CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIE LEGISLATORSPDF电子书下载

AUTHOR’S NOTE 1

PART ONE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW 5

INTRODUCTION： HANS KELSEN，JUDICIAL REVIEW，AND THE NEGATIVE LEGISLATOR 5

CHAPTER 1 JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION AND THE LEGISLATOR 13

Ⅰ. THE SYSTEMS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS 13

Ⅱ. CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY AND CONTROL OF CONVENTIONALITY 20

Ⅲ. THE INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE INFLUENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND LEGAL REFORMS 29

Ⅳ. THE QUESTION OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS 31

CHAPTER 2 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERFERENCE WITH THE CONSTITUENT POWER 41

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ RESOLUTION OF DISPUTES OF CONSTITUTIONAL RANK AND ENACTMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 41

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND OF CONSTITUTIONAL REFORMS AND AMENDMENTS 45

Ⅲ. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ADAPTATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMATE CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION 50

1. Adapting the Constitution on Matters of Fundamental Rights Guarantees 51

2. The Mutation of the Constitution on Institutional Matters 65

Ⅳ. THE PROBLEM OF ILLEGITIMATE MUTATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION 68

CHAPTER3 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR ON EXISTING LEGISLATION 73

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES IN HARMONY WITH THE CONSTITUTION 73

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS COMPLEMENTING THE LEGISLATOR BY ADDING NEW RULES （AND NEW MEANING） TO AN EXISTING LEGISLATIVE PROVISION 79

Ⅲ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS COMPLEMENTING LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS BY INTERFERING WITH THE TEMPORAL EFFECTS OF LEGISLATION 94

1. The Power of the Constitutional Court to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects： Postponing the Effect of the Court’s Ruling 95

2. The Power ofthe Constitutional Court to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects： Retroactive or Nonretroactive Effects of 1ts Own Decisions 103

A. The Possibility of Limiting the Retroactive Ex Tunc Effects Regarding Declarative Decisions 103

B. The Possibility of Retroactive Effects for Ex Nune Constitutive Decisions 108

3. The Power of Constitutional Courts to Revive Repealed Legislation 114

Ⅳ. THE DEFORMATION OF THE INTERPRETATIVE PRINCIPLE： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ REFORMING OF STATUTES AND INTERPRETING THEM WITHOUT INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 115

CHAPTER 4 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ INTERFERENCE WITH THE LEGISLATOR REGARDING LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS 125

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ FILLING THE GAP OF ABSOLUTE LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS 126

1. Direct Action against Absolute Legislative Omissions 126

2. The Protection of Fundamental Rights against Absolute Legislative Omissions by Means of Actions or Complaints for Their Protection 135

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS’ FILLING THE GAP OF RELATIVE LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS 148

1. Constitutional Courts and Equality Rights： Deciding on the Unconstitutionality of Statutes without Declaring Their Nullity 149

2. Constitutional Courts ’Issuing Nonbinding Directives to the Legislator 153

3. Constitutional Courts’ Issuing Binding Orders and Directives to the Legislator 160

Ⅲ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS PROVISIONAL LEGISLATORS 165

CHAPTER 5 CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS LEGISLATORS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 173

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS CREATING THEIR OWN JUDICIAL REVIEW POWERS 173

1. The Judge-Made Law Regarding the Diffuse System of Judicial Review 173

2. The Extension of Judicial Review Powers to Ensure the Protection of Fundamental Rights 174

3. The Need for the Express Provision in the Constitution of Judicial Review Powers of the Constitutional Jurisdiction and Its Deviation 178

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS CREATING PROCEDURAL RULES ON JUDICIAL REVIEW PROCESSES 186

FINAL REMARKS 189

PART TWO NATIONAL REPORTS 193

ARGENTINA： Alejandra Rodriguez Galan and Alfredo Mauricio Vitolo，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 195

Ⅰ. REDUCTION OF THE SCOPE OF THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS DOCTRINE 199

Ⅱ. RECOGNITION OF PROCEDURAL GUARANTEES IN THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION 200

Ⅲ. STANDING 202

Ⅳ. ACCION DECLARATIVA DE CERTEZA （DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS） AS A DIRECT FORM OF EXERCISE OF CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 203

