INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTIONPDF电子书下载

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

1.1.The Significance of the Subject 1

1.2.Methodology and Structure 6

1.3.Main Propositions 8

Chapter 2 Preparatory Considerations 9

2.1.Necessity and Permissibility of Functions Not Within the Original Contemplation of the Procedure 9

2.2.Some Conceptual Clarifications 12

2.2.1.Standard Setting 12

2.2.2.Compliance Control 15

2.2.3.Law Development 18

2.2.4.International Arbitral， Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Procedures 19

2.2.4.1.Arbitral， Judicial and Quasi-Judicial Nature 20

2.2.4.2.International Character 23

2.2.4.3.Scope of the Procedures Covered by this Book 27

2.3.The Overall Analytical Framework： ‘Judicial Control’ Integrating Standard Setting and Law Development 28

2.3.1.The Origin of the Concept of ‘Judicial Control’ 28

2.3.2.A Proposed Model of ‘Judicial Control’ 29

2.4.Angles of the Analysis 32

2.4.1.Inter-State Relations versus State-Individual Relations 32

2.4.2.‘Soft’ Control versus ‘Hard’ Control 33

Chapter 3 Standard Setting 35

3.1.Standard Setting in International Environmental Law 35

3.2.Standard Setting for the Conservation of Marine Living Resources： Through the Practice of the ICJ， the ITLOS and Arbitral Tribunals 38

3.2.1.Introduction 38

3.2.2.The Practice of Arbitral Tribunals 39

3.2.2.1.1893 Fur-Seals Case （UK/US） 39

3.2.2.2.1910 Atlantic Fisheries Case （UK/US） 41

3.2.2.3.1986 Filleting Case （Canada/France） 43

3.2.3.The Practice of the ICJ 44

3.2.3.1.1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases （UK v.Iceland； FRG v.Iceland） 44

3.2.3.2.1998 Fisheries Jurisdiction Case （Spain v.Canada） 47

3.2.4.The Practice of the ITLOS and an Arbitral Tribunal under the UNCLOS 48

3.2.4.1.1999/2000 Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases （Australia and New Zealand v.Japan） 48

3.2.4.2.Currently Docketed Swordfish Case （Chile/EC） 51

3.2.5.The International Judiciary’s Contribution to Setting Environmental Standards 52

3.2.5.1.Standard Setting by the International Judicia Itself 52

3.2.5.2.Assistance for Standard Setting by the Parities 53

3.2.5.3.Clarification of the Requirements for Valid Domestic Standard Setting 54

3.2.6.A Comparison between Compromis Application and Unilateral Application 54

3.2.6.1.The Difference of the Influence 54

3.2.6.2.Methods to Overcome the Difficulties in Setting Standards 56

3.2.7.Concluding Remarks 59

3.3.Towards Environmental Standard Setting as Conciliato Law-Making between the Parties： Lessons Learned from the ICJ Maritime Delimitation Cases 60

3.3.1.Introduction： The Expected Conciliatory Role of the ICJ 60

3.3.2.Methods in which the ICJ Engages in Conciliatory Law-Making in Maritime Delimitation 63

3.3.2.1.Obedience to the Parties’ Common Views 63

3.3.2.2.Adoption of Each Party’s Views 64

3.3.2.3.Elaboration of the Court’s Own Views Equitably Adjusting the Parties’ Interests 64

3.3.3.Concluding Remarks 65

3.4.Setting Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards and More： The International Human Rights Judiciary’s Challenge to State Sovereignty 67

3.4.1.Introduction 67

3.4.2.The Individual-Oriented Judiciary’s Practice to Protect Human Rights against Environmental Destruction 69

3.4.2.1.Human Rights Committee （HRC） of the ICCPR 69

3.4.2.2.European Human Rights Commission and Court 72

3.4.2.2.1.Noise 73

3.4.2.2.2.Pollution 77

3.4.2.2.3.Nuclear Risk 79

3.4.2.2.4.Nature Conservation 80

3.4.2.2.5.2001/2003 Hatton and Others v.UK 82

3.4.3.Setting Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards： The Individual-Oriented Judiciary 86

