产业组织 战略方法 英文PDF电子书下载

Ⅰ Foundations 1

1 Introduction 3

1.1 A More Formal Introduction to IO 7

1.1.1 The Demand for Industrial Organization 10

1.2 Methodologies 10

1.2.1 The New Industrial Organization 10

1.2.2 The Theory of Business Strategy 11

1.2.3 Antitrust Law 12

1.3 Overview of the Text 12

1.3.1 Foundations 12

1.3.2 Monopoly 12

1.3.3 Oligopoly Pricing 13

1.3.4 Strategic Behavior 14

1.3.5 Issues in Antitrust Economics 15

1.3.6 Issues in Regulatory Economics 16

1.4 Suggestions for Further Reading 16

2 The Welfare Economics of Market Power 19

2.1 Profit Maximization 20

2.2 Perfect Competition 21

2.2.1 Supply 22

2.2.2 Market Equilibrium 23

2.3 Efficiency 25

2.3.1 Measures of Gains from Trade 25

2.3.2 Pareto Optimality 28

2.4 Market Power 29

2.4.1 Market Power and Pricing 31

2.4.2 Measurement and Determinants of Market Power 36

2.4.3 The Determinants of Deadweight Loss 37

2.5 Market Power and Public Policy 40

2.6 Chapter Summary 42

2.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 43

3 Theory of the Firm 49

3.1 Neoclassical Theory of the Firm 50

3.1.1 Review of Cost Concepts 52

3.1.2 The Potential Advantages of Being Large 54

3.1.3 Economies of Scale and Seller Concentration 60

3.2 Why Do Firms Exist? 62

3.2.1 Two Puzzles Regarding the Scope of a Firm 62

3.2.2 Explanations for the Existence of Firms 63

3.2.3 Alternative Economic Organizations 65

3.2.4 Spot Markets 65

3.2.5 Specific Investments and Quasi-Rents 69

3.2.6 Contracts 72

3.2.7 Complete vs.Incomplete Contracts 73

3.2.8 Vertical Integration 76

3.3 Limits to Firm Size 81

3.3.1 The Paradox of Selective Intervention 82

3.3.2 Property Rights Approach to the Theory of the Firm 84

3.4 Do Firms Profit Maximize? 94

3.4.1 Shareholder Monitoring and Incentive Contracts 95

3.4.2 External Limits to Managerial Discretion 98

3.5 Chapter Summary 101

3.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 102

Ⅱ Monopoly 109

4 Market Power and Dominant Firms 111

4.1 Sources of Market Power 113

4.1.1 Government Restrictions on Entry 116

4.1.2 Structural Characteristics 118

4.1.3 Strategic Behavior by Incumbents 123

4.2 A Dominant Firm with a Competitive Fringe 124

4.2.1 The Effect of Entry 129

4.3 Durable Goods Monopoly 130

4.3.1 The Coase Conjecture 130

4.3.2 Pacman Economics 141

4.3.3 Coase vs.Pacman 143

4.3.4 Recycling 144

4.4 Market Power:A Second Look 145

4.4.1 X-Inefficiency 145

4.4.2 Rent Seeking 147

4.5 Benefits of Monopoly 148

4.5.1 Scale Economies 148

4.5.2 Research and Development 148

4.6 Chapter Summary 149

4.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 150

5 Non-Linear Pricing and Price Discrimination 155

5.1 Examples of Price Discrimination 156

5.2 Mechanisms for Capturing Surplus 158

5.3 Market Power and Arbitrage:Necessary Conditions for Price Discrimination 160

5.4 Types of Price Discrimination 161

5.4.1 First-Degree Price Discrimination 162

5.4.2 Third-Degree Price Discrimination 164

5.4.3 Second-Degree Price Discrimination 166

5.4.4 General Non-Linear Pricing 170

5.4.5 Optimal Non-Linear Pricing 173

5.5 Antitrust Treatment of Price Discrimination 177

5.6 Chapter Summary 178

5.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 179

6 Market Power and Product Quality 183

6.1 Search Goods 185

6.1.1 Monopoly Provision of Quality 186

6.1.2 Quality Discrimination 189

