LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY THE COMMON LAW WORLD VOLUME IIPDF电子书下载

Part Ⅰ - Prologue 1

Chapter 1 - Analytic Jurisprudence Established 3

1.1.Austinian Orthodoxy 5

1.1.1.Holland’s Opus 5

1.1.2.Austinian Orthodoxy Challenged 6

1.1.2.1.Commands and Complications 7

1.1.2.2.Limits of the Sovereignty Doctrine 9

1.2.Dicey: The Sovereignty of Parliament and the Supremacy of Law 13

1.3.Salmond: Positivism Recast 18

1.3.1.Jurisprundentia Universalis—The Science of Civil Law 18

1.3.2.The Nature of Cavil Law 19

1.3.3.Ultimate Legal Principles and Judicial Recognition 21

1.3.4.Salmond and Analytic Jurisprudence 24

1.4.Matters of Method 25

1.4.1.Analytic Jurisprudence: General vs.Particular 26

1.4.2.The Province of Analytic Jurisprudence 29

1.4.3.Dissenting Voices 32

1.4.3.1.Miller: Jurisprudence in the Scottish Tradition 33

1.4.3.2.Moderate Dissent at Mid-Century 35

1.4.3.3.Oakeshott: Philosophical Jurisprudence Reconceived 36

1.4.4.Glanville Williams: Convergence of Philosophy and Jurisprudence 39

Chapter 2 - Justice Holmes: A New Path for American Jurisprudence 43

2.1.Holmes:The Man and the Mind 45

2.1.1.Jurist, Judge, Justice 45

2.1.2.Orientation 46

2.2.Common Law, Science, and Positivism 48

2.2.1.“Formalism” and Langdell’s Science of Law 49

2.2.2.Pollock’s Predictions 51

2.3.Holmes’s Static Conception of Law 57

2.3.1.Common-Law Orientation 57

2.3.2.Enforcement Positivism 59

2.3.3.Law, Morality, and the Bad Man 62

2.4.Holmes’s Dynamic Conception of Law 64

2.4.1.The Life of the Law 64

2.4.2.The Dynamic Interaction of Form and Substance 66

2.5.Law, Theory, and Adjudication 70

2.5.1.Holmes’s General Jurisprudence 70

2.5.2.Theory, Skepticism, and Adjudication 73

Part Ⅱ - The Holmesian Legacy 79

Chapter 3 - Realism and Reaction 81

3.1.Roots of Realism 81

3.1.1.Movement or Mood, Metaphysics or Method? 82

3.1.2.Fabricators of the Tools of the Realist Trade 84

3.1.2.1.Gray: Law vs.Sources and the Importance of Finality 84

3.1.2.2.Pound: Two Forms of Jurisprudential Empiricism 89

3.1.2.3.Dewey: The Logic of Inquiry 95

3.1.3.Hohfeld: Analytic Jurisprudence in Realism’s Province 98

3.1.3.1.Jural Correlatives and Opposites 99

3.1.3.2.A General Framework for Analysis of Law 103

3.1.3.3.Reception of Hohfeld’s Analytic Jurisprudence 104

3.2.Realism: Skepticisms and Remedies 106

3.2.1.Rules: Paper and Proper 107

3.2.2.Rules and Reasoning in Judicial Decision Making 110

3.2.2.1.Conflicting Rules 110

3.2.2.2.Finding the Ratio Decidendi and the Problem of Generalization 111

3.2.2.3.The Problem of Determination: Authority and the Judgment Gap 113

3.2.2.4.Argument from the Conclusion:Judicial Window Dressing 118

3.2.2.5.The Problem of Relevance: Fact-Skepticism 121

3.3.If Not Rules, What? 122

3.3.1.Failures of Formalism 123

3.3.2.Realist Science of Law 124

3.3.2.1.Impartial Idiosyncrasy 126

3.3.2.2.Jurisprudence as Social Science 127

3.3.2.3.Law Jobs: Llewellyn’s Conception of Legal Science 131

3.3.3.Recovery of Craft and Principle 132

3.3.3.1.Pound, Cardozo, and Reasoned Elaboration 133

3.3.3.2.Llewellyn: The Discipline of Craft 135

3.3.3.3.Levi: The Forum of Principle 137

3.4.Conclusion 138

Chapter 4 - Implicit Law and Principles of Legality 141

4.1.Charting a New Path 142

4.1.1.Legal Realism vs.Legal Reality 142

4.1.2.Sovereignty and the Foundations of Legal Order 143

4.2.Human Interaction and the Law 146

4.2.1.Eunomics: The Science of Good Social Order 147

4.2.2.Interactional Foundations of Law 147

4.2.2.1.Interaction and Informal Social Rules 148

4.2.2.2.Interactional Dimensions of Contract,Case Law, and Statute 149

