Introduction 1
Doctrine and Theory 3
The Centrality of Jurisprudence 6
Introduction to Part 1: Justice 9
Subjectivism 11
Other Options 13
Neutrality 14
1.Utilitarianism 17
Why Be a Utilitarian? 19
Liberalism, Utility and Moral Neutrality 21
Uncertainty 25
Consequences 26
Utility and Distribution 29
Act and Rule Utilitarianism 35
Rule Utilitarianism as a Jurisprudential Theory 37
Liberalism and Preferences 40
Rights and Utility 44
Selected reading 45
2.Rawls 47
Introduction 47
Reflective Equilibrium 49
The Original Position 52
The Basic Structure 58
Criticism of Utilitarianism 62
The Thin Theory of the Good 66
Two Principles 69
The Difference Principle 69
Choosing the Difference Principle 74
Greater Equality? 77
The First Principle of Justice 79
Political Liberalism 84
Selected reading 90
3.Nozick 91
An Arbitrary Starting Point? 93
Comparison with Rawls 96
Principles of Acquisition 97
Pale Self-Ownership 101
Patterned Distribution and Historical Entitlement 103
Markets and Equality 106
Giving Content to Rights 108
Selected reading 111
4.Finnis on Objective Goods 113
Goods and Desires 114
Objective Goods 116
Goods and Human Nature 119
Prudence and Morality 120
Incommensurability of Goods 123
The Common Good 125
The Role of Choice 126
Justice 129
Basic Rights 131
Law 134
Selected reading 135
Introduction to Part 2: Law 137
Natural Law and Legal Positivism 141
5.Hart 145
Legal Positivism 145
What Positivists Do and Do Not Claim 146
Normativity and Reductionism 149
Rules and the Internal Point of View 151
Powers and Secondary Rules 154
The Legal System 157
Adjudication 160
Distinguishing Cases 164
Legal Obligation and the Internal Point of View 167
A Different Positivism? 170
Rules and Formal Justice 174
The Minimum Content of Natural Law 176
The Nature of Conceptual Analysis 180
Hart’s Theory as Political Philosophy 185
Legal Doctrine and Legal Theory 191
Selected reading 197
6.Dworkin 199
Rules and Principles 200
Principles and Positivism 202
The rule of Recognition and the Soundest Theory 206
Constructive Interpretation 209
Semantic Theories 216
Some Scepticisms 221
The “Threshold Objection” 224
Choosing a Legal Theory 228
Law as Integrity 231
Order, Theory and Community 237
Selected reading 240
7.Fuller 241
The Story of Rex 241
Facts, Values and Purposes 249
Conceptual Structure 252
Moral Purposes 256
Wicked Regimes 260
The Value of the Rule of Law 262
Guidance by Rule and by Aspiration 266
Principle and Change 270
Selected reading 274
Part 3: Rights 275
8.The Analysis of Rights 275
Some Fundamental Ideas 276
Legal and Moral Rights 283
Hard Atoms and Soft Molecules 287
Rights as Complex and Peremptory 291
A Slight Digression 294
Hohfeld’s Analysis 295
Kantian and Hohfeldian Rights Compared 300
Internal Complexity Restored? 303
Is the Absence of a Duty a Right? 308
Internal Complexity Without Peremptory Force? 311
Rights Against Nobody? 314
Rights Against Specific Persons 316
Levels of Abstraction 317
Peremptory Force: Exclusionary or Conclusory? 318
Exclusion Upon Exclusion 320
One Set of Reasons: Two Perspectives 321
Exclusion Abandoned 323
The “Will” and “Interest” Theories 324
MacCormick’s Criticisms 330
Selected reading 332
Index 335