Ⅴ. SUA SPONTE CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW 204

Ⅵ. ERGA OMNES EFFECT OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS 205

Ⅶ. ACTIVIST JURISPRUDENCE 205

1. “Educating” Congress 206

2. Reconciling Internal Legislation with Human Rights Treaties by Means of Interpretation 207

3. Amending Political Will and Rewriting Statutes 208

Ⅷ. CONCLUSION 211

AUSTRALIA： Cheryl Saunders，Interpretation and Review 213

Ⅰ. FRAMEWORK 213

1. Authority for Review 213

2. Jurisdiction 215

3. Concrete Review 217

A. Advisory Opinions 217

B. Declarations of Incompatibility 219

4. Standing 220

Ⅱ. APPROACH 223

1. Phases 224

A. 1903-1920 224

B. 1920-1944 225

C. 1944-1981 226

D. 1981-1998 228

E. 1998 to the Present 230

2. Legalism and Realism 231

A. Legalism 231

B. Realism 232

C. Realistic Legalism 234

3. Interpretation and Change 236

A. An Instrument of Government 236

B. Relevance of the Framers 238

Ⅲ. SOURCES 240

1. Precedent 240

2. Extrinsic Materials 241

3. Foreign Law 244

4. International Law 246

BIBLIOGRAPHY 249

AUSTRIA： Konrad Lachmayer，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 251

Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION： CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE IN AUSTRIA 251

Ⅱ. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW METHOD APPLIED IN AUSTRIA 252

1. Introduction 252

2. Access to Constitutional Justice 254

Ⅲ. JUDICIAL QUESTIONS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 256

1. Judicial Decisions on Judicial Review 256

2. Effects of Judicial Decisions on Constitutional Matters 257

Ⅳ. IMPORTANT DEVELOPMENTS AND DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 258

1. Developing the Contents of the Fundamental Principles of the Austrian Constitution 258

2. Concrete Guidelines for the Legislator 259

3. Creating Constitutional Systems 261

4. Principle of Equality 262

Ⅴ. CONCLUSION-OPENING UP CONSTITUTIONAL POTENTIALS AND VALUE-BASED JUDGMENTS 263

BELGIUM： Patricia Popelier，The Belgian Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator： In Search of a Balance Between Rights Protection and Respect for Acts of Parliament 265

INTRODUCTION 265

Ⅰ. THE IMPACT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ON CONSTITUTIONAL RELATIONS 266

Ⅱ. LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS IN THE CASE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 269

1. Some Examples 271

2. Two Examples 272

Ⅲ. LEGAL FRAMEWORK 273

Ⅳ. CONSEQUENCES OF THE FINDING THAT A LEGISLATIVE LACUNA IS CONTRARY TO THE CONSTITUTION 275

CONCLUSIONS 279

BRAZIL： Thomas Bustamante and Evanilda de Godoi Bustamante，Constitutional Courts as Negative Legislators： The Brazilian Case 283

INTRODUCTORY CONSIDERATIONS 283

Ⅰ. THE DIFFUSE AND INCIDENTAL SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 285

Ⅱ. THE CONCENTRATED SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 289

1. Concentrated Constitutional Jurisdiction by Direct Actions 289

A. The Direct Action of Unconstitutionality 290

B. The Declaratory Action of Constitutionality 292

C. The Direct Action against Unconstitutional Omissions 293

D. The Claim against the Disrespect to a Fundamental Precept 296

2. Concentrated Constitutional Review by Concrete Claims 298

A. Mandado de Seguranca （When Used to Contest an Act within the Legislative Procedure） 299

B. The Writ of Injunction （Mandado de Injuncao） 300

C. Additive Decisions and the Writ of Injunction 302

Ⅲ. EFFECTS OF THE JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS 303

1. Inter Partes and Erga Omnes Decisions 303

2. Binding and Nonbinding Decisions 305

3. The Scope ofthe Binding Effects of the Decisions of the Court 306

4. Interpretative and Reductive Decisions by the Federal Supreme Court 308

5. The Temporal Effects of the Decisions on Constitutional Matters （on Direct Actions of Unconstitutionality） 310

6. The Temporal Effects of the Decisions on Constitutional Matters （on Diffuse Decisions on Constitutional Matters） 311

7. Constitutional Mutations 312

Ⅳ. CONCLUSION： THE IDEA OF THE NEGATIVE LEGISLATOR 312

CANADA： Kent Roach，The Canadian Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 315

INTRODUCTION 315

Ⅰ. CANADA’S SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 317

1. Federalism and the Court as Negative Legislator 317

2. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 318

3. Negative and Positive Rights 318

4. Charter Litigation 319

5. Reference Cases 319

6. Constitutional Remedies 321

7. Positive Alternatives to Judicial Invalidation： Reading In or Judicial Amendments to Legislation 322

8. Alternatives to Immediate Invalidation： Delayed Declarations of Invalidity and Reply Legislation 324

Summary 326

Ⅱ. CANADA’S EXPERIENCE WITH COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS 328

