Risk Regulation and Administrative ConstitutionalismPDF电子书下载

Introduction 1

1: Risk Evaluation through the Lens of Administrative Constitutionalism 3

Ⅰ THE SCIENCE/DEMOCRACY DICHOTOMY IN REGULATING TECHNOLOGICALRISK 6

A Technological Risks 7

B The Science/Democracy Dichotomy 11

C The Role of Law 14

D Problems with the Science/Democracy Dichotomy 16

Ⅱ TECHNOLOGICAL RISK, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION, AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 18

A The Necessary Role of Public Administration 19

B The Contentious Role of Public Administration, Law and Administrative Constitutionalism 22

Ⅲ TWO PARADIGMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE RISK REGULATION CONTEXT 26

A The Rational-Instrumental Paradigm 28

B The Deliberative Constitutive Paradigm 30

C The Paradigms Compared 32

Ⅳ ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AS A FORM OF LEGAL CULTURE 35

Ⅴ AN EXAMPLE: THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 39

A The Precautionary Principle 40

B The Precautionary Principle and the DC and RI Paradigms 42

C The Precautionary Principle and the Burden of Proof 44

Ⅵ CONCLUSION 46

Part One: Administrative Constitutionalism in National Legal Cultures 49

Introduction to Administrative Constitutionalism in National Legal Cultures 51

Ⅰ NATURE OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 52

Ⅱ THE ROLE OF LAW 55

Ⅲ THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LEGAL CONCEPTS AND THE REGULATORY REGIMES FOR TECHNOLOGICAL RISK REGULATION 57

Ⅳ CONCLUSION 58

2: BSE, Expertise and Administrative Constitutionalism: Examining the Role of the Southwood Working Party 59

Ⅰ THINKING OF BSE IN TERMS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 61

Ⅱ TECHNOLOGICAL RISK REGULATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE UK: A BRIEF HISTORY 66

Ⅲ THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM CONTEXT OF THE BSE CRISIS 71

Ⅳ THE SOUTHWOOD WORKING PARTY 76

Ⅴ AFTER SOUTHWOOD 84

Ⅵ CONCLUSIONS 87

3: Hard Looks and Substantial Evidence: Scope of Review of US Risk Regulation Rulemaking in the 1970s 89

Ⅰ SCOPE OF REVIEW AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 90

Ⅱ ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM AND RISK REGULATION REGIMES IN THE EARLY 1970s 98

Ⅲ HARD LOOK REVIEW 101

Ⅳ SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 107

Ⅴ SCOPE OF REVIEW UNDER THE RI PARADIGM 116

Ⅵ REFLECTIONS 121

Ⅶ CONCLUSION 124

4: The Precautionary Principle and Merits Review in Australia 125

Ⅰ AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND THE DC PARADIGM OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 127

Ⅱ THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN AUSTRALIAN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 130

Ⅲ GENERALIST TRIBUNALS, ENVIRONMENTAL COURTS, AND MERITS REVIEW 133

Ⅳ DC INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 140

Ⅴ RI INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 146

Ⅵ THE SEARCH FOR A UNIFORM INTERPRETATION 154

Ⅶ CONCLUSIONS 160

Part Two: Administrative Constitutionalism and Risk Regulation Beyond the State 163

Introduction to Administrative Constitutionalism and Risk Regulation Beyond the State 165

Ⅰ THIE WTO AND EU: AN OVERVIEW 167

Ⅱ THE ROLE OF LAW 169

Ⅲ GOVERNANCE AND ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 171

Ⅳ CONCLUSION 172

5: Risk Assessment, The World Trade Organisation Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement and Administrative Constitutionalism 173

Ⅰ THE WTO SPS AGREEMENT 175

Ⅱ THE SPS AGREEMENT THROUGH THE LENS OF ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM 180

Ⅲ EC-HORMONES AND THE DEFINITION OF RISK ASSESSMENT 185

Ⅳ DEFINING RISK ASSESSMENT IN DISPUTES SINCE EC-HORMONES: THE INADVERTENT PURSUIT OF THE RI PARADIGM 190

Ⅴ THE PROBLEM WITH THE WTO SPS JURISPRUDENCE ON ARTICLE 5.1 200

Ⅵ FUTURE LINES OF INQUIRY 203

Ⅶ CONCLUSION 206

6: The Precautionary Principle and Administrative Constitutionalism in the European Union: Asking Some Difficult Questions 207

Ⅰ CONTEXTUALISING THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 208

Ⅱ OVERLAPS, INTERRELATIONSHIPS AND ADMINISTRATIVE INTEGRATION 214

Ⅲ THE CASE LAW BEFORE THE COMMISSION’S COMMUNICATION 218

Ⅳ THE COMMISSION’S COMMUNICATION ON THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 224

Ⅴ CASE- LAW AFTER THE COMMISSION’S COMMUNICATION 229

Ⅵ REFLECTIONS 238

Ⅶ CONCLUSION 241

Conclusions 243

7: Beyond the Science/Democracy Dichotomy 245

Ⅰ A SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS 245

Ⅱ SOME PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 250

Ⅲ NEXT STEPS 254

Ⅳ CONCLUSION 257

Bibliography 259

Index 283