 108

3.5.3.2.3.5 Severe Budget Constraints 109

3.5.3.2.3.6 Conclusions 109

3.5.3.3 Supply of First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes 110

3.5.3.3.1 Correlation 111

3.5.3.3.2 Uncertainty of the Risk 111

3.5.3.3.3 Limited Capacity 112

3.5.3.3.4 Risk as Feelings 112

3.5.3.4 Comprehensive Natural Disaster Insurance 113

3.5.3.4.1 Advantages 114

3.5.3.4.2 Setting the Premium in an All-Hazards Insurance Policy 115

3.5.3.5 Compulsory First-Party Disaster Coverage? 117

3.5.3.5.1 Economic Arguments for Compulso First-Party Insurance against Natural Catastrophes 118

3.5.3.5.2 Drawbacks (and Refinements) 120

3.5.3.6 Conclusion: Mandatory Comprehensive Disaster Insurance or the Public Purse? 122

3.6 Conclusion on Insurance against Catastrophes 124

Chapter 4 Solutions to the Catastrophe Insurance Capacity Problem 127

4.1 Introduction 127

4.2 Reinsurance 129

4.2.1 The Concept of Reinsurance 129

4.2.2 Goals of Reinsurance 130

4.2.3 Forms of Reinsurance 131

4.2.4 The Reinsurance Premium 134

4.2.5 Reinsurance for Catastrophes 134

4.2.5.1 Insurer Demand for (Natural) Catastrophe Reinsurance 135

4.2.5.2 Supply of (Natural) Catastrophe Reinsurance 136

4.2.5.3 Market Cycles 138

4.2.5.4 Conclusion on Reinsurance for Catastrophes 138

4.3 Alternative Risk Transfer 139

4.3.1 Introduction to Alternative Risk Transfer 141

4.3.1.1 Classifications of Alternative Risk Transfer 141

4.3.1.2 ART Market Participants 143

4.3.1.3 The Future of ART 143

4.3.2 Self-Insurance and Captives 144

4.3.3 Pools 146

4.3.3.1 Pooling by Insurers 147

4.3.3.2 Pooling by Operators 148

4.3.4 Capital Market Instruments 149

4.3.4.1 Introduction 149

4.3.4.1.1 Securitization and Insurance-Linked Securities 150

4.3.4.1.2 Contingent Capital 151

4.3.4.1.3 (Insurance) Derivatives 151

4.3.4.2 Insurance-Linked Securities 152

4.3.4.2.1 Standard Structure 152

4.3.4.2.2 Benefits and Costs of Insurance-Linked Securities 152

4.3.4.2.3 Triggers 153

4.3.4.2.4 Catastrophe Bonds 154

4.3.4.2.4.1 Standard Structure 155

4.3.4.2.4.2 Catastrophes Covered 156

4.3.4.2.4.3 Advantages and Disadvantages of Catastrophe Bonds 156

4.3.4.2.4.4 Future Prospects for Catastrophe Bonds 158

4.3.4.3 Contingent Capital 159

4.3.4.3.1 Standard Structure 159

4.3.4.3.2 Benefits and Costs of Contingent Capital 161

4.3.4.4 Catastrophe Derivatives 162

4.3.4.4.1 Standard Structure 162

4.3.4.4.2 Benefits and Costs of (Catastrophe) Derivatives 163

4.3.4.4.3 Exchange-Traded Catastrophe Derivatives 165

4.3.4.4.3.1 Chicago Board of Trade 165

4.3.4.4.3.2 Catastrophe Risk Exchange 166

4.3.4.4.3.3 Bermuda Commodities Exchange 166

4.3.4.4.4 OTC Catastrophe Derivatives 167

4.3.4.4.4.1 Catastrophe Swap 167

4.3.4.4.4.2 Pure Catastrophe Swap 167

4.3.4.4.4.3 Weather Derivatives 168

4.3.4.4.5 Challenges for Catastrophe Derivatives 169

4.3.4.5 A Comparative Analysis of Capital Market Instruments 169

4.3.4.5.1 Liquidity Risk, Basis Risk, Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection, and Credit Risk 170

4.3.4.5.2 Catastrophe Bonds Versus Catastrophe Reinsurance 174

4.3.4.6 Capital Markets and the Terrorism Risk 177

4.3.4.6.1 The Potential of Capital Market Instruments to Undertake Terrorism Coverage 177

4.3.4.6.2 A Market for Terrorism Catastrophe Bonds? 178

4.3.4.7 Conclusions on Capital Markets as an Instrument to Manage the Catastrophe Insurance Capacity Problem 179

4.4 Conclusions on Solutions to the Catastrophe Insurance Capacity Problem 181

Chapter 5 The Potential Role of the Government in Compensating Catastrophic Damages 185

