Enforcing Obligations Erga Omnes in International LawPDF电子书下载

Introduction 1

Part Ⅰ Background to the erga omnes concept 17

1 Clarifications 19

1.1 Countermeasures and ICJ proceedings 19

1.2 The notion of standing 25

1.2.1 Standing as a normative concept 28

1.2.2 Standing as a flexible concept 32

1.2.3 The diversity of rules governing standing 36

1.2.4 Interim conclusions 40

1.3 Standing to enforce individual legal positions 40

1.3.1 The basis of the distinction 41

1.3.2 Categories of individual legal positions 42

1.3.2.a Bilateral legal rules and similar situations 42

1.3.2.b Special injury 44

1.4 Concluding observations 46

2 Traditional approaches to standing 48

2.1 Restrictive tendencies 52

2.1.1 A structural analysis of multilateral obligations 53

2.1.1.a Three categories of obligations 54

2.1.1.b The legal regime 58

2.1.2 A restrictive interpretation of treaty provisions： the South West Africa case 63

2.2 Expansive tendencies 69

2.2.1 Treaty-based rules of standing 70

2.2.1.a Unequivocal treaty clauses 71

2.2.1.b Equivocal clauses broadly interpreted： the Wimbledon case 76

2.2.2 The position in the absence of special treaty regulations 80

2.2.2.a Interdependent obligations 80

2.2.2.b Status treaties 80

Background 81

Standing to react against breaches 83

2.2.2.c The duty to comply with judgments of the International Court of Justice 87

2.2.2.d Basic humanitarian standards 89

2.3 Concluding observations 94

Part Ⅱ Legal issues raised by the erga omnes concept 97

3 Distinguishing types of erga omnes effects 99

3.1 Terminological imprecision 101

3.2 The traditional meaning of the term 103

3.3 ‘Other’ erga omnes effects in the ICJ’s jurisprudence 106

3.3.1 The traditional meaning 107

3.3.2 The territorial restriction of obligations 110

3.3.3 The descriptive function 112

3.4 Concluding observations 115

4 Identifying obligations erga omnes 117

4.1 The question of sources 120

4.1.1 The Court’s jurisprudence 121

4.1.2 Further considerations 123

4.2 Distinguishing obligations erga omnes from other customary obligations 128

4.2.1 The structural approach 130

4.2.1.a The strong version 131

4.2.1.b The moderate version 133

4.2.1.c Interim conclusion 135

4.2.2 The material approach 136

4.2.2.a The point of reference 136

4.2.2.b The required threshold of importance 138

Obligations erga omnes and norms of jus cogens 139

The merits of a comparative approach 141

Implications for the erga omnes concept 146

Interim conclusion 151

Beyond jus cogens： obligation erga omnes not deriving from peremptory norms 151

Dispositive obligations erga omnes？ 152

Relevant factors 153

4.3 Concluding observations 156

5 Standing to institute ICJ proceedings 158

5.1 The Barcelona Traction dictum 162

5.2 Possible counter-arguments 165

5.2.1 Isolated pronouncements？ 165

5.2.2 An obiter dictum lacking legal relevance？ 167

5.2.3 The international community as the exclusive beneficiary？ 173

5.2.4 Contradictions within the judgment？ 176

5.2.5 Inconclusive jurisprudence since 1970？ 179

5.2.5.a The Nuclear Tests cases 180

5.2.5.b The East Timor case 182

Obligations erga omnes and the indispensable third-party rule 183

The issue of standing 185

5.2.5.c The Genocide case 187

5.2.5.d The Nicaragua case 187

5.2.5.e The Gabcikovo case 190

5.2.5.f Summary 192

5.2.6 A restrictive， contextual interpretation？ 193

5.3 Concluding observations 196

6 Standing to take countermeasures 198

6.1 The Court’s jurisprudence 201

6.1.1 The Barcelona Traction case 202

6.1.2 The Namibia and Hostages cases 204

6.1.3 The Nicaragua case 205

6.1.4 Interim conclusions 207

6.2 International practice 207

6.2.1 Specific instances of state practice 208

6.2.1.a Actual violations 209

Western countries - Uganda （1971-1978） 210

European countries - Liberia （1980） 211

G77 and socialist countries - colonial regimes （1970s-1990s） 211

Western countries - Poland （1981） 213

United States - Soviet Union （1981） 214

Western countries - Argentina （1982） 215

Western countries - Soviet Union （1983） 217

Western countries - South Africa （1985-1986） 217

Various countries - Iraq （1990） 219

European and Commonwealth countries - Nigeria （1995） 220

African States - Burundi （1996） 221

European countries - Yugoslavia （1998） 223

Various countries - Zimbabwe （2002-2003） 224

6.2.1.b Statements implying a right to take countermeasures 225

G7 declarations on aircraft hijacking （1978/1981） 225

Western countries - Iran （1979-1980） 226

6.2.1.c Actual non-compliance justified differently 227

Netherlands-Surinam （1982） 227

European countries-Yugoslavia （1991） 228

6.2.1.d An assessment 228

A preliminary evaluation 230

Counter-arguments examined 231

The relevance of the erga omnes concept 232

The selectivity of practice 234

The dominance of western practice 235

A lack of opinio juris 237

The requirement of collective action 240

Interim conclusion 241

6.2.2 Governments’ comments on the ILC’s work on State responsibility 241

6.2.2.a Comments made during the first reading 242

6.2.2.b Comments made during the second reading 245

6.2.2.c Interim conclusions 248

6.3 Concluding observations 249

7 Erga omnes enforcement rights and competing enforcement mechanisms 252

7.1 Identifying areas of conflict 256

7.1.1 Overlapping legal rules 256

7.1.2 Different enforcement rights 258

7.1.2.a Treaty-based systems of enforcement： a survey 259

7.1.2.b Specific types of conflict 261

7.2 Addressing conflicts 263

7.2.1 Contracting out of decentralised enforcement by States 263

7.2.1.a Direct recourse by individuals 263

7.2.1.b Institutional enforcement 264

7.2.1.c Summary 268

7.2.2 Contracting out of specific forms of decentralised enforcement 268

7.2.2.a General considerations 268

The exclusivity thesis 269

Alleged support in international jurisprudence 269

Its rejection 271

Guidelines for the analysis of specific conflicts 276

Explicit conflict rules 276

Effectivity 277

Formal indications of effectivity 278

The character of the breach 278

Summary 279

7.2.2.b Contracting out of ICJ proceedings 279

Non-exclusivity clauses 280

Implied non-exclusivity 282

Flexible exclusivity clauses 283

Interim conclusion 286

7.2.2.c Contracting out of countermeasures 286

No inter-State procedures available 288

Inter-State procedures available 289

Non-judicial procedures 289

Judicial procedures 291

Interim conclusion 299

7.2.3 Special factors restricting treaty enforcement 300

7.2.3.a Article 51 UNC 300

7.2.3.b The effects of reservations 302

7.3 Concluding observations 304

Conclusion 306

Epilogue 312

Bibliography 339

Index 378