4.2.2.3.Vertical Interaction and Congruence 151

4.3.The Internal Morality of Law 153

4.3.1.Immanent Reason 154

4.3.2.Law’s Internal Morality 155

4.3.3.Legality and Substantive Justice 161

4.4.Spontaneous Order and the Foundations of Law 162

4.4.1.Spontaneous Order and Social Rules 164

4.4.1.1.The Idea of Spontaneous Order 164

4.4.1.2.Social Rules: Implicit and Abstract 166

4.4.2.The Informational Conditions of Thetic Law 168

4.4.3.Modern Law as a Mixed Order 170

4.5.Nomos, Liberty, and the Rule of Law 172

4.5.1.The Rule of Law in The Constitution of Liberty 172

4.5.2.Nomos, the Law of Liberty 174

4.5.3.The Value of Liberty 175

4.6.Common-Law Adjudication and Hayek’s Arguments for Law-as-Nomos 176

4.7.Conclusion 180

Chapter 5 - Economic Jurisprudence 181

5.1.Roots, Ambitions, and Projects 181

5.1.1.Realism and Neo-Classical Economic Theory 181

5.1.2.Theoretical Ambitions of Law and Economics 183

5.1.2.1.Basic Theoretical Assumptions 184

5.1.2.2.Projects and Theses: Analytic, Explanatory,and Normative 185

5.1.2.3.Law and Economics and General Jurisprudence 189

5.2.Analytical Tools 190

5.2.1.Concepts of Efficiency 190

5.2.1.1.Utility and the Pareto Criteria 190

5.2.1.2.Kaldor-Hicks and Wealth Maximization 191

5.2.2.Virtual Markets, Transaction Costs, and Legal Rules 192

5.3.Positive Economics: Case Law, Torts, and Deep Explanation 194

5.3.1.Efficiency Explains the Law 194

5.3.2.The Case-Law Thesis Illustrated: An Economic Theory of Tort Law 195

5.3.3.Evidence and Explanation 197

5.3.3.1.The Empirical Case for the Case-Law Thesis 197

5.3.3.2.Functional-Causal Explanation 198

5.3.3.3.Interpretive Explanation 200

5.3.3.4.Economics as the Logic of Law 201

5.4.Efficiency as a Political Norm 202

5.4.1.Is Social Wealth a Value? 202

5.4.2.The Proxy Principle and Ex Ante Consent 204

5.5.Pragmatism and Politics 206

Chapter 6 - Critical Jurisprudence and the Rule of Law 213

6.1.Progressive Politics and Critical Theories 213

6.2.Law as Ideology and the Ideology of Law 215

6.2.1.Law as Ideology 215

6.2.2.Ideology Analysis in Critical Jurisprudence 217

6.2.2.1.Law as Patriarchy 217

6.2.2.2.Law as Politics 220

6.3.The Indeterminacy Critique 224

6.3.1.Structure of the Argument 225

6.3.2.Dimensions of Indeterminacy 226

6.3.3.Sources of Law’s Indeterminacy 228

6.3.3.1.Impoverished Opulence 228

6.3.3.2.Theory-Dependence 229

6.3.3.3.Patchworks, Political Forces,and Fundamental Contradictions 231

6.3.4.Indeterminacy and the Rule of Law 235

6.4.Oppression, Objectivity, and Law 240

6.4.1.Oppression 242

6.4.2.Law’s Complicity in Gender Oppression 244

6.4.2.1.Man is the Measure 245

6.4.2.2.Impoverished Legal Reason 248

6.4.2.3.Objectivity as Objectification 251

6.5.Attack on the Citadel 257

Part Ⅲ - Hart and His Legacy 259

Chapter 7 - Hart’s Critical Positivism 261

7.1.Hart and Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century 261

7.1.1.Hart’s Project 261

7.1.2.Hart’s Philosophical Resources 264

7.1.2.1.Bentham, “Greats,” and the Two Austins 264

7.1.2.2.Philosophical Techniques:Alternatives to Definition and Description 265

7.1.3.Hart’s Theory of Law in Outline 267

7.2.Hart’s Critical Frame 271

7.2.1.The Strategy of The Concept of Law 271

7.2.2.Against Reduction 273

7.2.2.1.Kinds of Laws and their Functions 274

7.2.2.2.Normativity and Empirical Reductionism 279

7.2.3.Transcendental Inflation of Normativity 283

7.3.Social Rules 285

7.3.1.Hart’s Hermeneutics 286

7.3.2.The Internal Point of View 291

7.3.2.1.Accept and Use as Guides 292

7.3.2.2.Interior vs.Insider 294

7.3.2.3.Social Rules and Conventions 297

7.3.3.Obligation: Social and Legal 299

