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Introduction by Aulis Aarnio 1

1 The Dilema of Legal Reasoning: Moral Evaluation or Description of the Law? 13

1.1 A Theory of Legal Reasoning 13

1.2 Legal Decision-Making and Evaluations 14

1.2.1 Introduction.Subsumption in Clear and Hard Cases 14

1.2.2 Interpretative Problems - Ambiguity, Vagueness and Value-Openess 16

1.2.3 Gaps in the Law 18

1.2.4 Evidence of Facts 20

1.2.5 Choice of a Legal Norm 20

1.2.6 Choice of a Legal Consequence 21

1.2.7 Obsolete Laws and Desuetudo 22

1.3 The Concept “Legal Decision-Making” 22

1.4 Why do the Lawyers Need Special Interpretation Methods? 24

1.4.1 Expectation of Legal Certainty 24

1.4.2 The Law and Democracy 27

1.5 Legal Knowledge? 33

1.5.1 Introductory Remarks on Theoretical and Practical Statements 33

1.5.2 Legal Interpretatory Statements 34

1.5.3 The Main Problem: Knowledge, Truth and Rightness In Legal Reasoning 35

2 Rationality of Moral Judgments 39

2.1 Cognitivism and Non-Cognitivism 39

2.2 Practical and Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements 42

2.2.1 Practical Meaning 42

2.2.2 More About Practical Meaning.Norms and the Will 43

2.2.3 Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements:Justifiability 44

2.2.4 Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements:L-, S- and D-rationality 45

2.3 More About Theoretical Meaning of Practical Statements Prima-facie Moral Statements 47

2.3.1 Criteria of Moral Goodness 47

2.3.2 General Theories of the Morally Good 48

2.3.3 Prima-facie Character of Moral Theories and Criteria 49

2.3.4 The Step From Theoretical Propositions to Prima-facie Practical Conclusions 53

2.3.5 Permissibility-Making Facts 55

2.3.6 Claim-Making Facts 57

2.3.7 Competence-Making Facts 59

2.3.8 Complex Right-Making Facts 60

2.4 Weighing and Balancing 61

2.4.1 Principles and Values 61

2.4.2 All-Things-Considered Practical Statements 62

2.4.3 Weighing and Balancing of Principles 63

2.4.4 Weighing Rules 66

2.4.5 Final Act of Weighing and Balancing 67

2.4.6 A Step From Theoretical Propositions to Definitive Practical Statements? 69

2.4.7 The Step From Practical Statements To Theoretical Conclusions 75

2.4.8 Concluding Remarks Concerning Logical Relations Between Theoretical and Practical Statements 76

2.5 Some Examples of the Role of Weighing in Moral Theories 77

2.5.1 Introductory Remarks 77

2.5.2 Weighing Preferences: Hare’s Utilitarianism 77

2.5.3 Weighing Practices: MacIntyre’s Theory of Virtue 81

2.6 Examples of Weighing in Theories of Justice 83

2.6.1 Justice, Equality and Weighing 83

2.6.2 The Role of Weighing In John Rawls’s Theory of Justice 86

2.6.3 The Role of Weighing In Robert Nozick’s Theory of Justice 90

2.6.4 Some Concluding Remarks on Justice 93

2.7 Support in Moral Reasoning 95

2.7.1 Gaps and Jumps in Moral Reasoning 95

2.7.2 The Concept of a Jump 96

2.7.3 The Concept of a Reasonable Premise 96

2.7.4 The Concept of Reasonable Support 97

3 Rationality of Legal Reasoning 99

3.1 Support of Legal Reasoning.Introduction and an Example 99

3.1.1 Fixity of Law.Extensive Support of Legal Reasoning 99

3.1.2 An Example of Extensively Supported Legal Reasoning 100

3.1.3 An Example of Analysis of Legal Concepts -the Concept of Adequacy 100

3.1.4 An Example of Substantive Reasons in the Law.The Purpose of Protection.Influence of Moral Theories and Criteria 103