1. Criminal Justice 328

2. National Security 329

3. Gay Rights 331

4. Aboriginal and Treaty Rights 333

5. Political Policy 334

6. Minority-Language Policy 335

7. Social and Economic Policy 337

8. Labor Policy 338

9. Health-Care Policy 340

CONCLUSION 342

COLOMBIA： German Alfonso Lopez Daza，Le juge constitutionnel colombien，legislateur-cadre positif： un gouvernement des juges 345

INTRODUCTION 345

Ⅰ. DYNAMISME DE LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE COLOMBIENNE DANS SON ROLE DE PROTECTRICE DE LA CONSTITUTION DE 1991 346

Ⅱ. JUSTICE CONSTITUTIONNELLE VERSUS POUVOIR EXECUTIF-POUVOIR LEGISLATIF 348

Ⅲ. LA COUR CONSTITUTIONNELLE COLOMBIENNE-LEGISLATEUR CADRE POSITIF 350

1. Sentences mampulatrices 353

2. Sentence substitutive 353

3. Sentences interpretatives ou conditionnees 353

4. Sentence additive ou d’integration 354

5. Sentence de recommandation du legislateur 355

6. Les sentences-lois 355

7. Les sentences a effet differe 355

Ⅳ. CONSTRUCTION THEORIQUE DU CONCEPT“GOUVERNEMENT DES JUGES” 356

BIBLIOGRAPHIE 359

COLOMBIA： Sandra Morelli，The Colombian Constitutional Court：From Institutional Leadership to Conceptual Audacity 363

Ⅰ. PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS 363

Ⅱ. DISPLACEMENT IN COLOMBIA 366

1. What Is the Unconstitutional State of Affairs？ 367

Ⅲ. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROL OF LAWS 378

1. Warning 378

2. The Control of the Constitutionality ofthe Acts Amending the Constitution 383

A. The Constitutional Control Limited to the Vices of Procedure 384

B. The Procedural Vices of the Law through Which a Constitutional Referendum Is Summoned 385

a. The Power ofthe Congress of the Republic to Amend the Law Presented at the Request of a Popular Initiative 386

b. The Violation of the Law of Benches （Bancadas） 386

COSTA RICA： Ruben Hernaandez Valle，The Normative Resolutions of the Constitutional Court 389

Ⅰ. TYPOLOGY OF FAVORABLE LEGAL REVIEW RESOLUTIONS 389

1. Favorable Exhortative Resolutions 389

2. Simple Unconstitutionality Resolutions 391

A. Simple Unconstitutionality Declaration of Partial Nature 391

B. Simple Unconstitutionality Declaration of Full Nature 391

3. Interpretative Resolutions 392

A. Unconstitutionality Due to Erroneous Interpretation or Misapplication of a Provision in a Specific Case 392

B. Unconstitutionality a Result of the Effects of the Challenged Text or Provision 394

4. Favorable Resolutions of Inapplicability 395

5. Normative Resolutions 395

A. Favorable Additive Resolutions 396

B. Favorable Substitutive Resolutions 397

Ⅱ. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF NORMATIVE RESOLUTIONS 401

1. The Justification of Normative Resolutions 401

2. Criticism of Regulatory Resolutions 402

Ⅲ. REGULATORY RESOLUTIONS AND THE LIMITS TO CONSTITUTIONAL JURISDICTION 403

BIBLIOGRAPHY 406

CROATIA： Sanja Baric and Petar Bacic，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 407

Ⅰ. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA： COMPOSITION，COMPETENCES，AND PROCEEDINGS 407

1. Introduction 407

2. Composition and Terms of Duty 409

3. Competences of the Constitutional Court 410

4. Proceedings of the Constitutional Court 411

5. Abstract Review 413

6. Concrete Review 415

7. Effects of the Constitutional Court’s Decision 415

8. Constitutional Complaint 417

9. Other Competences 420

A. Jurisdictional Disputes 420

B. Impeachment of the President of the Republic 420

C. Supervision of the Constitutionality of Programs and Activities of Political Parties 420

D. Control of the Constitutionality and Legality of the Elections and the National Referendum and the Electoral Disputes 421

E. Constitutional Court Procedures of Appeal 421

F. Monitoring the Execution of Constitutionality and Legality，and Supervisory Control over Passing Regulations for Executing the Constitution，Laws，and Other Regulations 422

Ⅱ. JUDICIAL ACTIVISM IN CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW DECISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 423

1. Judicial Activism versus the Legislative Branch 424

2. Methodological Activism of the Constitutional Court - The Interpretation and Power of the Legal Argument 428

3. Procedural Activism - Precedence of Form over Content 431

4. Substantial Activism - Support for Democracy and Constitutional Rights 433

Ⅲ. CONCLUSIONS ON THE ACTIVISM OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CROATIA 440

