A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTATION THE THEORY OF RATIONAL DISCOURSE AS THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATIONPDF电子书下载

INTRODUCTION 1

1.The Problem of the Justification of Legal Decisions 1

2.The Fundamental Ideas of this Enquiry 14

3.Topic Theory and its Limits 20

4.Towards Assessing whether Contemporary Methodologi- cal Discussions Reveal a Need for a Theory of Rational Legal Argumentation 24

A.REFLECTIONS ON SOME THEORIES OF PRACTICAL DISCOURSE 33

Ⅰ.Practical Discourse in Analytic Moral Philosophy 33

1.Naturalism and Intuitionism 34

1.1.Naturalism 34

1.2.Intuitionism 37

2.Emotivism 39

3.Practical Discourse as a Rule-Governed Activity 47

3.1.The Foundations in Linguistic Philosophy: Wittgen- stein and Austin 47

3.2.Hare’s Theory 58

3.3.Toulmin’s Theory 79

3.4.Baier’s Theory 93

4.Some Interim Results 99

Ⅱ.Habermas’s Consensus Theory of Truth 101

1.Habermas’s Critique of the Correspondence Theory of Truth 101

2.Combining Speech Act Theory and a Theory of Truth 104

3.Distinguishing between Action and Discourse 105

4.The Justification of Normative Statements 107

5.The Logic of Discourse 111

6.The Ideal Speech Situation 119

7.Critical Discussion of Habermas’s Theory 124

Ⅲ.The Theory of Practical Deliberation of the Erlangen School 138

1.The Programme of the Constructive Method 138

2.The Presupposed Purpose of Constructivist Ethics 140

3.The Principles of Constructivist Ethics 142

4.The Critical Genesis of Norms 149

5.Points to Remember 153

Ⅳ.Chaim Perelman’s Theory of Argumentation 155

1.The Theory of Argumentation as a Logical Theory （In the Wider Sense） 156

2.Argumentation as a Function of Audience 157

3.Demonstration and Argumentation 158

4.The Concept of the Universal Audience 160

5.Persuading and Convincing 164

6.Perelman’s Analysis of the Structure of Argumentation 164

7.The Rationality of Argumentation 169

8.Points to Remember 173

B.OUTLINE OF A THEORY OF GENERAL RATIONAL PRACTICAL DISCOURSE 177

1.The Problem of the Justification of Normative Statements 177

2.Possible Theories of Discourse 180

3.The Justification of Rules of Discourse 180

4.The Rules and Forms of General Practical Discourse 187

4.1.The Basic Rules 188

4.2.The Rationality Rules 191

4.3.Rules for Allocating the Burden of Argument 195

4.4.The Argument Forms 197

4.5.The Justification Rules 202

4.6.The Transition Rules 206

5.The Limits of General Practical Discourse 206

C.A THEORY OF LEGAL ARGUMENTA-TION 211

Ⅰ.Legal Discourse as a Special Case of General Practical Discourse 211

1.Types of Legal Discussion 211

2.The Special Case Thesis 212

3.Transition to a Theory of Legal Argumentation 220

Ⅱ.The Outline of a Theory of Legal Argumentation 221

1.Internal Justification 221

2.External Justification 230

2.1.The Six Groups of Rules and Forms of External Justification 231

2.2.Empirical Reasoning 232

2.3.The Canons of Interpretation 234

2.4.Dogmatic Reasoning 250

2.5.The Use of Precedent 274

2.6.The Application of Special Legal Argument Forms 279

2.7.The Role of General Practical Arguments in Legal Discourse 284

Ⅲ.Legal and General Practical Discourse 287

1.The Need for Legal Discourse in View of the Nature of General Practical Discourse 287

2.The Partial Correspondence in the Claim to Correctness 289

3.The Structural Correspondence between the Rules and Forms of Legal Discourse and those of General Practical Discourse 289

4.The Need for General Practical Arguments in the Framework of Legal Reasoning 291

5.The Limits and Necessity of the Theory of Rational Legal Discourse 292

Appendix 297

Bibliography 303

Index 317