3.1.5 An Example of Legal Authority Reasons.Brief Remarks on Precedents 104

3.2 Analysis of Support in Legal Reasoning 105

3.2.1 Legal Reasoning As a Dialogue.Reflective Equilibrium and Hermeneutical Circle 105

3.2.2 Legal Reasoning As an Inference.An Example 107

3.2.3 Legal Reasoning As a Reasonable Jump 109

3.2.4 Strong Support 110

3.2.5 Depth of Reasoning 113

3.3 Legal Rationality and Legal Paradigm 115

3.3.1 Introductory Remarks on Legal Paradigm 115

3.3.2 Some Theories of Science 115

3.3.3 Theory of Science and Legal Reasoning 117

3.3.4 Certain Premises 121

3.3.5 Presupposed Premises 124

3.3.6 Proved Premises of Legal Reasoning 126

3.3.7 Other Reasonable Premises of Legal Reasoning 126

3.3.8 Reasonableness and Falsification 128

3.3.9 The Problem of Fundamental Justification of Legal Reasoning 129

4 The Ultimate Justification of Moral and Legal Reasoning 131

4.1 Coherence 131

4.1.1 Introductory Remarks 131

4.1.2 The Concept and Criteria of Coherence 132

4.1.3 Properties of the Supportive Structure 133

4.1.4 Properties of Concepts 140

4.1.5 Properties of the Objects the Theory Deals With 143

4.1.6 Weighing and Balancing of Criteria of Coherence 144

4.2 Coherence, Correctness and Truth 145

4.2.1 Coherence and Rational Thinking 145

4.2.2 Coherence, Data, Presuppositions and Correctness 146

4.2.3 Theories of Truth 147

4.2.4 More About the Correspondence Theory of Truth 149

4.2.5 Conclusions About Truth and Coherence 150

4.2.6 Truth and Correctness of Practical Statements 152

4.3 Rational Discourse 152

4.3.1 Introductory Remarks on D-Rationality 152

4.3.2 Robert Alexy’s Rules for Rational Practical Discourse 154

4.3.3 Robert Alexy’s Principles of Rationality 157

4.3.4 Robert Alexy’s Rules For Rational Legal Discourse 158

4.4 Why Shall Legal Reasoning be Rational? 160

4.4.1 Introduction.Why Shall Theoretical Propositions Be Consistent and Highly Coherent? 160

4.4.2 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Logically Consistent? 161

4.4.3 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Highly Coherent? Some Conceptual Reasons 164