6.2 Experience Goods and Quality 190

6.2.1 Moral Hazard and the Provision of Quality 191

6.2.2 The Lemons Problem 191

6.3 Signaling High Quality 193

6.3.1 A Dynamic Model of Reputation for Quality 193

6.3.2 Advertising as a Signal of Quality 196

6.3.3 Warranties 199

6.4 Chapter Summary 202

6.5 Suggestions for Further Reading 203

6.6 Appendix:The Complete Model of Quality Discrimination 206

Ⅲ Oligopoly Pricing 209

7 Game Theory Ⅰ 211

7.1 Why Game Theory? 212

7.2.3 Equilibrium Concepts 215

7.2.2 Types of Games 215

7.2.1 The Basic Elements of a Game 215

7.2 Foundations and Principles 215

7.2.4 Fundamental Assumptions 216

7.3 Static Games of Complete Information 216

7.3.1 Normal Form Representation 216

7.3.2 Dominant and Dominated Strategies 217

7.3.3 Rationalizable Strategies 219

7.3.4 Nash Equilibrium 220

7.3.5 Discussion and Interpretation of Nash Equilibria 221

7.3.6 Mixed Strategies 225

7.4 Chapter Summary 226

7.5 Suggestions for Further Reading 227

7.6 Appendix:Nash Equilibrium in Games with Continuous Strategies 230

8 Classic Models of Oligopoly 231

8.1 Static Oligopoly Models 232

8.2 Cournot 233

8.2.1 Cournot Best-Response Functions and Residual Demand Functions 234

8.2.2 Properties of the Cournot Equilibrium 238

8.2.3 Free-Entry Cournot Equilibrium 247

8.2.4 The Efficient Number of Competitors 249

8.3 Bertrand Competition 256

8.3.1 The Bertrand Paradox 256

8.3.2 Product Differentiation 258

8.3.3 Capacity Constraints 264

8.4 Cournot vs.Bertrand 270

8.5.1 Conjectural Variations 272

8.5 Empirical Tests of Oligopoly 272

8.6 Chapter Summary 274

8.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 275

8.8 Appendix:Best-Response Functions,Reaction Functions,and Stability 279

8.8.1 Stability 281

8.8.2 Uniqueness 282

9 Game Theory Ⅱ 283

9.1 Extensive Forms 284

9.2 Strategies vs.Actions and Nash Equilibria 286

9.3 Noncredible Threats 287

9.3.1 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 287

9.3.2 The Centipede Game 290

9.4 Two-Stage Games 291

9.5.1 Finitely Repeated Stage Game 292

9.5 Games of Almost Perfect Information 292

9.5.2 Infinitely Repeated Stage Game 293

9.6 Chapter Summary 299

9.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 299

9.8 Appendix:Discounting 303

10 Dynamic Models of Oligopoly 305

10.1 Reaching an Agreement 308

10.1.1 Profitability of Collusion 314

10.1.2 How Is an Agreement Reached? 314

10.1.3 Factors That Complicate Reaching an Agreement 318

10.2 Stronger,Swifter,More Certain 328

10.3 Dynamic Games 329

10.3.1 Credible Punishments and Subgame Perfection:Finite Games 329

10.4 Supergames 331

10.4.1 Subgame Perfection and Credible Threats:Infinite Game 332

10.4.2 Harsher Punishment Strategies 334

10.4.3 Renegotiation Proof Strategies 340

10.5 Factors That Influence the Sustainability of Collusion 340

10.6 Facilitating Practices 348

10.6.1 Efficiency and Facilitating Practices 355

10.7 Antitrust and Collusion 355

10.8 Chapter Summary 357

10.9 Suggestions for Further Reading 358

11 Product Differentiation 367

11.2 Monopolistic Competition 369

11.2.1 Preference Specification 369

11.1 What Is Product Differentiation? 369

11.2.2 Monopolistic Competition:Equilibrium 370

11.2.3 Too Many Brands of Toothpaste? 373

11.3 Bias in Product Selection 376

11.3.1 Asymmetric Preferences 376