7.3.4.Challenges to Hart’s Account of Normativity 301

7.4.Social Rules and Legal Systems 304

7.4.1.The Luxury of Legal Validity 305

7.4.2.The Sobering Truth about Law 307

7.5.The Rule of Recognition 309

7.5.1.The Idea of a Rule of Recognition 310

7.5.2.The Unity, Persistence, and Systematic Character of Law 314

7.5.3.Ultimacy and the Normative Foundations of Law 317

7.5.4.The Rule of Recognition and the Social Foundations of Law 319

7.6.Adjudication 321

7.7.Lead Us not into Temptation: Resisting the Pull of Natural Law 325

7.7.1.Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals 325

7.7.2.Natural Law as a Theory of Legal Validity 326

7.7.3.The Minimal Demands of Natural Necessity 329

7.7.4.Justice in the Administration of Law and the Rule of Law 334

7.7.5.Positivism and Jurisprudential Method 336

Chapter 8 - Positivism Extended: Institutions, Sources, Authority, and Law 341

8.1.Hart’s Legacy 341

8.2.Institutionalism 342

8.2.1.The Idea of an Institutionalized Normative Order 343

8.2.2.Law as an Institutionalized Normative Order 346

8.3.Basic Themes in Raz’s Theory of Law 348

8.3.1.Hartian Pedigree 349

8.3.2.Methodology of Legal Theory 350

8.3.3.Law’s Claim to Legitimate Authority 353

8.3.4.The Sources Thesis 355

8.4.The Case for the Sources Thesis 356

8.4.1.Authority Requires Sources 357

8.4.2.The Service Conception of Authority 360

8.4.2.1.Authority and Exclusionary Reasons 360

8.4.2.2.The Justification of Authority 364

8.4.2.3.Authority and Coordination 367

8.5.Law’s Claim to Authority: Challenges 369

8.5.1.Questioning Authority 370

8.5.2.Law’s Authority and Raz’s Claims for It 372

8.5.2.1.Non Sequiturs 372

8.5.2.2.Just What Does Law Claim? 375

8.6.Legal Reasoning 377

8.6.1.Applying the Law, Determining the Law, and Moral Reasoning 378

8.6.1.1.Directed Powers 379

8.6.1.2.Two Aspects of Legal Reasoning 380

8.6.2.The Impossibility of a Theory of Legal Reasoning 385

8.7.Formalism Again: The Rule of Rules 388

8.7.1.A Neo-Formalist Model of Practical Reasoning 389

8.7.1.1.Neo-Formalist Analytic 390

8.7.1.2.The Normative Case for Neo-Formalist Practical Reasoning 393

8.7.1.3.The Asymmetry of Authority 395

8.7.2.Neo-Formalist Jurisprudence: Rules and Law 396

Chapter 9 - Positivism Challenged: Interpretation, Integrity, and Law 401

9.1.Challengers 401

9.2.Principles and Controversy 404

9.2.1.The Province of Principles 404

9.2.1.1.Principles in Practice 405

9.2.1.2.Positivism’s Divided House 407

9.2.2.The Claims of Controversy 411

9.2.3.Positivist Conventions Feel the Sting of Controversy 415

9.3.Interpretive Jurisprudence 421

9.3.1.Against Archimedes 421

9.3.2.The Practice of Interpretation 425

9.3.2.1.The Interpretive Attitude 425

9.3.2.2.The Domain of Constructive Interpretation 426

9.3.2.3.The Dynamics of Constructive Interpretation: Data, Fit, and Appeal 430

9.3.3.Can There Be a Best Theory? 434

9.4.Law as Integrity 438

9.4.1.An Interpretive Plateau 438

9.4.2.Conventionalism: A Challenger in Interpretive Clothing 440

9.4.3.Law’s Integrity 443

9.4.3.1.Political Responsibility, Justice, and Integrity 444

9.4.3.2.Law as Integrity 446

9.4.3.3.The Problem of the Wicked Legal System 448

9.4.4.Questioning Integrity 451

9.4.4.1.On the Possibility of Principles 451

9.4.4.2.Whose Integrity? 453

Chapter 10 - The Incorporation Debate 457

10.1.Explaining the Difference Moral Principles Make 457

10.1.1.Elmer, The Duke, and Dr.Bonham 457

10.1.2.It’s a Mistake 458

10.1.3.A Case for Incorporation 459

10.1.4.Employed but not Incorporated.Exclusive Legal Positivism 461

10.1.5.Incorporation by Common Practice of Argument: Inclusive Legal Positivism 463