3.4.3.1.Coverage of Harm 86

3.4.3.1.1.Health Effects 86

3.4.3.1.2.Property Value’s Depreciation 88

3.4.3.1.3.Amenity Deterioration 89

3.4.3.1.4.Degradation of the Environment Per Se 89

3.4.3.2.The ‘Victim’ Requirement 90

3.4.3.3.State Discretion 90

3.4.3.4.Factors Leading to Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards 91

3.4.3.4.1.Anthropocentricity of the Human Rights Concept 91

3.4.3.4.2.Absence of an Environmental Provision 91

3.4.3.4.3.Scientific Uncertainty and Non-Specificity of Environmental Harm 91

3.4.3.4.4.State Sovereignty 91

3.4.4.Setting Higher and More Precise Environmental Standards？ The Population-Oriented Judiciary 92

3.4.4.1.The Population-Oriented Judiciary’s Practice to Protect Human Rights against Environmental Destruction 92

3.4.4.1.1.Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Court 92

3.4.4.1.2.African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 93

3.4.4.1.3.Summing-Up 95

3.4.4.2.Decrease of the Factors Leading to Minimum and Vague Environmental Standards 96

3.4.4.3.Potential Factors Enabling Higher and More Precise Environmental Standards 96

3.4.4.3.1.The Communal Approach 97

3.4.4.3.2.Active Reference to Outer-Regime Law 97

3.4.5.Reference to Outer-Regime Law as a Way to Set Higher and More Precise Environmental Standards 97

3.4.5.1.Reference to Outer-Regime Law Binding on the Accused State 98

3.4.5.2.Reference to Outer-Regime Law Not Binding on the Accused State 99

3.4.5.3.EU Environmental Law as Referable Outer-Regime Law 101

3.4.6.The Recent Trend of the International Human Rights Judiciary’s Practice 104

3.4.6.1.An Overview of Recent Cases 104

3.4.6.1.1.The Individual-Oriented Judiciary’s Cases 104

3.4.6.1.1.1.Human Rights Committee （HRC） of the ICCPR 104

3.4.6.1.1.2.European Court of Human Rights 105

3.4.6.1.2.The Population-Oriented Judiciary’s Cases： Inter-American Commission and Court of Human Rights 109

3.4.6.2.An Assessment 111

3.4.7.Concluding Remarks 114

Chapter 4 Compliance Control 117

4.1.Compliance Control in International Environmental Law 117

4.2.The Montreal NCP’s ‘Soft’ Control： Evaluation through the Practice 120

4.2.1.Introduction 120

4.2.2.A Survey of the Procedure 121

4.2.3.An Examination of the Practice of the Procedure 123

4.2.3.1.Voluntary Submissions 123

4.2.3.2.Secretariat Submissions 127

4.2.4.Evaluation of the Nature of the Procedure 129

4.2.4.1.Evidence for a ‘Soft’ Nature 129

4.2.4.2.A Potential Tendency towards a ‘Hard’ Nature 130

4.2.4.3.A Demand for a ‘Legal’ Nature 131

4.2.5.A New Trend of the Recent Practice： Finding ‘Potential Non-Compliance’ 133

4.2.6.Concluding Remarks 136

4.3.The ECJ’s ‘Hard’ Control over Compliance with International Environmental Law： Its Procedural and Substantive Aspects 137

4.3.1.Introduction 137

4.3.2.Existence of the ECJ’s Procedurally ‘Hard’ Control 141

4.3.2.1.A Survey of ECJ Procedures 141

4.3.2.1.1.Opinion Procedure 142

4.3.2.1.2.Contentious Procedures 143

4.3.2.2.An Assessment 143

4.3.3.Existence of the ECJ’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control： With Special Emphasis on Nature Conservation and Hazardous Waste Management 144

4.3.3.1.Preliminary Considerations 144

4.3.3.1.1.The ECJ’s Basic Stance on Control over Compliance with International Law 144

4.3.3.1.2.The ECJ’s Substantively ‘Soft’ Control： For the GATT/WTO Agreements 145