4.4.4 Some Conceptual Reasons for Rationality of a Practical Discourse 165

4.4.5 Why Shall Practical Statements Uttered Within Legal Reasoning Be Rational? Some Conceptual Reasons 166

4.4.6 The Concepts and Life 167

4.4.7 Why Shall Practical Statements Be Highly Coherent? Some Empirical and Technical Reasons 168

4.4.8 Why Should a Discourse be Rational? Empirical,Technical and Universally-Pragmatic Reasons 170

4.4.9 Why Should Practical Statements Uttered Within Legal Reasoning be Rational? Some Further Reasons 171

5 What is Valid Law? 173

5.1 What is a Valid Law? - Introductory Remarks 173

5.1.1 Starting Point: Rationality and Fixity 173

5.1.2 The Purpose of our Theory of Valid Law 174

5.1.3 Normative Character of the Concept “Valid Law” 175

5.2 Law and Morality - On Natural Law 176

5.2.1 Introductory Remarks 176

5.2.2 An Example of Empirical Theory of Natural Law 178

5.2.3 Some Critical Remarks on Natural-Law Theories 180

5.3 Law and Morality - Legal Positivism 180

5.3.1 Hans Kelsen’s “Pure” Theory of Law 180

5.3.2 Herbert Hart’s Theory of Law 186

5.3.3 The Institutionalist Legal Positivism 190

5.3.4 Limitations of Classical Theories of Valid Law 194

5.4 More about Law and Morality 195

5.4.1 Prima-facie Law and its Relation to Prima-facie Morality 195

5.4.2 The Justification of the Relation Between the Law and Prima-facie Moral Norms.Why Ought One to Follow the Law? 198

5.4.3 Weighing Legal Rules 203

5.4.4 All-Things-Considered Law as Interpreted Law 203

5.4.5 The Relation Between the All-Things-Considered Legal Norms and All-Things-Considered Moral Norms 205

5.4.6 Gaps in Interpreted Law.Legal Interpretation and Moral Criticism 206

5.4.7 The Right to Resist Oppression 207

5.5 The Question of Existence of the Law.Legal Realism 210

5.5.1 Introductory Remarks.Axel Hagerstrom’s Philosophical Starting Points 210

5.5.2 Karl Olivecrona On Independent Imperatives and Their Functions 211

5.5.3 Tore Stromberg’s Conventionalism 213

5.5.4 Alf Ross’s Predictionism 214

5.5.5 Some Critical Remarks On Legal Realism 216

5.5.6 The Three Worlds 218

5.5.7 Components of Valid Law 219

5.6 Norms as a Component of Valid Law 220

5.6.1 Introductory Remarks On Legal Norms 220

5.6.2 Internal Validity of Legal Norms 222

5.6.3 External Validity of Legal System.Criteria Concerning the Content of Norms 224

5.6.4 Regulative Norms 225

5.6.5 Constitutive Norms 226

5.7 More About External Validity of Legal System:Action as a Component of Valid Law 231

5.8 Fact and Values in the Law 232

5.8.1 More About External Validity of Legal System:Law-Making Facts 232

5.8.2 Ought-Making Facts As Law-Making Facts 234

5.8.3 Evaluative Openness of Valid Law 236

5.8.4 The Basic Norm For the Law 239

5.8.5 A Classification of Jumps and Transformations in Legal Reasoning 244

5.9 One Right Answer to all Legal Questions? 245

5.9.1 Introductory Remarks 245

5.9.2 The Right Thesis 246

5.9.3 The Right Answer Thesis 249

5.9.4 The Incommensurability Thesis 251

5.9.5 Existence of All-Things-Considered Law 253

5.9.6 Some Remarks on “External Scepticism” 254

5.9.7 Alexy on the Right Answer 255

6 The Doctrine of the Sources of the Law 257

6.1 Substantive Reasons and Authority Reasons.The Sources of the Law 257

6.1.1 Introductory Remarks 257

6.1.2 Substantive Reasons and Rationality 257

6.1.3 Authority Reasons and Fixity 259

6.1.4 Sources of Law 260

6.2 Must-Sources, Should-Sources and May-Sources of the Law 261

6.2.1 Why Three Categories of Sources of Law? 261

6.2.2 Concepts of Must-, Should- and May-Source 262

6.3 Norms Concerning the Sources of the Law 264

6.3.1 The Character of Source-Norms 264

6.3.2 Complexity of the Swedish Doctrine of the Sources of Law 266

6.3.3 Are Substantive Reasons Sources of the Law? 269

6.4 Custom 270

6.5 Precedent 272

6.5.1 Introductory Remarks 272

6.5.2 Ratio Decidendi and Rationality 273

6.5.3 Why and To What Extent Ought One to Follow Precedents? 274

6.5.4 Methods of Justifying Judicial Decisions 275

6.5.5 Coherence of Judicial Decisions 278

6.5.6 The Role of Precedents in Swedish Law 280

6.6 Legislative Preparatory Materials 282

6.6.1 Introductory Remarks 282

6.6.2 Ratio Legis 282

6.6.3 Is Subjective Interpretation of Statutes Possible? 283

6.6.4 Is Ratio-Legis Compatible with Democracy? 285

6.6.5 Should One Pay Attention to Preparatory Materials? 287

6.6.6 The Role of Preparatory Materials in Swedish Law.General Remarks 289

6.6.7 The Role of Preparatory Materials in Swedish Law.Some Source-Norms 292

6.7 Professional Juristic Literature 295

6.8 Foreign Laws 298

6.9 Draft Statutes and Formerly Valid Law 301

7 The Methods of Legal Reasoning 305

7.1 Reasoning Norms 305

7.1.1 Construction of Statutes in Hard Cases 305

7.1.2 Reasoning Norms 307

7.2 Logical, Literal and Systematic Interpretation 310

7.2.1 Logical and Quasi-Logical Interpretation 310

7.2.2 Literal Interpretation 312

7.2.3 Systematic Interpretation 314

7.3 Reduction, Restrictive Interpretation, Extensive Interpretation and Creation of New Norms 317

7.4 Conclusion by Analogy 320

7.4.1 Introductory Remarks on Statutory Analogy 320

7.4.2 The Origin and Justification of Statutory Analogy 321

7.4.3 Law-Analogy and Legal Induction 321

7.4.4 Argumentum e contrario 322

7.4.5 The Choice Between Analogy and Argumentume contrario 323

7.4.6 Argumentum a fortiori 328

7.5 Teleological Construction of Statutes 329

7.5.1 The Basic Structure 329

7.5.2 Subjective and Objective Teleological Interpretation of Statutes 330

7.5.3 Radical Teleological Interpretation of Statutes 331

7.5.4 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.Introductory Remarks 333

7.5.5 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.The Problem of Preciseness 334

7.5.6 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.Multiple Goals 337

7.5.7 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.Restricted List of Interpretatory Methods and Sources of Law 337

7.5.8 Teleological Interpretation of Statutes According to Ekelof.Conclusions 339

7.6 Solution of Collisions Between Legal Norms 340

7.6.1 Collisions of Rules and Principles 340

7.6.2 Collision Norms 342

Bibliography 347

Index 357