ECONOMICS OF EVIDENCEPDF电子书下载

PART Ⅰ MODELS WITH EXOGENOUS LITIGATION SPENDING 5

A Settlement and Plea Bargaining: Cooperative Game Theory Approach 5

1.Richard A.Posner （1973）, excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’, Journal of Legal Studies, Ⅱ （2）, June, Introduction and Part Ⅳ, 399-400, 417-29 5

2.John P. Gould （1973）, excerpt from ‘The Economics of Legal Conflicts’, Journal of Legal Studies, Ⅱ （2）, June, 279-93, 297-300 20

3.William M.Landes （1971）, excerpt from ‘An Economic Analysis of the Coufls’, Journal of Law and Economics, 14 （1）, April, 61-77, 101-6 39

B Settlement and Plea Bargaining: Asymmetric Information Models 65

4.Lucian Arye Bebchuk （1984）, ‘Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information’, RAND Journal of Economics, 15 （3）, Autumn, 404-15 65

5.Kathryn E.Spier （1992）, ‘The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation’, Review of Economic Studies, 59, 93-108 77

6.Jennifer F.Reinganum and Louis L.Wilde （1986）, ‘Settlement, Litigation, and the Allocation of Litigation Costs’, RAND Journal of Economics, 17 （4）, Winter, 557-66 93

C The Selection of Disputes for Litigation 105

7.George L.Priest and Benjamin Klein （1984）, excerpts from ‘The Selection of Disputes for Litigation’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅢ （1）, Janua , Parts Ⅰ and Ⅱ, 1-30 105

8.Steven Shavell （1996）, ‘Any Frequency of Plaintiff Victory at Trial is Possible’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅩⅤ （2）, June, 493-501 135

9.Joel Waldfogel （1995）, ‘The Selection Hypothesis and the Relationship between Trial and Plaintiff Victory’, Journal of Political Economy, 103 （2）, April, 229-60 144

D The Allocation of Legal Costs 179

10. Steven Shavell （1982）, ‘Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs’, Journal of Legal Studies, Ⅺ （1）, January, 55-81 179

11. Geoffrey P. Miller （1986）, ‘An Economic Analysis of Rule 68’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅤ （1）, January, 93-125 206

E Negative Expected Value Suits 241

12. Lucian Arye Bebchuk （1988）, ‘Suing Solely to Extract a Settlement Offer’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅦ （2）, June, 437-50 241

13. Lucian Arye Bebchuk （1996）, ‘A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of Threats to Sue’, Journal of Legal Studies, XXV （1）, January, 1-25 255

F Discovery 283

14. Robert D.Cooter and Daniel L.Rubinfeld （1994）, ‘An Economic Model of Legal Discovery’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅩⅢ （1）, January, 435-63 283

15. Henry S.Farber and Michelle J.White （1991）, ‘Medical Malpractice: An Empirical Examination of the Litigation Process’, RAND Journal of Economics, 22 （2）, Summer, 199-217 312

16. Bruce L.Hay （1994）, ‘Civil Discovery: Its Effects and Optimal Scope’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅩⅢ （1）, January, 481-515 331

G Litigation and Primary Activity Incentives 369

17. Steven Shavell （1982）, ‘The Social versus the Private Incentive to Bring Suit in a Costly Legal System’, Journal of Legal Studies, Ⅺ （2）, June, 333-9 369

18. Susan Rose-Ackerman and Mark Geistfeld （1987）, ‘The Divergence between Social and Private Incentives to Sue: A Comment on Shavell, Menell, and Kaplow’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅥ （2）, June,483-91 376

19. A.Mitchell Polinsky and Daniel L.Rubinfeld （1988）, ‘The Welfare Implications of Costly Litigation for the Level of Liability’, Journal of Legal Studies, ⅩⅦ （1）, January, 151-64 385

20. A.Mitchell Polinsky and Yeon-Koo Che （1991）, ‘Decoupling Liability: Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation’, RAND Journal of Economics, 22 （4）, Winter, 562-70 399

PART Ⅱ MODELS WITH ENDOGENOUS LITIGATION SPENDING 413

A The Litigation Expenditure Game 413

21. Richard A.Posner （1973）, excerpts from ‘An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration’, Journal of Legal Studies, Ⅱ （2）, June, Introduction, Part V and Appendix, 399-400, 429-41,452-58 413

22. Avery Katz （1988）, ‘Judicial Decisionmaking and Litigation Expenditure’, International Review of Law and Economics, 8, 127-43 435

23. George B.Shepherd （1999）, ‘An Empirical Study of the Economics of Pretrial Discovery’, International Review of Law and Economics, 19,245-63 452

B How Results Change when Spending is Endogenous 473

24. Ronald Braeutigam, Bruce Owen and John Panzar （1984）, ‘An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems’, Law and Contemporary Problems, 47 （1）, Winter, 173-85 473

25. Albert Choi and Chris William Sanchirico （2004）, ‘Should Plaintiffs Win What Defendants Lose? Litigation Stakes, Litigation Effort, and the Benefits of Decoupling’, Journal of Legal Studies, 33 （2）, June,323-54 486

Name Index 519