CZECH REPUBLIC： Zdenek Kuhn，Czech Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator？ 445

Ⅰ. THE HISTORY AND THE POWERS OF THE CZECH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 446

Ⅱ. CONSTITUTIONAL COMPLAINTS AGAINST DECISIONS OF GENERAL COURTS 448

Ⅲ. INTERPRETATIVE DECISIONS IN ABSTRACT CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW： “SOFT CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW” 454

Ⅳ. POSITIVE ASPECT OF NEGATIVE DECISIONS OF THE COURT 458

Ⅴ. UNCONSTITUTIONAL GAPS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM：PROVIDING CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDIES OR JUDICIAL SUBSTITUTION FOR THE LEGISLATOR？ 461

Ⅵ. THE CZECH CONSTITUTIONAL COURT ACTING OPENLY AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR-CASES OF CONSTITUTIONALITY OF AMENDMENTS TO THE LAW 466

Ⅶ. COURT’S SELF-PERCEPTIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 468

FRANCE： Bertrand Mathieu，Le Conseil constitutionnel “legislateur positif. ” Ou la question des interventions du juge constitutionnel francais dans l’exercise de la function legislative 471

Ⅰ. TITRE LIMINAIRE： ELEMENTS D’ANALYSES SUR LE CONTROLE DE CONSTITUTIONNALITE EN FRANCE 472

Ⅱ. LES INTERACTIONS ENTRE LA FONCTION JURIDICTIONNELLE DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL ET LA FONCTION LEGISLATIVE 478

1. Les principes cadres 478

2. De quelques modalites d’intervention mediates du Conseil constitutionnel 479

- Les incidences sur la fabrication de la loi 479

- Les incidences sur les revisions constitutionnelles 479

- La question de la separabilite des dispositions inconstitutionnelles 480

- Les consequences tirees de l’inconstitutionnalite relevee 481

- L’outil de la proportionnalite 483

Ⅲ. ANALYSE D’UNE MODALITE SPECIFIQUE D’INTERVENTION DU CONSEIL CONSTITUTIONNEL： LES RESERVES D’INTERPRETATION 484

1. Elements de definition et champ d’application 484

2 Les destinataires des reserves d’interpretation 488

3. La portee des reserves d’inierpretation： essai de typologie 489

-L’exclusion d’une interpretation inconstitutionnelle： le postulat du respect de la Constitution par le legislateur 489

-L’argument de la maladresse du 1egislateur 490

-La tentation de la reecriture 490

-La modification du champ d’application de la loi 492

-La paralyse de 1’application de la loi 493

4. Elements statistiques sommaires 494

EN GUISE DE CONCLUSION 495

GERMANY： Ines Hartel，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 497

Ⅰ. JUDICIAL MEANS FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW 498

1. Civil Rights Injunctions 498

2. Direct Actions to Control the Constitutionality of Statutes 499

3. Direct Actions to Control the Constitutionality of Legislative Omissions 500

4. Ex Officio Powers of Constitutional Judges and of the Constitutional Court or Tribunals 501

5. Authority of the Supreme Court of Constitutional Courts to Remove and Take Over Cases from Lower Courts（Avocamiento） 501

Ⅱ. JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON JUDICIAL REVIEW 502

1. Constitutional Interpretation 502

2. Declaration of the Unconstitutional Character of Statutes（Declaration of Incompatibility） 503

3. Annulment （Complete or Partial） of Unconstitutional Statutes 506

4. Influencing the Constitution 509

5. Decisions Including Legislative Structures 510

6. Additive Decisions Reforming Legislation 513

7. Admonitory Decisions 514

8. Judicial Replacement of the Legislator 516

9. Judicial Replacement of the Government in Policy-Making Processes 517

Ⅲ. EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL DECISIONS ON CONSTITUTIONAL MATTERS 518

BELGIUM，FRANCE，GERMANY： Christian Behrendt，L’activite du juge constitutionnel comme legislateur-cadre positif 521

INTRODUCTION 521

Ⅰ. LA NOTION D’“INTERFERENCE” 525

Ⅱ. LA CLASSIFICATION DES INTERFERENCES 527

Ⅲ. L’IMPORTANCE QUANTITATIVE DES INTERFERENCES 529

1. L’importance des lignes directrices 530

2. L’importance des injonctions 531

Ⅳ. LE RECOURS A LA TECHNIQUE DES INTERFERENCES：UNE TENTATIVE D’EVALUATION 533

CONCLUSIONS 537

GREECE： Julia Iliopoulos-Strangas and Stylianos-loannis G.Koutnatzis，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 539

