ANTITRUST ECONOMICS AND LEGAL ANALYSISPDF电子书下载

1. ANTITRUST POLICY AND ECONOMIC MODELS 1

Classical Economic Models in Antitrust 2

The Inadequacies of the Model of Pure Competition for Antitrust Policy 3

Conclusion 8

Endnotes 8

Thought Questions 9

2. INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION 11

The Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC) 12

Reclassification of Product Categories Over Time 15

Selection of a Sample of Industries 17

Concentration Trends 18

Selection of a Concentration Index 21

Conclusion 25

Endnotes 25

Thought Questions 26

3. PROFITS 29

Questions the Alleged Relationship Between Profits, Concentration and Monopoly Power 29

Inadequacies of Average Profit as a Performance Standard 30

The Statistical Significance of the Alleged Relationship Between Profits and Concentration 31

Conclusion 32

Endnotes 32

Thought Questions 32

4. INTRODUCTION TO ANTITRUST CASES 39

Monopoly 39

Price Fixing 41

Vertical Integration 42

Price Discrimination 43

Mergers 43

5. MONOPOLY CASES 47

The Standard Oil Case (1911) 47

Endnotes 50

Thought Questions 51

The Alcoa Case (1945) 54

United Shoe Machinery Case (1953) 58

Endnotes 59

Thought Questions 60

The Berkey Photo-Kodak Case (1978) 66

Thought Questions 68

The FTC ReaLemon Opinion (1978) 69

Endnotes 73

Thought Questions 73

The Memorex-IBM Case (1978) 74

Endnotes 80

Thought Questions 80

6. PRICE FIXING CASES 83

Introduction on Proof of Conspiracy 83

Direct Price Fixing Agreements 84

Price Reporting Plans 85

Endnotes 89

Thought Questions 90

7. VERTICAL INTEGRATION CASES 93

The Foreclosure of Suppliers 93

The "Squeezing" of Independent Fabricators 95

The Squeezing Dilemma 97

The Total Squeeze 98

Business Reciprocity 99

Territorial Restrictions on Dealers 101

Endnotes 103

Thought Questions 103

8. TYING ARRANGEMENTS 105

Economic Rationale for Tying Arrangement 105

The Per Se Rule for Tying Arrangements 109

Endnotes 115

9. ROBINSON-PATMAN CASES 119

Price Discrimination Under Section 2 (a) 119

The Meeting Competition Defense Under Section 2 (b) 123

Knowingly Inducing and Receiving Discriminatory Prices Under Section 2 (f) 125

Endnotes 127

Thought Questions 128

10. MERGER CASES 131

A. Determination of the Relevant Market 131

Endnotes 139

Thought Questions 140

B. Relative Concentration in Merger Cases 141

Endnotes 147

Thought Questions 148

C. Conglomerate Mergers 149

Endnotes 156

Thought Questions 156

D. Product Extension Mergers 157

Thought Questions 160

E. Horizontal Mergers Between A Leading Company and a Weak Competitor 160

Conclusion 165

Thought Questions 166

APPENDICES 167

A: Antitrust Law of the United States 169

B: Theoretical Comparison of the Models of Pure Competition and Pure Monopoly 175

C: Oligopoly Models 189

D: Economic Theory of Vertical Integration 211

E: Some Thoughts on the Calculation of Treble Damages 217

INDEX BY SUBJECT 227