5.1 Introduction 185

5.2 The Potential Role of the Government within the Insurance Market 187

5.2.1 Types of Government Intervention 187

5.2.1.1 Supporting the Private Insurance Market 188

5.2.1.2 Risk-Sharing with the Private Sector: The Government as Reinsurer of Last Resort 189

5.2.1.3 Government-Provided Insurance 190

5.2.1.4 A Newly Proposed Form of Government Intervention: The Auctioning of XOL Contracts 190

5.2.2 A Law and Economics Perspective on Government Intervention in the Catastrophe Insurance Market 192

5.2.2.1 An Overview of Theories of Public Policy 193

5.2.2.2 Law and Economics Perspective 195

5.2.2.2.1 Arguments in Favour of Government Intervention 195

5.2.2.2.2 Arguments against Government Intervention 197

5.2.3 Modalities for Efficient Government Intervention in the Catastrophe Insurance Markets 199

5.2.4 Conclusions on the Government Intervening within the Private Catastrophe Insurance Market 202

5.3 The Potential Role of the Government Outside the Insurance Market 202

5.3.1 Types of Government Intervention 203

5.3.1.1 Additional Risk Layer for the Government 203

5.3.1.2 Government-Run Compensation Funds 204

5.3.1.3 A Newly Proposed Form of Government Intervention: Government as Lender of Last Resort 205

5.3.2 A Law and Economics Perspective on Government Intervention Outside the Catastrophe Insurance Market 206

5.4 Conclusion on the Potential Role of the Government in Compensating Catastrophic Damages 208

Chapter 6 Summary Findings and Policy Recommendations 211

6.1 Introduction 211

6.2 Point of Departure 212

6.3 Overarching Principles 212

6.4 Classification of Catastrophes 214

6.5 Natural Catastrophes 215

6.5.1 Liability Law 215

6.5.2 First-Party Insurance 215

6.5.3 Further Government Intervention 217

6.5.4 Other Financing Techniques to be Pushed Forward 218

6.5.5 Conclusion 219

6.6 Technological Catastrophes 220

6.6.1 Liability Law 220

6.6.2 Liability Insurance 222

6.6.3 Further Government Intervention 222

6.6.4 Other Financing Techniques to be Pushed Forward 223

6.6.5 First-Party Insurance 223

6.6.6 Conclusion 224

6.7 Terrorism Events 225

6.7.1 Liability Law (and Liability Insurance) 225

6.7.2 First-Party Insurance 227

6.7.3 An Important Governmental Role 227

6.7.4 Conclusion 229

Part Ⅱ Compensation Solutions in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and the United States 235

