THE MILITARISATION OF PEACEKEEPING IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURYPDF电子书下载

1 Introduction 1

1.The Changed Nature of Peacekeeping 3

2.Militarised Peacekeeping： Slouching Towards Crisis 5

3.Structure of the Book 10

4.The Definition of Peacekeeping 12

2 Peacekeeping： The Opposite of Enforcement？ 17

1.Introduction 17

2.The Changed Nature of Peacekeeping 20

2.1 Peace Observation Missions 21

2.2 UNEF I-Type Missions 22

2.3 Post-UNEF I Non-Militarised Missions 26

2.4 Militarised Peacekeeping 31

2.4.1 ONUC （1960-64） 32

2.4.2 An Agenda for Peace （1992-95） 33

2.4.3 Twenty-First Century Peacekeeping（October 1999-Present） 36

2.5 Conclusion on the Changed Nature of Peacekeeping 42

3.The Changed Nature of Enforcement 43

3.1 Full-Blown Enforcement 45

3.2 Sanctions-Related Enforcement 47

3.3 Quasi-Enforcement 51

3.4 Conclusions on the Changed Nature of Enforcement 54

4.The Changed Nature of Peace-Enforcement 56

4.1 An Agenda for Peace 56

4.2 Late 1990s 56

4.3 Twenty-First Century Peace-Enforcement 58

4.4 Conclusion on the Changed Nature of Peace-Enforcement 61

5.Conclusion 62

3 The Peacekeeping Powers of the Security Council and the Limitations Thereupon 64

1.Introduction 64

2.Purposes and Principles of the UN 68

2.1 Article 1： Purposes 69

2.1.1 Article 1（1）： To Maintain International Peace and Security 70

2.2 Article 2： Principles 72

2.2.1 Article 2（1）： Sovereign Equality 73

2.2.2 Article 2（4）： Non-Use of Force 73

2.2.3 Article 2（7）： Non-Intervention in Domestic Matters 75

2.3 Conclusions on Purposes and Principles 77

3.Security Council Powers 77

3.1 Chapter Ⅵ Powers 78

3.2 Chapter Ⅶ Powers 80

3.2.1 Powers under Article 39 81

3.2.2 Powers under Article 40 87

3.2.3 Powers under Article 41 95

3.2.4 Powers under Article 42 101

4.Implied Security Council Powers 105

4.1 Chapter Ⅵ and Implied Powers 107

4.2 Powers Implied Outside Chapter Ⅶ 108

4.3 Chapter Ⅶ Implied Powers 109

4.4 Limitations on Implied Powers 112

4.5 Conclusions on Implied Powers 113

5.Overall Conclusions on the Security Council’s Legal Powers/Constraints 114

5.1 Peacekeeping as an Enforcement Measure 114

5.2 Peacekeeping as a Mandatory Provisional Measure under Article 40 116

5.3 Peacekeeping where Consent is Legally Required 117

5.3.1 Nature and Legality of the Consent 118

5.3.2 Withdrawal of Consent 120

4 When Peacekeeping and Enforcement Overlap： Twentieth Century Practice 122

1.Introduction 122

2.UNEF I （November 1956-June 1967） 123

2.1 Mandate and Functioning 123

2.2 Evaluation 125

2.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 125

2.2.2 Constitutional Basis 127

3.ONUC （July 1960-June 1964） 128

3.1 Mandate and Functioning 128

3.2 Evaluation 129

3.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 129

3.2.2 Constitutional Basis 134

3.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 141

4.Missions in the Mid-1990s 142

4.1 Mandates and Functioning 143

4.1.1 The Former Yugoslavia （February 1992-December 2002） 143

4.1.2 Somalia （April 1992-March 1995） 146

4.1.3 Rwanda （October 1993-March 1996） 148

4.1.4 Haiti （September 1993-March 2000） 150

4.2 Evaluation 151

4.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 151

4.2.2 Constitutional Bases 157

4.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success of the Militarised Peacekeeping Operations 160

5.Conclusions 163

5 When Peacekeeping and Enforcement Overlap： Twenty-First Century Practice - The Early Operations 165

1.Introduction 165

2.Sierra Leone （October 1999-December 2005） 166

2.1 Mandate and Functioning 166

2.2 Evaluation 171

2.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 171

2.2.2 Constitutional Basis 175

2.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 177

3.East Timor （October 1999-May 2002 and May 2002-May 2005） 181

3.1 Mandate and Functioning 181

3.2 Evaluation 189

3.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 189

3.2.2 Constitutional Basis 190

3.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 191

4.Democratic Republic of the Congo （November 1999-30 June 2010 and July 1 2010-Present） 192

4.1 Mandate and Functioning 192

4.2 Evaluation 211

4.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 211

4.2.2 Constitutional Basis 215

4.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 216

6 When Peacekeeping and Enforcement Overlap： Twenty-First Century Practice - The Later Operations 218

1.Introduction 218

2.Liberia （September 2003-present） 219

2.1 The Mission 219

2.2 Evaluation 225

2.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 225

2.2.2 Constitutional Basis 227

2.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 228

3.Cote D’Ivoire （April 2004-Present） 230

3.1 The Mission 230

3.2 Evaluation 241

3.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 241

3.2.2 Constitutional Basis 245

3.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 246

4.Haiti （April 2004-Present） 247

4.1 The Mission 247

4.2 Evaluation 253

4.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 253

4.2.2 Constitutional Basis 255

4.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 256

5.Burundi （June 2004-December 2006） 257

5.1 The Mission 257

5.2 Evaluation 260

5.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 260

5.2.2 Constitutional Basis 261

5.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 261

6.Sudan （March 2005-Present） 262

6.1 The Mission 262

6.2 Evaluation 271

6.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 271

6.2.2 Constitutional Basis 273

6.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 274

7.Central African Republic and Chad （September 2007-December 2010） 275

7.1 Mandate and Functioning 275

7.2 Evaluation 279

7.2.1 Adherence to the ’Fundamental Principles’ 279

7.2.2 Constitutional Basis 280

7.2.3 Conclusion and Assessment of Success 280

7 Conclusions 282

1.Introduction 282

2.Overview of the Problems 282

2.1 Difficulties of Establishment 283

2.2 Management Difficulties 286

2.3 Problems Relating to the Need for Host State Consent or Cooperation 288

2.4 Problems Relating to Expectations 289

3.Legal Conclusions 291

4.Final Remarks： The Way Forward 294

Index 297