Ⅰ. THE SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 540

1. Judicial Organization 540

2. Control of Legislative and Executive Acts 541

A. Origins and Development of Judicial Review throughout Greece’s Constitutional History 541

B. Judicial Review under the Greek Constitution of 1975 542

A. Constitutional Basis ofJudicial Review 542

B. Substantive and Procedural Constitutional Claims 543

C. Primary Features ofJudicial Review 544

D. Means of Concentration of Review 546

E. The Proposal to Establish a Constitutional Court 549

F. Control of Conventionality 552

G. Control of Executive Acts 553

H. Control of Constitutional Amendments 555

Ⅱ. THE APPLICATION OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 555

1. The Development of Constitutional Jurisprudence 556

A. The Greek Courts’ Deferential Tradition 556

B. Phases in the Judicial Implementation of the1975 Constitution 558

2. Positive Legislation through Constitutional Adjudication 563

A. Extension of Preferential Treatment in Equality Principle Cases 563

B. The Council of State’s Environmental Jurisprudence 567

A. Constitutional Entrenchment of the Current Status of Environmental Protection 568

B. The Principle of Sustainable Development 570

Ⅲ. FINAL REMARKS 571

HUNGARY，Lorant Csink，Jozsef Petretei，and Peter Tilk，Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator 575

Ⅰ. ANTECEDENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 575

Ⅱ. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 576

Ⅲ. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF THE DECISIONS OF THE COURT 578

Ⅳ. THE MANIFESTATION OF POSITIVE LEGISLATION 579

1. Constitutional Requirement 579

2. Mosaic Annulment 581

3. Role of the Court in the Examination of Omissions 582

4. Interpretation of the Constitution 583

INDIA： Surya Deva，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators： The Indian Experience 587

INTRODUCTION 587

Ⅰ. JUDICIAL REVIEW： CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 588

1. Judicial Review： The Provisions 588

2. Judicial Review： The Interpretation 591

Ⅱ. JUDICIARY BECOMING THE LEGISLATOR： SOME EXAMPLES 594

1. Guidelines for Police Arrest and Detention： D K Basu v. State of West Bengal 594

2. Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace： Vishaka v. State of Rajasthan 596

3. Ragging Menace at Universities 598

CONCLUSION 600

ITALY： Giampaolo Parodi，The Italian Constitutional Court as Positive Legislator 603

BIBLIOGRAPHY 620

MEXICO： Eduardo Ferrer Mac-Gregor，The Mexican Supreme Court as Positive Legislator 623

INTRODUCTION 623

Ⅰ. THE SUPREME COURT AS A CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 624

1. Brief Background 624

2. Constitutional Evolution 625

3. Powers 625

A. Constitutional Control 625

B. Other Jurisdiction and Powers 627

Ⅱ. THE SUPREME COURT AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR 627

1. Amparo Proceedings （Specific Effects） 628

2. Abstract Unconstitutionality Cause ofAction against General Norms （Laws and International Treaties） and Constitutional Controversies （Erga Omnes Effect） 632

3. Legislative Omissions 639

CONCLUSIONS 642

NETHERLANDS： Jerfi Uzman，Tom Barkhuysen，and Michiel L.van Em merik，The Dutch Supreme Court： A Reluctant Positive Legislator？ 645

INTRODUCTION 645

Ⅰ. THE BAN ON JUDICIAL CONSTITUTIONALITY REVIEW AND ITS SCOPE 648

1. Article 120 of the Dutch Constitution 648

2. Summary 651

Ⅱ. ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 652

1. Introduction： Monism and Article 94 of the Constitution 652

2. “Eligible to Bind All Persons ” and Judicial Lawmaking 653

3. The Increasing Role of the European Convention in National Case Law 656

4. Concluding Remarks 660

Ⅲ. THE LAWMAKING ROLE OF THE COURTS 661

1. Introduction 661

2. Defining the Process of Lawmaking 662

3. The Case Law of the Supreme Court Concerning Its Lawmaking Role 663

A. The Dual Custody Case： Distinguishing Positive from Negative Lawmaking 664

B. The Dutch Citizenship Case： Avoiding Policy Decisions 665

C. The Spring Decisions： Judicial Activism or Prudent Lawmaking？ 667

D. After the High-Water Mark： A Slow Retreat to Judicial Restraint 667

E. Toward a New Model： The 1999 Labour Expenses Deduction Judgment 669

F. The Exception to the Rule： European Union Law 673

4. Reactions of “La Doctrine ” after 1999 675

Ⅳ. MEANS AND EFFECTS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 678

1. Introduction 678

2. Procedures Available to Enforce Fundamental Rights Law 678

3. Remedies for Fundamental Rights Violations 679

4. Effects of Judgments 681

5. Mitigating the Temporal Effects of Judgments 683

6. Judicial Reforms 685

SUMMARY 686

BIBLIOGRAPHY 688

NORWAY： Eivind Smith，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 693

Ⅰ. ON THE ORIGINS OF THE NORWEGIAN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 693