4.3.3.2.Modalities of the ECJ’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control 147

4.3.3.2.1.Main Issues in Nature Conservation and Hazardous Waste Management 148

4.3.3.2.2.Implicit Enforcement of International Environmental Law 150

4.3.3.2.3.Explicit Enforcement of International Environmental Law 153

4.3.3.2.3.1.Using International Environmental Law as a Benchmark of EC Law Violation 153

4.3.3.2.3.2.Recognizing ‘Direct Applicability’ of Environmental Treaties 155

4.3.3.2.3.3.Some Considerations 156

4.3.3.3.Doubts about the ECJ’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control 160

4.3.4.Factors Enabling the ECJ’s ‘Hard’ Control 161

4.3.4.1.Factors Enabling Procedurally ‘Hard’ Control 161

4.3.4.1.1.Presence of the Commission’s Pre-Litigation Procedure 161

4.3.4.1.2.Existence of Active Applicants： the Commission and Private Parties 162

4.3.4.1.3.Well-Arranged Mechanisms for Promoting Second-Order Compliance 163

4.3.4.2.Factors Enabling Substantively ‘Hard’ Control 166

4.3.4.2.1.Possible Justification by Environmental Treaties 166

4.3.4.2.2.Irreparability and Transboundary Effect of the Harm 167

4.3.4.2.3.Necessity for Establishing a Common Market 168

4.3.5.Limits of the ECJ’s ‘Hard’ Control 168

4.3.5.1.Limits of Procedurally ‘Hard’ Control 168

4.3.5.1.1.Infrequent Utilization of Inter-State Infringement Proceedings 168

4.3.5.1.2.Respect for the Member States’ Discretion 169

4.3.5.2.Limits of Substantively ‘Hard’ Control 169

4.3.5.2.1.Respect for the EC Institutions’ Discretion 169

4.3.5.2.2.A Demand for Free Trade 170

4.3.6.Towards Substantively ‘Harder’ Control？ The ECJ’s Acknowledgment of Its Exclusive Jurisdiction on the Marine Environment 170

4.3.6.1.Exclusive Jurisdiction as a Factor Leading to Substantively ‘Harder’ Control 170

4.3.6.2.Cases Related to the ECJ’s Exclusive Jurisdiction 172

4.3.6.2.1.ECJ Mox Plant Case： Clarification of Preconditions for Exclusive Jurisdiction 172

4.3.6.2.2.Iron Rhine Arbitration： Resort to the Actes Clairs Doctrine and the CILFIT Test 175

4.3.6.3.Marine Environment as a Major Playground for the ECJ’s Exclusive Jurisdiction 178

4.3.6.4.Exclusive Jurisdiction as an Obstacle to Substantively ‘Harder’ Control 181

4.3.6.5.Some Considerations 182

4.3.7.Concluding Remarks 183

4.4.From the GATT Judiciary’s ‘Soft’ Control to the WTO Judiciary’s ‘Hard’ Control of Environmental Protection： Past， Present and Future 185

4.4.1.Introduction 185

4.4.2.The Nature of the GATT/WTO Judiciary’s Procedural Control 187

4.4.2.1.The GATT/WTO Judiciary as a Manager of Quasi-Judicial Procedures 187

4.4.2.2.The GATT Judiciary’s Relatively ‘Soft’ Control versus the WTO Judiciary’s Relatively ‘Hard’ Control in the Procedural Aspect 189

4.4.2.2.1.Institutional Settings 190

4.4.2.2.2.The Res Judicata Effect of a Ruling 191

4.4.3.A Quest for the Nature of the GATT/WTO Judiciary’s Substantive Control 194

4.4.3.1.The GATT Judiciary’s Practice on Trade-Related Environmental Measures 194