Chapter 7 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in Belgium 235

7.1 Introduction 235

7.2 Social Security 236

7.2.1 Workers' Compensation 237

7.2.2 Health Insurance 238

7.3 Liability Law 240

7.3.1 The Three Basic Requirements of Fault Liability and Negligence 240

7.3.2 The Two Basic Requirements of Strict Liability 241

7.3.3 Compensation under Tort Law 243

7.3.4 Governmental Liability 244

7.4 Insurance (and Government Intervention) 246

7.4.1 Natural Disasters 247

7.4.1.1 A Retrospective 248

7.4.1.1.1 Act of 12 July 1976 248

7.4.1.1.1.1 Main Disposals 248

7.4.1.1.1.2 Disadvantages 249

7.4.1.1.1.3 The 1976 Act in Practice 250

7.4.1.1.2 Royal Decree of 24 December 1992 251

7.4.1.1.3 Royal Decree of 16 January 1995 252

7.4.1.1.4 Act of 21 May 2003 253

7.4.1.2 Act of 17 September 2005 254

7.4.1.2.1 Area of Application 254

7.4.1.2.2 Covered Damage 255

7.4.1.2.3 Insurance Premium 256

7.4.1.2.4 Guarantees for the Insurer 257

7.4.1.2.5 Tariffication Office 258

7.4.1.2.6 Advantages 258

7.4.1.2.7 Conclusion 258

7.4.1.2.8 Judgment Number 39/2007 of the Constitutional Court of 15 March 2007 259

7.4.2 Terrorist Attacks 260

7.4.2.1 A Retrospective 260

7.4.2.1.1 Insurance Act 260

7.4.2.1.2 Royal Decree of 1 February 1988 and of 24 December 1992 261

7.4.2.2 Act of 1 April 2007 263

7.4.2.2.1 Area of Application 263

7.4.2.2.2 Maximum Compensation 264

7.4.2.2.3 Covered Damages 265

7.4.3 Man-Made Disasters 266

7.4.3.1 Act of 30 July 1979 267

7.4.3.1.1 Prevention 267

7.4.3.1.2 Compensation 268

7.4.3.1.3 Disadvantages 268

7.4.3.2 Gellingen/Ghislenghien: A Combination of Insurance and Solidarity 269

7.5 Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes in Belgium 272

7.5.1 Natural Catastrophes 273

7.5.2 Man-Made Disasters 276

7.5.3 Terrorist Attacks 278

Chapter 8 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in France 283

8.1 Introduction 283

8.2 Social Security 284

8.2.1 Workers' Compensation 285

8.2.2 Health Insurance 287

8.3 Liability Law 289

8.3.1 Private Liability Law 289

8.3.1.1 The Three Basic Requirements of Fault Liability and Negligence 289

8.3.1.2 The Three Basic Requirements of Strict Liability 291

8.3.2 Public Liability Law 292

8.3.2.1 Fault Liability of Public Authorities 293

8.3.2.2 Strict Liability of Public Authorities 294

8.3.2.3 Governmental Liability for Catastrophes 294

8.3.2.3.1 Natural Catastrophes 294

8.3.2.3.1.1 Liability of the Mayor in the Prevention of Natural Catastrophes 294

8.3.2.3.1.2 Liability of the State in the Prevention of Natural Catastrophes 296

8.3.2.3.1.3 An Example of Liability of the Mayor and the State in the Prevention of Natural Catastrophes 297

8.3.2.3.2 Terrorist Attacks 298

8.3.3 Compensation under Liability Law 299

8.4 Insurance (and Government Intervention) 300

8.4.1 ‘Garantie des Accidents de la Vie' and Other Insurance Contracts Covering Personal Injuries 301

8.4.1.1 ‘Garantie des Accidents de la Vie' 301

8.4.1.2 Other Insurance Contracts Covering Personal Injuries 302

8.4.2 Natural Disasters 302

8.4.2.1 Act of 13 July 1982 303

8.4.2.1.1 Area of Application 303

8.4.2.1.2 Natural Disasters 304

8.4.2.1.3 Covered Damage 305

8.4.2.1.4 Insurance Premium 306

8.4.2.1.5 Compensation Procedure 308

8.4.2.1.6 Guarantees for the Insurer 309

8.4.2.1.7 Tariffication Office 312

8.4.2.1.8 The Reform Project 313

8.4.2.2 Act of 25 June 1990 314

8.4.3 Terrorist Attacks 316

8.4.3.1 Prevention and a Retrospective on Compensation 316

8.4.3.2 Act of 9 September 1986 317

8.4.3.2.1 Area of Application 318

8.4.3.2.2 Acts of Terrorism 318

8.4.3.2.3 A Special Provision in Case of ‘Major Risks' 319

8.4.3.3 The New Terrorist Compensation Act 320

8.4.3.4 Gestion de l'Assurance et de la Reassurance des Risques Attentats et Actes de Terrorisme 321

8.4.3.4.1 The Creation of GAREAT 321

8.4.3.4.2 Membership 322

8.4.3.4.3 Structure 322

8.4.3.4.4 Premium 324

8.4.4 Man-Made Disasters 326

8.4.4.1 A Retrospective 326

8.4.4.2 Act of 30 July 2003 328

8.4.4.2.1 Area of Application 328

8.4.4.2.2 Technological Catastrophes 329

8.4.4.2.3 Covered Damage 331

8.4.4.2.4 Insurance Premium 331

8.4.4.2.5 Compensation Procedure 332

8.4.4.2.6 Subrogation 332

8.5 Compensation Funds 332

8.5.1 ‘Fonds de Garantie des Victimes d'Actes de Terrorisme et d'Autres Infractions' 332