Ⅱ. ON THE CHARACTER OF THE NORWEGIAN SYSTEM OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 695

Ⅲ. THE SUPREME COURT OF NORWAY AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR？ 697

POLAND： Marek Safjan，The Constitutional Courts as a Positive Legislator 701

Ⅰ. PRELIMINARY REMARKS 701

Ⅱ. WHAT IS THE FUNCTION OF THE COURT AS A POSITIVE LEGISLATOR？ 703

Ⅲ. INDIRECT，POSITIVE IMPACT- EFFECTS OF NEGATIVE LEGISLATION 703

Ⅳ. DIRECT FORMS OF IMPACT EXERTED BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS VERSUS NORMATIVE ACTS 708

1. Interpretation of the Constitution 708

2. Interpretation of Laws： Interpretative Rulings 714

3. Signalization 717

CONCLUSIONS 718

PORTUGAL： Joaquim de Sousa Ribeiro and Esperanca Mealha，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 721

Ⅰ. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE JUDICIAL REVIEW METHOD APPLIED IN PORTUGAL 721

1. The Preemptive Control 722

2. The Abstract Review and the Concrete Review of Legislation 723

3. The Enforceability and Implementation of Decisions of the Constitutional Court 723

Ⅱ. POWERS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 724

1. Portuguese Constitutional Court as a Negative Legislator 724

2. Powers of the Court and Effects of Constitutional Review Decisions 725

3. Interpretation of Statute in Harmony with the Constitution 728

4. Manipulative and Additive Decisions 729

5. The Impact of Constitutional Case Law 730

SERBIA： Bosko Tripkovic，A Constitutional Court in Transition：Making Sense of Constitutional Adjudication in Postauthoritarian Serbia 735

INTRODUCTION 735

Ⅰ. NORMATIVE GOALS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 736

Ⅱ. PERFORMANCE OF THE SERBIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 741

1. General Features of the System ofJudicial Review 741

2. Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Process 747

A. Representation 747

B. Deliberation 753

3. Constitutional Court and Liberal Values 757

A. Direct Protection of Liberal Values 758

B. Indirect Protection of Liberal Values 762

CONCLUSION 764

SLOVAK REPUBLIC： Jan Svak and Lucia Berdisova，Constitutional Court of the Slovak Republic as Positive Legislator via Application and Interpretation of the Constitution 767

Ⅰ. INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 769

Ⅱ. ABSTRACT CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 771

1. Effect of the Ruling of the Constitutional Court regarding the Unconformity Between Legal Regulations 773

Ⅲ. CONCRETE CONTROL OF CONSTITUTIONALITY 775

SWITZERLAND： Tobias Jaag，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 783

Ⅰ. INTRODUCTION 783

1. Courts as Legislators in General 783

2. The Federal Supreme Court as a Constitutional Court 784

A Judicial Review in General 784

B. Limitations on Judicial Review 785

3. The Federal Supreme Court as Legislator 786

A. Negative Legislation 786

B. Positive Legislation 788

4. Federal and Cantonal Law 788

Ⅱ. REFUSAL OF THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT TO ACT AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR 789

1. Principle 789

2. Examples 789

Ⅲ. THE FEDERAL SUPREME COURT AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR 791

1. In General 791

2. Fundamental Rights 791

A. New Fundamental Rights 791

B. Interpretation and Substantiation of Fundamental Rights 793

3. Political Rights 793

4. Procedural Guarantees 795

5. Federal Conflicts 796

6. Compensation for Infringement of Property Rights 797

7. Further Examples 798

CONCLUSIONS 798

BIBLIOGRAPHY 800

ABBREVIATIONS 802

UNITED KINGDOM： John Bell，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators 803

INTRODUCTION AND TERMINOLOGY 803

Ⅰ. CONSTITUTIONAL （JUDICIAL） REVIEW，CONCENTRATED OR DISTRIBUTED 806

Ⅱ. SPECIFIC ISSUES 807

1. Constitutional Review Procedures 807

2. Judicial Decisions 808

A. Human Rights and Judicial Activism 809

B. Judicial Substitution 811

3. Effect of Decisions 813

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA： Laurence Claus and Richard S.Kay，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators in the United States 815