4.4.3.1.1.1981 US - Tuna Case 194

4.4.3.1.2.1987 US - Petroleum Tax Case 195

4.4.3.1.3.1987 Canada - Herring and Salmon Case 195

4.4.3.1.4.1990 Thailand - Cigarettes Case 196

4.4.3.1.5.1991 US - Tuna/Dolphin Ⅰ Case 196

4.4.3.1.6.1994 US - Tuna/Dolphin Ⅱ Case 198

4.4.3.1.7.1994 US - Automobile Taxes Case 199

4.4.3.2.The WTO Judiciary’s Practice on Trade-Related Environmental Measures 200

4.4.3.2.1.1996 US - Gasoline Case 200

4.4.3.2.2.1997 EC - Hormones Case 203

4.4.3.2.3.1998 US - Shrimp Case 206

4.4.3.2.4.1998 Australia - Salmon Case 211

4.4.3.2.5.1998 Japan - Agricultural Products Ⅱ Case 215

4.4.3.2.6.2001 EC - Asbestos Case 217

4.4.3.2.7.2003 Japan - Apples Case 220

4.4.3.3.The WTO Judiciary’s ‘Hard’ Control as Compared to the GATT Judiciary’s ‘Soft’ Control： In the Substantive Aspect from the Environmental Perspective 221

4.4.3.3.1.Respect for Each Party’s Environmental Autonomy 223

4.4.3.3.2.Consideration of Characteristics of Environmental Measures 223

4.4.3.3.3.Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law 224

4.4.4.Limit of the WTO Judiciary’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control of Environmental Protection and Its Possible Breakthrough 227

4.4.4.1.Limit： Occurrence of Unavoidable Conflict between GATT/WTO Law and Non-GATT/ WTO Law 227

4.4.4.2.Possible Breakthrough： Application of Non-GATT/WTO Law 228

4.4.4.2.1.Arguments for and against the Application of Non-GATT/ WTO Law 228

4.4.4.2.2.Proposals for the Prioritised Application of Non-GATT/WTO Law 233

4.4.5.Obstacles to the WTO Judiciary’s Substantively ‘Hard’ Control of Environmental Protection and Ways Forward 234

4.4.5.1.2006 EC - Biotech Products Case： Non- Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law Not Binding on All Contracting Parties 234

4.4.5.1.1.Summary of the Case 234

4.4.5.1.2.Meaning of ‘Applicable in the Relations between the Parties’ in Article 31（3）（c） of the Vienna Convention 235

4.4.5.1.2.1.‘The Parties’ 235

4.4.5.1.2.2.‘Applicable in the Relations between’ 241

4.4.5.1.3.Conditions for the Reference to Other Treaties Which Are Binding on the Parties in Question but to Which Not All the Parties to the Treaty Being Interpreted Adhere 243

4.4.5.1.4.Possibility of Referring to Treaties Not Binding on the Parties in Question and Non-Binding International Instruments 247

4.4.5.2.2007 Brazil - Tyres Case： Insufficient Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law Binding on the Disputing Parties But Not Binding on All the WTO Contracting Parties 248

4.4.5.2.1.Summary of the Case 248

4.4.5.2.2.The Panel’s ‘Effects of the Measure’ Approach versus the AB’s ‘Objective of the Measure’ Approach 250

4.4.5.2.3.The AB’s Insufficient Reference to a MERCOSUR-Related Agreement 251

4.4.5.2.4.For Sufficient Reference to Non-GATT/WTO Law 252

4.4.6.Concluding Remarks 253

Chapter 5 Law Development 255

5.1.Law Development in International Environmental Law 255

5.2.The Obligation Not to Cause Transfrontier Pollution Harm as a Corollary of Territorial Sovereignty： Focusing on the Chernobyl Accident 257

5.2.1.Introduction 257

5.2.2.The Facts of the Chernobyl Accident 259

5.2.3.State Responsibility for Transfrontier Pollution Harm by a Nuclear Accident 260

5.2.3.1.Arguments in the International Law Association （ILA） 260

5.2.3.2.Precedents before the Chernobyl Accident 264

5.2.3.3.Decisions of Domestic Courts on the Chernobyl Accident 267

5.2.3.4.Attitudes of States after the Chernobyl Accident 269

5.2.3.5.Short Remarks 272

5.2.4.Territorial Sovereignty as an Obstacle to Charge the State with State Responsibility 273