11.4 Address Models 379

11.4.1 Consumer Preferences 380

11.4.2 A Simple Address Model:Hotelling s Linear City 381

11.4.3 Free Entry into the Linear City 384

11.4.4 Localized Competition 391

11.4.5 Efficiency of the Market Equilibrium 391

11.4.6 Endogenous Pricing 395

11.4.7 Pricing and the Principle of Minimum Differentiation 402

11.5.1 Brand Proliferation 404

11.5 Strategic Behavior 404

11.5.2 Brand Specification 407

11.5.3 Brand Preemption 407

11.6 Oligopoly Equilibrium in Vertically Differentiated Markets 411

11.7 Chapter Summary 413

11.8 Suggestions for Further Reading 415

12 Identifying and Measuring Market Power 423

12.1 Structure,Conduct,and Performance 425

12.1.1 SCP in Practice:The Framework 426

12.1.2 SCP in Practice:The Results 431

12.1.3 Critiques of SCP Studies 432

12.2 The New Empirical Industrial Organization 440

12.2.1 Structural Models 440

12.2.2 Nonparametric,or Reduced-Form,Approaches 451

12.3 The NEIO and SCP:A Summing Up 452

12.4 Chapter Summary 452

12.5 Suggestions for Further Reading 454

Ⅳ Strategic Behavior 457

13 An Introduction to Strategic Behavior 459

13.1 Strategic Behavior 461

13.1.1 Strategic vs.Tactical Choices 465

13.2 The Stackelberg Game 467

13.2.1 Stackelberg Equilibrium 468

13.3 Entry Deterrence 473

13.3.1 Constant Returns to Scale 473

13.3.2 Economies of Scale 474

13.4 Introduction to Entry Games 478

13.4.1 Limit Pricing 478

13.4.2 A Stylized Entry Game 479

13.5 Chapter Summary 481

13.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 482

14 Entry Deterrence 485

14.1 The Role of Investment in Entry Deterrence 487

14.1.1 Dixit s Model of Entry Deterrence 488

14.1.2 Strategic Investment and Monopolization 504

14.2 Contestable Markets 507

14.2.1 Logical Possibility 509

14.2.2 Robustness 510

14.2.3 Empirical Relevance 512

14.2.4 Contestability and Barriers to Entry 512

14.3.1 Positive Definitions of Barriers to Entry 513

14.3 Entry Barriers 513

14.3.2 An Assessment of Barriers to Entry 514

14.3.3 Normative Definitions of Entry Barriers 517

14.4 Chapter Summary 518

14.5 Suggestions for Further Reading 519

15 Strategic Behavior:Principles 525

15.1 Two-Stage Games 526

15.2 Strategic Accommodation 532

15.3 Strategic Entry Deterrence 535

15.4 The Welfare Effects of Strategic Competition 538

15.5 Chapter Summary 539

15.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 540

16.1 Learning by Doing 543

16 Strategic Behavior:Applications 543

16.1.1 Learning with Price Competition 546

16.1.2 Learning and Entry Deterrence 546

16.2 Switching Costs 546

16.2.1 Strategic Manipulation of an Installed Base of Customers 547

16.2.2 Incorporating New Buyers 549

16.2.3 Endogenous Switching Costs 549

16.3 Vertical Separation 550

16.4 Tying 551

16.5 Strategic Trade Policy Ⅰ:Export Subsidies to Regional Jets 552

16.6 Strategic Trade Policy Ⅱ:The Kodak-Fujifilm Case 553

16.7 Managerial Incentives 554

16.8 Research and Development 555

16.10 Chapter Summary 556

16.9 The Coase Conjecture Revisited 556

16.11 Suggestions for Further Reading 557

17 Advertising and Oligopoly 561

17.1 Normative vs.Positive Issues:The Welfare Economics of Advertising 562

17.2 Positive Issues:Theoretical Analysis of Advertising and Oligopoly 563

17.2.1 Advertising as an Exogenous Sunk Cost 563

17.2.2 Advertising as an Endogenous Sunk Cost 565