8.5.2 ‘Fonds de Garantie contre les Accidents' 335

8.6 Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes in France 337

8.6.1 Personal Injuries 337

8.6.1.1 Natural Catastrophes, Terrorist Attacks and Man-Made Disasters 337

8.6.1.2 Terrorist Attacks 339

8.6.2 Property Damage 339

8.6.2.1 Natural Catastrophes 339

8.6.2.2 Man-Made Disasters 342

8.6.2.3 Terrorist Attacks 345

Chapter 9 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in the Netherlands 349

9.1 Introduction 349

9.2 Social Security 350

9.2.1 Workers' Compensation 351

9.2.2 Health Insurance 353

9.3 Liability Law 354

9.3.1 The Three Basic Requirements of Fault Liability and Negligence 355

9.3.2 The Two Basic Requirements of Strict Liability 357

9.3.3 Compensation under Liability Law 358

9.3.4 Governmental Liability 359

9.4 Insurance and Government Intervention 362

9.4.1 Natural (and Man-Made) Catastrophes 363

9.4.1.1 A Retrospective of Insurance against Losses from Natural Disasters 363

9.4.1.2 Act of 25 May 1998 365

9.4.1.2.1 Area of Application 367

9.4.1.2.2 Covered Damage 369

9.4.1.2.3 Compensation Procedure 370

9.4.1.2.4 The Calamities Compensation Act in Practice 370

9.4.1.3 The Actual Insurability of Natural Catastrophes 372

9.4.2 Terrorist Attacks 375

9.4.2.1 A Retrospective 375

9.4.2.2 The Dutch Terrorism Risk Reinsurance Company NHT 376

9.4.2.2.1 Area of Application 377

9.4.2.2.2 Definition of the Terrorism Risk 377

9.4.2.2.3 Capacity of the NHT 378

9.4.2.2.4 Compensation Procedure 379

9.4.2.2.5 Emergency Act on Financial Transactions 380

9.4.2.2.6 The NHT in Practice 381

9.5 Ad Hoc Compensation.The Example of Some Recent Man-Made Disasters 381

9.5.1 Enschede 382

9.5.1.1 Financial Compensation to the Victims of the Enschede Catastrophe 382

9.5.1.2 Governmental Liability? 383

9.5.2 Volendam 385

9.5.2.1 Financial Compensation to the Victims of the Volendam Catastrophe 385

9.5.2.2 Governmental Liability? 386

9.6 Compensation Funds 386

9.6.1 Ad Hoc Compensation Funds 387

9.6.2 Structural Compensation Funds 387

9.6.2.1 Introduction 387

9.6.2.2 Compensation Fund for Victims of Violent Crime 388

9.6.3 The National Disaster Fund 389

9.7 Reform 390

9.8 Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes in the Netherlands 393

9.8.1 Natural Catastrophes 394

9.8.2 Man-Made Disasters 396

9.8.3 Terrorist Attacks 398

Chapter 10 Financial Compensation of Catastrophe Victims in the United States 401