Ⅰ. LEGISLATORS AND POSITIVE LEGISLATORS 815

Ⅱ. HOW AMERICAN COURTS LEGISLATE THROUGH CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION 820

Ⅲ. ENFORCING JUDICIAL LEGISLATION 829

VENEZUELA： Daniela Urosa Maggi，Constitutional Courts as Positive Legislators： The Venezuelan Experience 843

Ⅰ. THE NORMATIVE JURISDICTION ACCORDING TO THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER 846

Ⅱ. CASES WHERE THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER HAS EXTENDED ITS OWN COMPETENCIES THROUGH THE PRACTICING OF THE NORMATIVE JURISDICTION 847

1. Competencies in Constitutional Amparo Matters 848

A. Modification of the Competencies to Hear the Amparo Claims 849

B. Modification of the Procedure of the Constitutional Amparo Claim 849

2. Competencies in the Special Recourse to Review Decisions 850

3. Competencies to Hear the Interpretation of the Constitution Recourse 852

4. Competencies in Matters of Concentrated Control of the Constitutionality of Statutes and Other Acts Having Rank of Law 855

A. Jurisprudential Inclusion of the Competency of Incidental Control over Statutes 855

B. Modification of the Procedure of the Nullity Cases 857

5. Competencies in Matters of Control over Unconstitutionality for Omission 858

6. Competency in Matters of Claims for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests 859

A. Creation of a Claim for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests 859

B. Procedure to Be Followed and Legitimacy in Claims for Protection of Diffuse and Collective Interests 860

7. Competencies in Mattes of Habeas Data 860

Ⅲ. CASES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM ON MATTERS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION： THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER AS POSITIVE CONSTITUENT 862

1. Decisions No. 6 ofJanuary 27，2000 （case Milagros Gomez et al） and No. 180 of March 28，2000 （case Allan Brewer-Cariaset al）： Legitimization of the Constitutional Transition Regime Approved by the National Constituent Assembly on December 1999 and Legitimization of the Acts Performed by Such Assembly in the Execution of Such Transition RegimE. 863

2. Decision No. 34 of January 26，2004 （case Vestalia Araujo）：Interpretation of Article 203 of the Constitution 864

3. Decision No. 565 ofApril 15，2008 （case Attorney General of the Republic）： Interpretation ofArticle 164.10，of the 1999 Constitution 865

Ⅳ. PRECEDENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER IN WHICH IT ACTED AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR FOR ADDING TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM REGULATORY PRINCIPLES THAT DID NOT EXIST BEFORE 867

1. Decision No. 1013 ofJune 12，2001 （case Elias Santana）：Interpretation and Limitation of Rights Related to Freedom of Expression and Right to Rebuttal 867

2. Decision No. 978 ofApril 30，2003 （case Bolivar Banco）：Resolution of the Method and Opportunity for Exercising the State Tax Authority on Tax Stamp Matters Pending the Issuing of the Relevant National Legislation 868

3. Decision No. 511 ofApril5，2004 （case Maira Rincon Lugo）：Decision on the Taking over Proceeding of Cases from Lower Courts （Avocamiento），Having Binding Nature for All Other Courts of the Supreme Tribunal ofJustice 869

4. Decision No. 1682 ofJuly 15，2005 （case Carmela Manpieri）：Interpretation of Article 77 of the Constitution - Comparison between Men and Women De Facto and Men and Women Marriage - and the Praetorian Development ofIts Legal Regime 870

5. Decision No. 1456 ofJuly 27，2006 （case Yamilex Nunez de Godoy） and the Praetorian Development of the Legal Regime of Assisted Reproduction 871

Ⅴ. PRECEDENTS OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT THAT ACTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATOR TO MODIFY PREEXISTING LAWS 872

1. Decisions That Modify Legal Rules through SubstitutiveDecisions on No Prior Declaration of Annulment of the Rule 872

A. Decision No. 2855 of November 20，2002 （case FEDENAGA）： Constitutionality of Articles 40 and 43 of the Decree with Force of Law on Rural Lands and Agrarian Development 873

B. Decision No. 2560 of August 5，2005 （case Romulo Pacheco）： Modification of Article 172 of the Organic Code of Criminal Procedure 874

C. Decision No. 301 of February 27，2007 （case Adriana Vigilanza）： Modification of the Sense and Scope of Article 31 of the Income Tax Law 875

2. Decisions of the Constitutional Chamber That Annulled and Established the New Wording of Legal Provisions 877

A. Decision no. 80 of February 1，2001 （Case of Procedural Terms）： Modification of Article 197 of the Civil Procedure Code Regarding the Calculation of Procedural Terms 877