17.2.3 Cooperative and Predatory Advertising 566

17.3 Advertising and Strategic Entry Deterrence 567

17.4 A More General Treatment of Strategic Advertising:Direct vs.Indirect Effects 567

17.5 Positive Issues:Advertising and Oligopoly Empirics 569

17.6 Chapter Summary 571

17.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 571

18 Research and Development 575

18.1 A Positive Analysis:Strategic R＆D 577

18.2 Market Structure and Incentives for R＆D 578

18.2.1 A More Careful View of Market Structure 581

18.2.2 Patent Races 582

18.2.3 Stochastic Patent Races 585

18.2.4 Product Innovation and Patent Races 586

18.3 Normative Analysis:The Economics of Patents 588

18.3.1 Other Forms of Intellectual Property Protection:Copyrights and Trademarks 591

18.4 Chapter Summary 592

18.5 Suggestions for Further Reading 593

Ⅴ Issues in Antitrust Economics 597

19 The Theory of the Market 599

19.1.1 Economic Markets 601

19.1 The Concept of a Market 601

19.1.2 Antitrust Markets 602

19.2 Antitrust Markets:The Search for Market Power 603

19.2.1 Market Power and Antitrust 603

19.2.2 Market Power and Market Shares 604

19.2.3 The Importance of Demand Elasticities 605

19.2.4 Critical Elasticities of Demand 607

19.2.5 Break-Even Elasticities of Demand 608

19.2.6 Recent Developments:Innovation Markets 612

19.3 The Practice of Market Definition 612

19.3.1 Demand Elasticities 612

19.3.2 The Structural Approach 613

19.3.4 Qualitative Evaluative Criteria 616

19.3.3 Shipment Flows 616

19.4 Antitrust Markets in Monopolization Cases:The Cellophane Fallacy 617

19.4.1 The Cellophane Fallacy and Mergers 618

19.5 Chapter Summary 618

19.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 619

20 Exclusionary Strategies Ⅰ: Raising Rivals Costs 625

20.1 A Simple Model of Raising Rivals Costs 626

20.2 The Salop and Scheffman Model:Raising the Costs of a Competitive Fringe 628

20.3 Accommodation vs.Deterrence Strategies 630

20.4 A More General Treatment of Raising Rivals Costs:Direct vs.Indirect Effects 634

20.5 Reducing Rivals Revenue 635

20.6 Raising Rivals Costs in Antitrust 639

20.7 Chapter Summary 639

20.8 Suggestions for Further Reading 640

21 Exclusionary Strategies Ⅱ: Predatory Pricing 643

21.1 The Classic Chicago Attack on Predation 645

21.2 Rational Theories of Predation 647

21.2.1 The Long Purse 648

21.2.2 Reputation Models 649

21.2.3 Signaling Models of Predation 653

21.2.4 Softening Up the Victim 653

21.2.5 Predation in Learning and Network Industries 653

21.3 Empirical Evidence on Predation 654

21.3.1 Case Studies 655

21.3.2 Experimental Evidence 658

21.4 Predation in Antitrust 659

21.4.1 Areeda-Turner and Cost-Based Definitions of Predation 659

21.4.2 Major Antitrust Cases 661

21.5 Chapter Summary 662

21.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 662

21.7 Appendix:An Introduction to Games of Incomplete Information 670

21.7.1 Bayesian Games 670

21.7.2 Extensive-Form Bayesian Games with Observable Actions 672

21.7.3 Multiple but Finite Numbers of Victims in the Extortion Game 677

22 Vertical Integration and Vertical Restraints 683

22.1 Incentives for Vertical Merger(Vertical Integration) 684

22.1.1 Transaction Economies 684

22.1.2 Vertical Integration to Avoid Double Marginalization 685

22.1.3 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:Fixed Proportions 686