10.1.6.Natural-Law Perspectives on Incorporation 467

10.2.The Dialectic in the Positivist Camp 470

10.2.1.The Fiction of the Midas Touch 471

10.2.2.The Compatibility of Conventionalism and Incorporation 474

10.2.3.Implications of the Practical Dimension of Law 478

10.2.3.1.The Challenge of the Argument from Authority 478

10.2.3.2.Practical Guidance, Authoritative Directives, and Directed Powers 481

Chapter 11 - Conventions and the Foundations of Law 483

11.1.Conventions, Conventionalisms, and Law 483

11.1.1.Law and Conventions 483

11.1.2.Normativity and Law’s Conventional Foundations 485

11.2.Humean Conventions 486

11.2.1.Conventions and Social Cooperation 486

11.2.1.1.Hume on the Conventions of Justice 486

11.2.1.2.Lewis Conventions 488

11.2.2.Humean Conventions and the Law 493

11.2.2.1.The Rule of Recognition as a Humean Convention 494

11.2.2.2.Humean Conventions and the Normativity of Law: Two Approaches 497

11.2.3.Humean Conventions Challenged 500

11.3.Conventions as Joint Commitments 504

11.3.1.Joint Commitments and Shared Cooperative Activities 505

11.3.1.1.Existence Conditions of Social Conventions 505

11.3.1.2.Conventions, Dispositions, and Reasons 506

11.3.2.Duties and Joint Commitments 507

11.3.2.1.Conventions as Collective Fiat 508

11.3.2.2.Shared Cooperative Activity, Obligation, and Disagreement 511

11.3.3.Commitments, Reasons, and Obligations: Some Questions 514

11.3.3.1.Dispositions, Commitments and Reasons 514

11.3.3.2.Do Joint Commitments Yield （the Right Kind of） Obligations? 515

11.3.3.3.On the Possibility of Fundamental Disagreement within Shared Cooperative Activities 517

11.4.Constitutive Conventions 519

11.4.1.The Concept of Convention Analyzed 519

11.4.2.Kinds of Conventions 523

11.4.2.1.Constitutive Conventions 523

11.4.2.2.Deep vs.Surface Conventions 526

11.4.3.Constitutive Conventions and the Foundations of Law 526

11.4.4.Constitution, Cooperation, and Convention 528

11.4.4.1.Is Law Like Chess? 529

11.4.4.2.Convergence 531

11.5.Legal Conventionalism Disputed 533

11.5.1.Conformism, Arbitrariness, and Moral Seriousness 534

11.5.2.Law as a Discursive Practice 536

11.5.3.Getting It Together vs.Getting It Right 538

11.5.4.The Limits of Formal Conventionalism 542

Chapter 12 - Analytic Jurisprudence Confronted 547

12.1.Natural-Law Theory’s Ambitions 549

12.2.A Natural-Law Theory of Practical Reasonableness 551

12.2.1.Basic Human Goods 551

12.2.2.Principles of Practical Reasonableness and Morality 552

12.3.Natural-Law Jurisprudence: Law, Authority, and the Common Good 554

12.3.1.A Natural-Law Challenge to Methodological Positivism 555

12.3.2.Practical Reasonableness in Community: Common Good and Poiesis 556

12.3.3.Positive Law and Legal Reasoning: Dimensions of Natural-Law Positivism 558

12.4.Retrieving Normative Jurisprudence 562

12.4.1.The Poverty of Methodological Positivism 563

12.4.2.Law’s Habitat: The Circumstances of Politics 564

12.5.Authoritative Rules, Systematic Integrity, and Argument: Waldron’s Normative Jurisprudence 565

12.5.1.The Normative Case for a Positivist Conception of Law 565

12.5.2.Publicity, Systematicity, and the Argumentative Nature of Law 568

12.5.3.The Artificial Reason of Law: Judicial Reasoning as an Institution-Shaped Hybrid 571

Chapter 13 - Concluding Note 577

13.1.Vera Philosophia 577

13.2.On the Threshold of a Philosophical Jurisprudence 578

Bibliography 585

Index of Subjects 607

Index of Names 613