MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROLPDF电子书下载

PART Ⅰ BACKGROUND 3

1.R.H. Coase (1937), 'The Nature of the Firm', Economica, 4 (16),November, 386-405 3

PART Ⅱ THE PERCEIVED PROBLEM 25

2.AdolfA. Berle, Jr and Gardiner C. Means (1933), 'The Divergence of Interest between Ownership and Control', in The Modern Corporation and Private Property, Chapter Ⅵ, New York, NY; Macmillan Company, 119-25 25

3.Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling (1976), 'Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure', Journal of Financial Economics, 3 (4), October, 305-60 32

4.Michael C. Jensen (1986), 'Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow,Corporate Finance, and Takeovers', American Economic Review,76 (2), May, 323-9 88

PART Ⅲ MERGERS AND THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 97

5.Henry G. Manne (1965), 'Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control', Journal of Political Economy, 73 (2), April, 110-20 97

6.William J. Carney (1999), 'The Legacy of"The Market for Corporate Control" and the Origins of the Theory of the Firm',Case Western Reserve Law Review, 50, Winter, 215-44 108

7.Fred S. McChesney (1999), ‘Manne, Mergers, and the Market for Corporate Control', Case Western Reserve Law Review, 50, Winter,245-52 138

PART Ⅳ HOW THE MARKET OPERATES: INTERNAL ISSUES 149

8.Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1981), 'The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer',Harvard Law Review, 94 (6), April, 1161-204 149

9.Lucian A. Bebchuk (1982), 'The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers', Harvard Law Review, 95 (5), March, 1028-56 193

10.David D. Haddock, Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1987), 'Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers',Virginia Law Review, 73 (4), May, 701-46 222

11.Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel (1982), 'Corporate Control Transactions', Yale Law Journal, 91 (4), March, 698-737 268

12.Robert B. Thompson and Randall S. Thomas (2004), 'The New Look of Shareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions', Vanderbilt Law Review, 57, 133-209 308

PART Ⅴ HOW THE MARKET OPERATES: EXTERNAL ISSUES 387

13.William J. Carney and Leonard A. Silverstein (2003), 'The Illusory Protections of the Poison Pill', Notre Dame Law Review, 79,179-220 387

14.Jonathan R. Macey and Fred S. McChesney (1985), 'A Theoretical Analysis of Corporate Greenmail', Yale Law Journal, 95 (1),November, 13-61 429

15.John C. Coates, Ⅳ (2001), 'Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers', California Law Review, 89 (5),October, 1301-421 478

PART Ⅵ EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 601

16.Michael C. Jensen and Richard S. Ruback (1983), 'The Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence', Journal of Financial Economics, 11 (1-4), April, 5-50 601

17.Gregg A. Jarrell, James A. Brickley and Jeffry M. Netter (1988),'The Market for Corporate Control: The Empirical Evidence Since 1980', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 2 (1), Winter, 49-68 647