LEGALIZATION OF DEVELOPMENT IN THE WTO BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICSPDF电子书下载

Chapter 1 Introduction 1

1.1 The Context 1

1.2 The Legalized Trading System 6

1.2.1 Developing Countries 7

1.2.2 The DSM 8

1.2.3 Effectiveness of the S&DT Provisions 10

1.2.4 S&DT Provisions 11

1.3 The Theory 12

1.3.1 Regime Theory 13

1.3.2 The Legal Approach 15

1.3.3 Obligation, Precision, and Coherence 17

1.3.4 Interpreting Development 18

1.4 The Book 18

1.4.1 Part 1: Development as a Legal Regime 19

1.4.2 Part 2: Success or Failure 21

1.4.3 Part 3: Findings 21

1.5 Conclusion 22

Chapter 2 Regulation of International Relations: A Legal Reading of Regime Theory 25

2.1 Introduction 25

2.2 International Law and International Relations 26

2.2.1 Regime Theory 28

2.3 The Debates and Three Traditional Approaches 29

2.4 Legal Approach 37

2.4.1 Issue Area 37

2.4.2 Regulating an Issue Area 39

2.4.3 Between Law and Politics 41

2.4.4 Managing Issue Areas 43

2.4.5 International Law 45

2.4.6 Actors' Expectations or Actors' Options 47

2.4.7 Compliance 48

2.4.8 Principles 51

2.4.9 Norms and Rules 54

2.4.10 Legalization and Changes to Legal Regimes 59

2.4.11 Measuring Obligation, Precision, and Coherence 60

2.4.12 Legalization and De-legalization 63

2.4.13 Legal Dispute Settlement and Interpreting Legal Rules 64

2.5 Conclusion 70

Chapter 3 Developing Countries' Special Status in the GATT and WTO 73

3.1 Introduction 73

3.2 The Bretton Woods Conference 73

3.3 GATT: A Brief History 75

3.3.1 Multilateral Negotiations 80

3.3.2 Non-discrimination 80

3.3.3 Use of Quantitative Restrictions 81

3.3.4 Transparency 81

3.3.5 Reciprocity 81

3.3.6 Settlement of Disputes 82

3.3.7 Consensus Decision-Making 82

3.3.8 GATT's Exceptions 83

3.4 The S&DT Regime 84

3.5 The Evolution of the S&DT Regime 86

3.6 The First Phase: World in Harmony （WWII-1973） 87

3.7 The Second Phase: North-South Conflict （1973-1981） 92

3.8 The Third Phase: Developing Countries Split （1981-1987） 94

3.9 The Fourth Phase: Consolidation of the Position of Developing Countries Within the System （1987-1999） 95

3.10 WTO: The ‘New' Regime 98

3.10.1 Broadening the GATT: The Issue Area 99

3.10.2 Single Undertaking: The Rule 99

3.10.3 WTO: The Organization 99

3.11 The Fifth Phase: The New Battle-Ground （1999-?） 101

3.12 Conclusion 103

Chapter 4 Dispute Settlement in GATT to WTO 105

4.1 Introduction 105

4.2 Constitutionalization of International Trade 107

4.3 Legalization of the DSM 109

4.4 Dispute Settlement During GATT 111

4.5 The Development of GATT's System of Dispute Settlement 114

4.6 The Dispute Settlement Mechanism 117

4.6.1 The Dispute Settlement Body 118

4.6.2 The DSU 118

4.6.3 Panels 118

4.6.4 The Appellate Body 119

4.6.5 The WTO Secretariat and the DSM 119

4.6.6 Disputing Parties 120

4.7 How Does the DSM Work? 120

4.7.1 The Consultation Phase 120

4.7.2 The Ruling Phase: Ruling by the Panel and/or the Appellate Body 121

4.7.3 The Implementation Phase 122

4.7.4 The Retaliation Phase 123

4.8 Comparing the GATT Dispute Settlement System with the DSM 125

4.8.1 The Institution of the System 125

4.8.2 Blocking of Decisions No Longer Possible 125

4.8.3 The Rulings are Binding on the Disputing Parties 126

4.8.4 The DSM Covers All Agreements 126

4.8.5 Rulings and Agreed Solutions Must Be in Line with WTO Agreements 126

4.8.6 The Appellate Body Is Established as a Decision-Making Forum of ‘Second Instance' 126

4.8.7 Mandatory Use of the DSM 126

4.9 Functions of the DSM 127

4.9.1 Securing a Rule-Based System （DSU Article 3） 127

4.9.2 Clarifying the WTO Agreements （Article 3.2.） 128

4.9.3 Settling Disputes 129

4.10 Legalization of the Settlement of Disputes 130

4.11 The Political DSM 135

4.12 Legalization of Development in the DSU 137

4.12.1 Article 3.12: Use of the 1966 Decision as an Alternative to the DSU in the Consultation Phase 140

4.12.2 Article 4.10: During Consultations the Interests of Developing Countries Should be Recognized 143

4.12.3 Article 8.10: Panellists from Developing Countries 143

4.12.4 Article 12.10: Different Deadlines during Consultations and Panel Proceedings 144

4.12.5 Article 12.11: Panels' Analyses of the Invoked S&DT Provisions 145

4.12.6 Article 21.2: During the Implementation Phase the Interests of Developing Countries Should Be Recognized 146

4.12.7 Article 21.7: Implementation of Matters Raised by a Developing Country 146

4.12.8 Article 21.8: Impact of Measures Complained about on Developing Countries during the Implementation Phase 147

4.12.9 Article 24.1: Special Procedures Involving Least-Developed Countries 148

4.12.10 Article 24.2: Special Procedures Involving Least-Developed Countries 148

4.12.11 Article 27.2: Secretariat's Assistance to Developing Countries 149

4.13 Conclusion: A Theoretical View on the DSM 149

Chapter 5 On the （Non-）effectiveness of the WTO's Special and Differential Treatments in the Dispute Settlement Process 153

5.1 Introduction 153

5.2 The Invoked S&DT Provisions, Cases and Rulings 156

5.3 Dispute Settlement Understanding 157

5.3.1 Articles 12.10 of the DSU 157

5.3.2 Article 12.11 of the DSU 158

5.3.3 Article 21.2 of the DSU 160

5.3.4 Article 24.1 of the DSU 162

5.4 Agreement on Implementation of Article Ⅵ（Anti-Dumping） of the GATT 1994 163

5.5 Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures 166

5.5.1 Article 27.3 of the SCM 166

5.5.2 Article 27.4 of the SCM 167

5.6 Balance of Payments Agreement 169

5.6.1 Article ⅩⅤⅢ.B of the GATT 1994 169

5.7 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 171

5.7.1 Article 65.4 of the TRIPs 172

5.8 Licensing Agreement 173

5.9 Agreement on Safeguards 173

5.10 Agreement on Agriculture 175

5.11 General Agreement on Trade in Services （GATS） 176

5.12 Enabling Clause 177

5.13 Why have the Invoked S&DT Provision Been Less Effective? 179

5.14 Conclusion 184

Chapter 6 African Countries and WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism 189

6.1 Introduction 189

6.2 Developing Countries and the DSM 190

6.3 An Overview of the Current DSM Negotiations 196

6.4 The African View of the DSU's Problems 198

6.5 Entry Barriers 199

6.6 Weak Retaliation 203

6.7 Lack of Development-Friendliness 204

6.8 Conclusion 210

Chapter 7 Conclusion 213

7.1 Theoretical Contributions of this Study 213

7.2 Empirical Findings of this Study 218

7.3 Future StepsList of References 223

Index 241