10.1 Introduction 401

10.2 Social Security 403

10.2.1 Workers' Compensation 404

10.2.2 Disability Provisions 405

10.2.3 Health Insurance 407

10.2.4 Gaps in Social Security Coverage 408

10.3 Liability Law 409

10.3.1 Intentional Torts 409

10.3.2 Negligence 410

10.3.3 Strict Liability 410

10.3.4 Compensation under Liability Law 410

10.3.5 The Incentive to Sue in Tort, also after a Catastrophic Accident 412

10.4 Private Insurance 413

10.5 Government Assistance 414

10.5.1 Legislative No-Fault or Insurance Schemes 415

10.5.1.1 Federal Government Involvement in the Insurance Market 415

10.5.1.1.1 National Flood Insurance Program 415

10.5.1.1.1.1 A Retrospective of Assistance to Flood Victims 415

10.5.1.1.1.2 The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 416

10.5.1.1.1.3 Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973 418

10.5.1.1.1.4 National Flood Insurance Reform Act of 1994 419

10.5.1.1.1.5 Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2004 419

10.5.1.1.1.6 The Provision of Flood Insurance: The WYO Program 420

10.5.1.1.1.7 The Mandatory Flood Insurance Purchase Requirement 421

10.5.1.1.1.8 The Standard Flood Insurance Policy 422

10.5.1.1.1.9 Covered Damage 423

10.5.1.1.1.10 Insurance Premium 424

10.5.1.1.1.11 Funding 426

10.5.1.1.1.12 Flood Insurance Demand 427

10.5.1.1.1.13 Problems with and Failures of the NFIP 428

10.5.1.1.1.14 The Future of the NFIP 432

10.5.1.1.2 Terrorism Risk Insurance Act 438

10.5.1.1.2.1 Insured Losses after 9/11 438

10.5.1.1.2.2 Background to Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 439

10.5.1.1.2.3 TRIA of 2002 440

10.5.1.1.2.4 TRIEA of 2005 446

10.5.1.1.2.5 Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 447

10.5.1.1.2.6 How Are the Losses Really Distributed under TRIA? 448

10.5.1.1.2.7 Advantages and Disadvantages of TRIA 450

10.5.1.1.2.8 Expiration Debate and Alternatives to TRIA 454

10.5.1.2 State Government Involvement in the Insurance Market 459

10.5.1.2.1 California Earthquake Authority 460

10.5.1.2.2 Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund 460

10.5.1.2.3 Hawaii Hurricane Relief Fund 461

10.5.2 Federal Emergency Relief: FEMA 461

10.5.2.1 Roles and Responsibilities in Emergency Relief 461

10.5.2.2 Federal Emergency Relief 462

10.5.2.3 Disaster Relief to Individuals under FEMA 464

10.5.2.4 FEMA in the Twenty-First Century 464

10.5.3 Fund Solutions: The September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 465

10.5.3.1 The Special Master 466

10.5.3.2 Eligibility to the Fund 467

10.5.3.3 Covered Damage 468

10.5.3.4 Compensation Procedure 469

10.5.3.5 A Mixed Balance? 470

10.5.3.6 The Fund as a Model for the Future? 473

10.5.3.7 Financial Relief through the Fund 475

10.5.3.8 Other Financial Relief after 9/11, Independent of the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund 476

10.5.3.8.1 Federal Aid 476

10.5.3.8.2 Charity 477

10.5.3.8.3 Tort 477

10.5.3.8.4 Social Security 479

10.5.3.8.5 Crime-Victim Programmes 479

10.5.3.8.6 Workers' Compensation 479

10.5.3.8.7 Tax Relief 480

10.5.3.8.8 Totality of Compensation after 9/11 481

10.6 Financial Compensation for Victims of Catastrophes in the United States 482

10.6.1 Natural Catastrophes 483

10.6.2 Man-Made Disasters 487

10.6.3 Terrorist Attacks 489

Part Ⅲ Comparative Conclusions and Policy Recommendations with Regard to Compensating Catastrophe Victims 495

Chapter 11 Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective 495

11.1 Introduction 495

11.2 Natural Catastrophes 496

11.2.1 Belgium 496

11.2.2 France 496

11.2.3 The Netherlands 497

11.2.4 United States 497

11.2.5 Comparative Table 499

11.2.6 Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective 508

11.2.7 Summary 515

11.3 Man-Made Disasters 517

11.3.1 Belgium 517

11.3.2 France 518

11.3.3 The Netherlands 518

11.3.4 United States 518

11.3.5 Comparative Table 519

11.3.6 Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective 524

11.3.7 Summary 527

11.4 Terrorist Attacks 529

11.4.1 Belgium 529

11.4.2 France 529

11.4.3 The Netherlands 530

11.4.4 United States 530

11.4.5 Comparative Table 531

11.4.6 Comparative Conclusions from a Law and Economics Perspective 537

11.4.7 Summary 542

Chapter 12 General Conclusions on Financial Compensation to Victims of Catastrophes 545

12.1 Introduction 545

12.2 Five Categories of Compensation Mechanisms 546

12.3 Country Experiences 546

12.4 An Interim Conclusion 547

12.5 Policy Recommendations 548

12.6 Final Conclusion 550

12.7 Topics for Further Research 552

Bibliography 555

Index 603