5.2.4.1.Absence of Due Diligence 273

5.2.4.2.Occurrence of Serious Harm 280

5.2.4.3.Short Remarks 282

5.2.5.Concluding Remarks 284

5.3.The Principle of Equitable Utilization of International Watercourses： A Quest for Its Relationship with the Obligation Not to Cause Transfrontier Pollution Harm 286

5.3.1.Introduction 286

5.3.2.Preliminary Considerations 289

5.3.2.1.The Essence of the No Pollution Harm Principle and the Equitable Utilization Principle 289

5.3.2.1.1.The Essence of the No Pollution Harm Principle： Prevention of Factual Harm 289

5.3.2.1.2.The Essence of the Equitable Utilization Principle： Balancing of Interests 290

5.3.2.2.The Relationship between the Equitable Utilization Principle and the No Pollution Harm Principle Highlighted 293

5.3.3.Arguments for the ‘Relaxation’ of the No Pollution Harm Principle by the Equitable Utilization Principle 298

5.3.3.1.A Survey of Academic Views 298

5.3.3.2.The Background of the Arguments： Protection of the Interests of Upper Riparian Developing Countries as Beginning Users 301

5.3.4.Deliberations in the ILC and the Observations of Governments 303

5.3.5.The 1997 Watercourses Convention 309

5.3.5.1.Ex Ante Prevention of Harm （Article 7（1））： Rejection of ‘Relaxation’ 310

5.3.5.2.Ex Post Remedial Measures [Elimination or Mitigation of Harm and Discussion of Compensation] （Article 7（2）） 310

5.3.5.2.1.The Situation Where ‘Relaxation’ Can Be Argued： Reduction of Continuous Pollution （Ex Post Prevention of Harm） 310

5.3.5.2.2.A Negative Attitude towards ‘Relaxation’ 311

5.3.5.3.Summing-Up 312

5.3.6.An Examination of Some Judicial Precedents and State Practice 312

5.3.7.The 1997 ICJ Gabcikovo Case 317

5.3.8.An Overall Appraisal 320

5.3.9.Concluding Remarks 322

Chapter 6 Synthesis of the Analysis 325

6.1.A Comprehensive Appraisal 325

6.1.1.Standard Setting 325

6.1.2.Compliance Control 327

6.1.3.Law Development 328

6.2.Reassessment of the Concept of ‘Judicial Control’ 329

6.2.1.Appropriateness of the Proposed Model of ‘Judicial Control’ 329

6.2.2.Scope of ‘Judicial Control’ 330

6.2.2.1 Scope Personae 330

6.2.2.2.Scope Temporis 331

6.2.3.Necessity， Effectiveness and Limits of ‘Judicial Control’ 332

6.2.4.Actual Effect of Standard Setting and Law Development on ‘Judicial Control’ 334

6.2.5.An Essential Feature of ‘Judicial Control’： Permeability to the Outer World 336

6.2.6.Conflict between ‘Judicial Control’ and ‘Judicial Settlement of Disputes’ 339

6.3.Towards More Effective Functioning of International Environmental Law 343

6.3.1.Reform Related to the Primary Rule System 343

6.3.1.1.Setting Lower Standards for Less Capable Non-Compliant Parties 343

6.3.1.2.Referring to （or Applying） Outer-Regime Law 344

6.3.2.Reform Related to the Compliance Information System 347

6.3.2.1.Collecting Information through on-the-Spot Investigation 347

6.3.2.2.Collecting Information from Private Third Parties 347

6.3.2.3.Disseminating Information to the Disputing Parties and Third Parties 347

6.3.3.Reform Related to the Non-Compliance Response System 348

6.3.3.1.Introducing Active Triggering Mechanisms in Inter-State Relations 348

6.3.3.2.Promoting Ruling Implementation 348

6.3.3.3.Selecting or Combining ‘Soft’/‘Hard’ Control Mechanisms 349

6.4.Achievements， Limits and Possible Generalization 350

6.5.Conclusion： The International Judiciary as an International Legal Guardian 352

Bibliography 355

Table of Cases 381

Table of International Instruments 399

Index 403