激励理论PDF电子书下载

Introduction 1

1 Incentives in Economic Thought 7

1.1 Adam Smith and Incentive Contracts in Agriculture 8

1.2 Chester Barnard and Incentives in Management 11

1.3 Hume,Wicksell,Groves：The Free-Rider Problem 14

1.4 Borda,Bowen,Vickrey：Incentives in Voting 15

1.5 Léon Walras and the Regulation of Natural Monopolies 18

1.6 Knight,Arrow,Pauly：Incentives in Insurance 18

1.7 Sidgwick,Vickrey,Mirrlees：Redistribution and Incentives 20

1.8 Dupuit,Edgeworth,Pigou：Price Discrimination 22

1.9 Incentives in Planned Economies 23

1.10 Leonid Hurwicz and Mechanism Design 25

1.11 Auctions 27

2 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 28

2.1 The Basic Model 32

2.2 The Complete Information Optimal Contract 33

2.3 Incentive Feasible Menu of Contracts 36

2.4 Information Rents 39

2.5 The Optimization Program of the Principal 40

2.6 The Rent Extraction-Efficiency Trade-Off 41

2.7 The Theory of the Firm Under Asymmetric Information 46

2.8 Asymmetric Information and Marginal Cost Pricing 48

2.9 The Revelation Principle 48

2.10 A More General Utility Function for the Agent 51

2.11 Ex Ante versus Ex Post Participation Constraints 57

2.12 Commitment 63

2.13 Stochastic Mechanisms 65

2.14 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting 68

2.15 Contract Theory at Work 72

Appendix 81

3 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Adverse Selection 82

3.1 More than Two Types 86

3.2 Multidimensional Asymmetric Information 93

3.3 Type-Dependent Participation Constraint and Countervailing Incentives 101

3.4 Random Participation Constraint 115

3.5 Limited Liability 118

3.6 Audit Mechanisms and Costly State Verification 121

3.7 Redistributive Concerns and the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Off 130

Appendices 134

4 Moral Hazard：The Basic Trade-Offs 145

4.1 The Model 148

4.2 Risk Neutrality and First-Best Implementation 153

4.3 The Trade-Off Between Limited Liability Rent Extraction and Efficiency 155

4.4 The Trade-Off Between Insurance and Efficiency 158

4.5 More than Two Levels of Pefformance 163

4.6 Informative Signals to Improve Contracting 167

4.7 Moral Hazard and the Theory of the Firm 172

4.8 Contract Theory at Work 174

4.9 Commitment Under Moral Hazard 184

Appendices 185

5 Incentive and Participation Constraints with Moral Hazard 187

5.1 More than Two Levels of Effort 191

5.2 The Multitask Incentive Problem 203

5.3 Nonseparability of the Utility Function 226

5.4 Redistribution and Moral Hazard 232

Appendices 235

6 Nonverifiability 240

6.1 No Contract at Date 0 and Ex Post Bargaining 242

6.2 Incentive Compatible Contract 244

6.3 Nash Implementation 246

6.4 Subgame-Perfect Implementation 256

6.5 Risk Aversion 261

6.6 Concluding Remarks 264

7 Mixed Models 265

7.1 Adverse Selection Followed by Moral Hazard 269

7.2 Moral Hazard Followed by Adverse Selection 294

7.3 Moral Hazard Followed by Nonverifiability 298

8 Dynamics under Full Commitment 303

8.1 Repeated Adverse Selection 307

8.2 Repeated Moral Hazard 319

8.3 Constraints on Transfers：The Role of Implicit Incentives 342

9 Limits and Extensions 347

9.1 Informed Principal 351

9.2 Limits to Enforcement 360

9.3 Dynamics and Limited Commitment 364

9.4 The Hold-Up Problem 370

9.5 Limits to the Complexity of Contracts 375

9.6 Limits in the Action Space 387

9.7 Limits to Rational Behavior 391

9.8 Endogenous Information Structures 395

References 399

Author Index 413

Subject Index 417