22.1.4 Vertical Integration with Perfect Competition Downstream:Variable Proportions 687

22.2 Vertical Restraints 688

22.2.1 Restraints on Intrabrand Competition 690

22.2.2 Alternative Explanations of RPM and Exclusive Territorial Restrictions 694

22.2.3 RPM,Exclusive Territories,and Welfare 694

22.2.4 Antitrust Policy toward RPM and Exclusive Territories 695

22.3 Contractual Exclusivity 696

22.3.1 Tying Arrangements 696

22.3.2 Exclusive Dealing 704

22.4 Chapter Summary 707

22.5 Suggestions for Further Reading 708

22.6 Appendix:Price versus Non-Price Competition in the Winter Model 711

23 Horizontal Mergers 715

23.1 A Partial-Equilibrium Analysis of Horizontal Mergers 717

23.1.2 The Use of the Herfindahl Index in Merger Analysis 718

23.1.1 Price versus Efficiency:The Williamson Trade Off 718

23.2 Equilibrium with Nonmerging Firms:A More General Analysis 720

23.2.1 Mergers in Differentiated Markets 722

23.3 The Coordinated Effects of Mergers 724

23.4 Entry 725

23.5 Mergers:The Antitrust Framework 726

23.5.1 Merger Guidelines 726

23.5.2 Market Definition 726

23.5.3 Innovation Markets 727

23.5.4 Entry and Product Repositioning 728

23.5.5 Efficiencies:A Growing Emphasis 729

23.5.6 Methodology:The Growing Role of Simulation in Antitrust Analysis 732

23.6 Chapter Summary 738

23.7 Suggestions for Further Reading 739

23.8 Appendix:Bertrand Equilibrium with Three Differentiated Products 741

Ⅵ Issues in Regulatory Economics 745

24 Rationale for Regulation 747

24.1 Public Interest Justifications for Regulatory Intervention 750

24.1.1 The Market Failure Test 752

24.1.2 Natural Monopoly 752

24.1.3 Large Specific Investments 765

24.2 The Economic Theories of Regulation 769

24.2.1 The Theory of Economic Regulation 769

24.2.2 Explaining Regulation Using a Principal-Agent Approach 772

24.3 Chapter Summary 775

24.4 Suggestions for Further Reading 777

24.5 Appendix:Subadditivity and Multiproduct Firms 781

25 Optimal Pricing for Natural Monopoly 785

25.1 Efficient Pricing by a Single-Product Natural Monopolist 786

25.1.1 First-Best Pricing 786

25.1.2 Second-Best Pricing:Ramsey Prices 788

25.1.3 First-vs.Second-Best Pricing 788

25.2 Multiproduct Natural Monopoly 788

25.2.1 Ramsey Pricing 789

25.3 Peak-Load Pricing 801

25.3.1 A Simple Illustrative Model of Peak-Load Pricing 802

25.3.2 Optimal Capacity 806

25.3.3 Discussion of Peak-Load Pricing 808

25.4 Multipart Tariffs 810

25.4.1 Two Common Examples of Multipart Tariffs 812

25.4.2 The Coase Result 814

25.4.3 N-Part Tariffs and a Menu of Two-Part Tariffs 817

25.4.4 Pareto-Dominating Block Tariffs 817

25.5 Chapter Summary 821

25.6 Suggestions for Further Reading 822

26 Issues in Regulation 829

26.1 Regulation under Asymmetric Information 831

26.1.1 The Full-Information Benchmark 831

26.1.2 Asymmetric Information:The Importance of Distributional Considerations 833

26.1.3 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism:Hidden Information 834

26.1.4 An Optimal Regulatory Mechanism:Hidden Action 838

26.1.5 Implications for Regulatory Regimes 839

26.2 Regulation in Practice 840

26.2.1 Cost-of-Service Regulation 841

26.2.2 An Assessment of COS Regulation 847

26.2.3 Summary of Cost-of-Service Regulation 852

26.2.4 Incentive Regulation 852

26.2.5 Guidelines for Regulation 860

26.3 Regulatory Reform in Network Industries 861

26.3.1 Why Regulated Firms Should Be Kept Out of Unregulated Markets 863

26.3.2 Access Pricing and Interconnection 871

26.3.3 The Interconnection Problem 871

26.3.4 The Efficient Component Pricing Rule 872

26.3.5 Optimal Access Pricing 873

26.4 Chapter Summary 877

26.5 Suggestions for Further Reading 879

A.1.1 The Sherman Act 889

A.1 Antitrust in the United States 889

Appendix The Legal Framework of Antitrust Enforcement 889

A.1.2 The Clayton Act 891

A.1.3 Enforcement in the U.S 891

A.2 Competition Policy in Canada 895

A.2.1 Criminal Provisions in the Competition Act 895

A.2.2 The Director of Research and Investigation 896

A.2.3 Noncriminal Reviewable Offenses 896

A.3 Competition Policy of the European Union 897

A.3.1 Enforcement in the EU 898

A.4 Suggestions for Further Reading 899

Selected Solutions for Odd Numbered Questions 901

Index of Names 909

Subject Index 915