THE NATURE OF LAW:PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN CONCEPTUAL JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL THEORYPDF电子书下载

PART 1 The Nature of Law: Positivism, Natural Law, and Ronald Dworkin 1

CHAPTER ONE Classical Natural Law Theory 2

A.Introduction 2

B.Early Writings 4

C.Criticisms of Classical Natural Law Theory 22

D.An Alternative Interpretation of Natural Law Theory 24

E.Suggested Readings 27

CHAPTER TWO Early Positivism 29

A.Introduction 29

B.Early Positivism Defended 31

C.Objections to the Command Theory 41

D.Suggested Readings 48

CHAPTER THREE Central Tenets of Modern Hartian Positivism 50

A.Introduction 50

B.The Relationship Between Law and Morality 51

C.The Rule of Recognition as Defining Criteria of Legal Validity 56

D.The Rule of Recognition as Social or Conventional Rule 59

E.Suggested Readings 67

CHAPTER FOUR Towards a “Third” Theory of Law: Dworkin’s Attack on Positivism 68

A.Introduction 68

B.The Rule of Recognition as Social Rule 70

C.Judicial Discretion 74

D.Suggested Readings 90

CHAPTER FIVE Contemporary Natural Law Theories 92

A.Introduction 92

B.Procedural Natural Law Theory 94

C.Neo-Classical Natural Law Theory 105

D.Strong Natural Law Theory 120

E.Suggested Readings 127

CHAPTER SIX Dworkin’s Third Theory 128

A.Introduction 128

B.Suggested Readings 166

CHAPTER SEVEN Law, Morality, and Conventional Criteria of Validity: Contemporary Positivism and Dworkin 167

A.Introduction 167

B.The Separability Thesis 171

C.The Relationship Between the Content of the Rule of Recognition and the Social Practice 192

D.What Kind of Convention Is the Rule of Recognition? 195

E.Is the Rule of Recognition a Conventional Rule? 235

F.Suggested Readings 250

CHAPTER EIGHT Inclusive and Exclusive Legal Positivism 252

A.Introduction 252

B.Inclusive Legal Positivism 254

C.Exclusive Legal Positivism 262

D.Suggested Readings 270

PART 2 Authority, Practical Guidance and the Possibility of Moral Criteria of Validity 271

CHAPTER NINE Authority and the Possibility of Moral Criteria of Validity 272

A.Introduction 272

B.The Conceptual Impossibility of Moral Criteria of Validity 275

C.Does Law Claim Legitimate Authority? 285

D.Is the Preemption Thesis True? 288

E.Is Razian Authority Really Incompatible With Moral Criteria of Validity? 304

F.Suggested Readings 311

CHAPTER TEN Practical Guidance and the Possibility of Moral Criteria of Validity 313

A.Introduction 313

B.The Incompatibility of Moral Criteria of Validity and the Practical Difference Thesis 315

C.Inclusive Positivist Responses 322

D.Suggested Readings 333

PART 3 General Problems in the Conceptual Theory of Law: Obligation, Objectivity, and the Methodology of Conceptual Analysis 335

CHAPTER ELEVEN The Problem of Legal Obligation 336

A.Introduction 336

B.Natural Law Solutions 341

C.Positivist Solutions: The Command Theory 349

D.Positivist Solutions: Hart’s Practice Theory 359

E.Positivist Solutions: Obligation as a Point of View 368

F.Suggested Readings 389

CHAPTER TWELVE Legal Objectivity 391

A.Introduction 391

B.The Concepts of Objectivity, Legal Objectivity, and Legal Determi-nacy 395

C.Different Questions About the Objectivity of Law 411

D.Skeptical and Non-Skeptical Theories of Objectivity in Morality 417

E.Skepticism About Determinacy and Objectivity in Law: Legal Realism and Critical Legal Studies 437

F.Theories of Objectivity in Law 453

G.Does It Matter Whether Law or Morality Is Objective? 477

H.Suggested Readings 483

CHAPTER THIRTEEN The Methodology Of Conceptual Analysis 484

A.Introduction 484

B.Descriptive Jurisprudence: The Project as Conceived by Hart and Austin 488

C.An Explanation and Defense of Traditional Conceptual Analysis 502

D.General Challenges to Traditional Descriptive Conceptual Analysis 510

E.Normative Jurisprudence 524

F.Naturalized Jurisprudence 546

G.Skepticism About the Value of Conceptual Theorizing 559

H.Suggested Readings 565

INDEX 567