INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL SYSTEM POLICY AND REGULATIONPDF电子书下载

Chapter 1 History of the Global Financial System 1

1.1 History 1

1.2 The Bretton Woods System 5

1.2.1 Pressures on the Bretton Woods System 7

1.2.2 Collapse of the Bretton Woods Exchange Rate System 9

1.2.3 The International Monetary Fund Today 11

1.2.4 The World Bank 13

1.2.5 The World Trade Organization 13

1.3 The System Today 14

Chapter 2 Globalization and Global Capital Flows 15

Chapter 3 The Latin American and African Debt Crisis of 1982 21

3.1 The Debt Crisis of 1982 21

3.2 The Loans of the 1970s： Their Origins and Destinations 23

3.2.1 The Lenders 24

3.2.2 The Borrowers 25

3.3 Causes of the Latin American and African Debt Crisis 25

3.3.1 Recycling of OPEC Funds 26

3.3.2 Bank Behaviour 27

3.3.2.1 Time and Ignorance of History 28

3.3.2.2 Inexperience of the Banks 29

3.3.2.3 Bank Profitability and Market Share 30

3.3.2.4 The Promotion of Bankers’ Careers 31

3.3.2.5 Strong Debtor Economies 31

3.3.2.6 Syndicated Lending 32

3.3.2.7 Floating Interest Rates 32

3.3.2.8 The Position of US Banks at Home 32

3.3.3 Debtor Nation Policies 33

3.3.3.1 Large Budget Deficits 33

3.3.3.2 Overvalued Exchange Rates 33

3.3.3.3 Anti-export Trade Regimes 33

3.3.3.4 Capital Flight 34

3.3.3.5 Corruption 34

3.3.4 External Factors 35

3.3.4.1 Interest Rate Increases 35

3.3.4.2 Adverse Exchange Rate Movements 35

3.3.4.3 Falls in Commodity Prices 36

3.3.4.4 The Worldwide Recession 36

3.3.4.5 Cessation of Petrodollar Recycling 36

3.3.4.6 Conclusion on External Factors 36

Chapter 4 The Brady Plan 39

4.1 Background to the Brady Plan 39

4.2 The Baker Plan 40

4.3 The Brady Plan 40

4.3.1 Mexico’s Brady Restructuring 41

4.3.2 The Phillipines Brady Restructuring 47

4.3.3 Venezuela’s Brady Restructuring 48

4.3.4 Uruguay’s and Chile’s Restructurings 50

4.3.5 Brazil’s Brady Restructuring Initiated 50

4.3.6 Argentina’s Brady Restructuring 50

4.3.7 Brazil’s Brady Restructuring is Completed 51

4.3.8 Collateralizing Brady Bonds 52

4.3.9 Conclusions Regarding the Brady Plan 53

Chapter 5 The Asian Economic Crisis of 1997 55

5.1 The Crisis Erupts 55

5.2 Causes of the Asian Economic Crisis 56

5.2.1 Type of Indebtedness 57

5.2.2 Extent of Indebtedness 57

5.2.2.1 Excess Liquidity in the Developed World 58

5.2.2.2 The Central Role of Crossover Investors 59

5.2.3 Financial Sector Weaknesses 60

5.2.3.1 Failure to Intermediate Capital Flows Effectively 60

5.2.3.2 The Premature Liberalization of Local Financial Markets 61

5.2.4 Fixed Exchange Rates 61

5.2.5 Region-Wide Loss of Confidence 62

5.3 Conclusion and Lessons 63

5.3.1 The Bene§its of Floating Exchange Rates 64

5.3.2 The High Risks of Foreign Currency Borrowing 64

5.3.3 The Need for Long-Term Local Currency Capital 65

5.3.4 International Capital Flows as a Product of Developed World Liquidity 65

5.3.5 The Urgent Need for a New Perspective on Responsibility in International Lending and Investment 65

5.4 The Role and Impact of the IMF in the Asian Crisis 66

5.4.1 Misdiagnosis 67

5.4.2 Excessive Conditionality 68

5.4.3 Protection of the System and of Creditors 69

5.4.4 Mishandling of Market Expectations 70

5.4.5 Social Costs of IMF Policies 70

5.5 Conclusions on the IMF’s Role in the Asian Crisis 71

Chapter 6 Let’s all Cry for Argentina 75

6.1 The Argentine Experience 75

6.2 Causes of the Argentine Crisis 77

6.2.1 The Peso-Dollar Peg 77

6.2.2 Excessive Indebtedness 78

6.2.3 Corruption 79

6.2.4 IMF Policies 80

6.3 The Restructuring of Argentina’s Indebtedness 81

Chapter 7 Debt Relief for Poor Countries and for Iraq 85

7.1 Debt Relief 85

7.2 The US Approach to Iraqi Debt 86

7.3 Debt-for-Development Exchanges 93

Chapter 8 Measures Available to Debtor Nations 97

8.1 Rigorous Local Prudential Regulation 97

8.2 Debt Policy 99

8.2.1 Borrow Less Foreign Currency Debt 99

8.2.2 Issue Less Short-Term Debt 100

8.2.3 Issue More Long-Term Local Currency Denominated Debt 100

8.3 Exchange Rate Policies 101

8.4 Capital Controls 104

8.4.1 Chile’s Controls 107

8.4.2 Malaysia’s Controls 108

8.4.3 The Uses of Inflow Controls 109

8.4.4 The Uses of Outflow Controls 110

8.4.5 Inflow and Outflow Controls Compared 111

8.4.6 Inflow Controls in Developed Countries 111

8.4.7 Conclusion on Capital Controls 112

8.5 Be More Willing to Play the Default Card 112

Chapter 9 Global Measures to Improve the System 121

9.1 The National Balance Sheet Problem 121

9.1.1 The Volatility Machine 122

9.1.2 Original Sin 123

9.1.3 Currency Mismatches 124

9.1.4 Local Currency Bond Markets 125

9.1.5 An International Solution 127

9.1.5.1 Changing the Lending Policies of Multilateral Development Banks 129

9.1.5.2 Local Currency Solutions 130

9.1.5.3 Re-orienting the Paris Club 130

9.1.6 Conclusion on National Balance Sheet Structures 131

9.2 A Tax on International Currency Transactions 132

9.3 A Global Financial Regulator 135

9.4 A Lender of Last Resort 135

9.5 A Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime 137

9.5.1 The Benefits of Bankruptcy Regimes 138

9.5.2 Why Is There No Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime？ 139

9.5.2.1 Absence of an Overarching Need - until Relatively Recently - for a Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime 140

9.5.2.2 Difficulties of Creating International Institutions 140

9.5.2.3 Perceived Interests of Creditors 141

9.5.3 The Details of a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime 142

9.6 Collective Action Clauses 143

9.7 The IMF Proposal： The SDRM 145

9.7.1 Would the SDRM Have Served the Debtors？ 148

9.8 Bene§its of a Global Sovereign Bankruptcy Regime 151

9.8.1 Conclusion on Systemic Measures 152

Chapter 10 The Way Forward 155

10.1 The Socialization of Private Sector Debt 156

10.2 The Future of the IMF 158

10.2.1 The IMF and Poverty in Africa 165

10.2.2 The Fund’s Inability to Reinvent Itself 166

List of References 171

Index 191