B. Decision No. 1264 of June 11，2002 （case Jesus Rendon）：Partial Annulment of Article 201 of the Civil Procedure Code That Governs Judicial Holidays 878

C. Decision No. 2241 of September 24，2002 （case Andres Velazquez）： Partial Annulment of Article 80 of the Organic Law on the Financial Administration of the Public Sector 879

D. Decision No. 3241 of December 12，2002 （case COVEIN）： Partial Annulment of Article 1 of the Ordinance on the Industry and Commerce License Tax of the Bolivar Municipality of the Anzoategui State 880

E. Decision No. 865 of April 22，2003 （case Ernesto Jose Rodriguez Casares）： Annulment of Article 48 of the Ordinance on Urban and Rural Common and Personal Lands for the Bolivar District of the Zulia State 881

F. Decision No. 1104 of May 23，2006 （case Carlos Brender）： Partial Annulment of Article 90 of the Organic Law of the Attorney General of the Republic 882

G. Decision No. 163 of February 28，2008 （case Ciro Ramon Aratjo）： Partial Annulment of the Organic Law of Public Detcnse 883

a. Partial Annulment and Modification of the Text of Article 3 of the Organic Law of Public Defense 883

b Partial Annulment and Modification of Articles 11，12，and 13 of the Organic Law of Public Defense 883

c. Partial Annulment and Modification of Article 15 of the Organic Law of Public Defense 884

Ⅵ BRIEF CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXERCISE OF THE NORMATIVE POWERS BY THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHAMBER OF THE SUPREME CHAMBER OF JUSTICE 885

PART THREE SYNTHESIS REPORT： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS POSITIVE LEGISLATORS IN COMPARATIVE LAW 889

PRELIMINARY REMARKS 889

1. The Subordination of Constitutional Courts to the Constitution 889

2. New Role of Constitutional Courts and the Question of Acting as Positive Legislators 891

FIRST TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERFERING WITH THE CONSTITUENT POWER 893

1. Constitutional Courts Resolving Constitutional Federal Disputes and Enacting Constitutional Rules 893

2. Constitutional Courts Exercising Judicial Review on Constitutional Provisions 894

3. Constitutional Courts Exercising Judicial Review on Constitutional Reforms and Amendments 894

4. The Role of Constitutional Courts Adapting the Constitution on Matters of Fundamental Rights 896

5. The Mutation of the Constitution on Institutional Matters 897

SECOND TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERFERING WITH EXISTING LEGISLATION 899

1. Constitutional Courts Complementing Legislative Functions by Interpreting Statutes in Harmony with the Constitution 899

2. Constitutional Courts Complementing the Legislator byAdding New Rules （and a New Meaning） to the Existing Legislative Provision 900

3. Constitutional Courts Complementing Legislative Functions by Interfering with the Temporal Effects of Legislation 902

A. The Power of the Constitutional Courts to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effect：Postponing the Etfect of the Courts’ Ruling 903

B. The Power of the Constitutional Courts to Determine When Annulled Legislation Will Cease to Have Effects：The Retroactive or Nonretroactive Effects of Their Own Decisions 904

A. The Possibility of Limiting the Retroactive Ex Tunc Effects of Declarative Decisions 905

B. The Possibility of Retroactive Effects for Ex Nunc Constitutive Decisions 906

4. The Power of Constitutional Courts to Revive Repealed Legislation 907

THIRD TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS INTERFERING WITH THE ABSENCE OF LEGISLATION OR WITH LEGISLATIVE OMISSIONS 907

1. Constitutional Courts Filling In Absolute Legislative Omissions 907

A. The Direct Action against Absolute Legislative Omissions 908

B. The Protection of Fundamental Rights from Absolute Legislative Omissions by Means of Actions or Complaints for Their Protection 909

2. Constitutional Courts Filling In the Gap of Relative Legislative Omissions 912

A. Constitutional Courts’ Issuing of Nonbinding Directives to the Legislator 913

B. Constitutional Courts’ Issuing of Binding Orders and Directives to the Legislator 914

3. Constitutional Courts as Provisional Legislators 915

FOURTH TREND： CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS AS LEGISLATORS ON MATTERS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 917

1. Constitutional Courts’ Creating of Their Own Judicial Review Powers 917

A. The Judge-Made Law on the Diffuse System of Judicial Review 917

B. The Extension of Judicial Review Powers to Ensure the Protection of Fundamental Rights 918

2. The Need for the Express Provision in the Constitution of Judicial Review Powers of the Constitutional Jurisdiction and Its Deviation 919

3. Constitutional Courts ’Creation of Procedural Rules on Judicial Review 920

FINAL REMARKS 921

APPENDIX 925

INDEX 929