AUSTRIAN LAW AND ECONOMICS VOLUME IIPDF电子书下载

PART Ⅰ COMMON LAW, BALANCING AND EFFICIENCY 3

1. Mario J.Rizzo （1980）, ‘Law Amid Flux: The Economics of Negligence and Strict Liability in Tort’, Journal of Legal Studies, 9 （2）, March, 291-318 3

2. Mario J.Rizzo （1980）, ‘The Mirage of Efficiency’, Hofstra Law Review, 8 （3）, Spring, 641-58 31

3. James M.Buchanan （1969）, ‘Private and Social Cost’, in Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory, Chapter 5, Chicago, IL: Markham Publishing Company, 70-83 49

4. Peter Lewin （1982）, ‘Pollution Externalities: Social Cost and Strict Liability’, Cato Journal, 2 （1）, Spring, 205-29 63

5. Roy E.Cordato （1996）, ‘Time Passage and the Economics of Coming to the Nuisance: Reassessing the Coasean Perspective’, Campbell Law Review, 20, 273-92 88

6. Mario J.Rizzo （1985）, ‘Rules Versus Cost-Benefit Analysis in the Common Law’, Cato Journal, 4 （3）, Winter, 865-84 108

PART Ⅱ RULES 131

7. Richard A.Epstein （2006）, ‘Intuition, Custom, and Protocol: How to Make Sound Decisions with Limited Knowledge’, NYU Journal of Law and Liberty, 2 （1）, 1-27 131

8. Douglas Glen Whitman （2009）, ‘The Rules of Abstraction’, Review of Austrian Economics, 22 （1）, March, 21-41 158

9. Todd J.Zywicki （1998）,‘Epstein and Polanyi on Simple Rules, Complex Systems, and Decentralization’, Constitutional Political Economy, 9 （2）, June, 143-50 179

PART Ⅲ SLIPPERY SLOPE ANALYSIS 189

10.Mario J.Rizzo and Douglas Glen Whitman （2003）, ‘The Camel’s Nose is in the Tent: Rules, Theories, and Slippery Slopes’, UCLA Law Review, 51 （2）, December, 539-92 189

11.Douglas Glen Whitman and Mario J.Rizzo （2007）, ‘Paternalist Slopes’, NYU Journal of Law and Liberty, 2 （3）, 411-43 243

PART Ⅳ INSTITUTIONS 279

12. L.M.Lachmann （1971）, ‘On Institutions’, in The Legacy of Max Weber, Berkeley, CA: The Glendessary Press, 49-91 279

13. Karol Boudreaux and Paul Dragos Aligica （2007）, ‘The Evolutionary Path’, in Paths to Property: Approaches to Institutional Change in International Development, Chapter 6, London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 71-9, references 322

14. Karol Boudreaux and Paul Dragos Aligica （2007）, ‘An Intellectual Toolbox for the Creation of Property Rights’, in Paths to Property: Approaches to Institutional Change in International Development, Chapter 8, London: The Institute of Economic Affairs, 84-99, references 333

15. David A.Harper （2003）, ‘Institutions Ⅰ: Rule of Law, Property and Contract’, in Foundations of Entrepreneurship and Economic Development, Chapter 4, London and New York, NY: Routledge, 57-88, references 351

16. David A.Harper （2003）, ‘Institutions Ⅱ: Money, Political and Legal Decentralisation and Economic Freedom’, in Foundations of Entrepreneurship and Economic Development, Chapter 5, London and New York, NY: Routledge, 89-126, references 386

17. Peter J.Boettke, Christopher J.Coyne and Peter T.Leeson （2007）, ‘Saving Government Failure Theory from Itself: Recasting Political Economy from an Austrian Perspective’, Constitutional Political Economy, 18 （2）, June, 127-43 427

PART Ⅴ MARKET CHOSEN LAW 447

18. Edward Stringham （1999）, ‘Market Chosen Law’, Journal of Libertarian Studies, 14 （1）, Winter 1998-1999, 53-77 447

19. Edward Stringham （2003）, ‘The Extralegal Development of Securities Trading in Seventeenth-Century Amsterdam’, Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 43 （2）, Summer, 321-44 472

20. Edward Stringham （2002）, ‘The Emergence of the London Stock Exchange as a Self-Policing Club’, Journal of Private Enterprise, 17（2）,1-19 496

21. Anthony Ogus （1999）, ‘Competition Between National Legal Systems: A Contribution of Economic Analysis to Comparative Law’, International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 48 （2）, April, 405-18 515

22. Peter T.Leeson （2007）, ‘Trading with Bandits’, Journal of Law and Economics, 50 （2）, May, 303-21 529

23. Peter T.Leeson （2007）, ‘An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization’, Journal of Political Economy, 115 （6）, 1049-94 548

PART Ⅵ MINIMIZING THE STATE 597

24. John Hasnas （2003）, ‘Reflections on the Minimal State’, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 2 （1）,115-28 597

25. Peter T.Leeson （2008）, ‘Coordination Without Command: Stretching the Scope of Spontaneous Order’, Public Choice, 135 （1-2）, April, 67-78 611

26. Peter T.Leeson （2006）, ‘Efficient Anarchy’, Public Choice, 130 （1-2）,41-53 623

27. Peter T.Leeson （2008）, ‘How Important is State Enforcement for Trade?’, American Law and Economics Review, 10 （1）, Spring, 61-89 636

28. Walter Block and Thomas J.DiLorenzo （2000）, ‘Is VoluntaryGovernment Possible? A Critique of Constitutional Economics’, Journal of Theoretical and Institutional Economics, 156 （4）, December, 567-82 665

29. Randall G.Holcombe （2004）, ‘Government: Unnecessary but Inevitable’, Independent Review: A Journal of Political Economy, Ⅷ （3）, Winter, 325-42 681

PART Ⅶ DISPERSED KNOWLEDGE AND THE LIMITS OF LAW 701

30. Mario J.Rizzo （2005）, ‘The Problem of Moral Dirigisme: A New Argument Against Moralistic Legislation’, NYU Journal of Law and Liberty, 1 （2）,789-843 701